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REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

November 30, 1984

Canada

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Advisory Committee to the Solicitor General of Canada on the Management of Correctional Institutions | Comité consultatif chargé par le Solliciteur général du Canada d'étudier la gestion des établissements correctionnels

November 30, 1984

The Honourable Elmer MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P.
Solicitor General of Canada

Dear Minister:

We respectfully submit the report of your Advisory Committee on the Management of Correctional Institutions.

John J. Carson
Chairman

Claude Edwards

Claude Bouchard

Patricia Ware
Patricia Ware

Chester Cunningham

William Westlake

Chairman
Président : John Carson

Members : Claude Bouchard, Chester Cunningham
Membres : Claude Edwards, Patricia Ware, William Westlake

Executive Secretary
Secrétaire général : Frank Porporino, Ph.D.

Canada

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PREFACE

A flurry of violent incidents has once again drawn attention to the operation of The Correctional Service of Canada. This is understandable, yet we question whether a correctional service should be noticed and judged primarily for what goes wrong.

Our Committee began its work from a position that we should seek to evaluate not just the weaknesses or faults of the Correctional Service of Canada; an objective assessment must consider also the many things that go right. In a large penal service such as we have in this country, with 62 institutions operating at different levels of security and housing some of the most violent and incorrigible individuals in society, something will inevitably go wrong somewhere at some time.

We agree with correctional practitioners and scholars that there are no simple organizational solutions to eliminate violence in prisons; that it results from a complex interaction of factors related to both the nature of incarcerated individuals and the experience of imprisonment; and that considering the limits of our knowledge regarding how to deal with violent individuals, society must realistically expect that some degree of violence in our prisons may continue to erupt periodically.

On the other hand, the need to actively seek ways to reduce violence in prisons cannot be overstated. With the broader criminal justice system working toward the principle of incarceration as a last resort, our federal penitentiaries will face an accumulation of more long term, more violent, and more disturbed offenders. As the struggle for survival in prisons becomes more acute, violence-prone attitudes and behavior may be intensified. In the long run, protection of society is not served if some offenders are changed for the worse by the conditions of imprisonment. Almost all of these individuals will someday be returning to society. Until a better solution is found, correctional officials must strive to meet the challenge of a more turbulent correctional reality, attending always to the need to maintain safe and just prison environments, for both staff and inmates. The relationships that develop between staff and inmates are at the heart of corrections and we firmly believe that effective programming and control will ultimately flow from getting those relationships right.

The Committee hopes that the package of proposals that are outlined in this report will set the groundwork for the Service to move into a period of revitalization. As our work progressed, we were encouraged by the apparently growing acceptance for our ideas. We would like to plead for the continued support and wholehearted cooperation that will be needed at all levels of the Service if our recommendations are to be fully implemented. Curbing the incidence of violence is a major goal to which all staff and all levels of management must subscribe and contribute. We trust they will.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Advisory Committee to the Solicitor General on the Management of Correctional Institutions was commissioned on July 27, 1984. It was created in the wake of three studies related to suicide and violence in The Correctional Service of Canada; the Atlantic Suicide Study, the Study on Murder and Assaults in the Ontario Region, and the Correctional Investigator's Inquiry into the aftermath of the 1982 Archambault riot.

In general, the Committee was asked to review the management of the Correctional Service of Canada in light of these reports, examine how institutions are run, how programs are delivered and make any other pertinent observations. The detailed terms of reference are included in the report as Appendix A.

The Committee was composed of six members, introduced in the Minister's Press Release as follows:

John Carson, Chairman -- Mr. Carson is professor of human resource management, University of Ottawa, and former Chairman of the Public Service Commission of Canada.

Claude Bouchard -- Mr. Bouchard has held several major positions in the Canadian criminal justice system, including Vice-Chairman of the National Parole Board, Assistant Deputy Warden of a federal penitentiary, and Associate Secretary of the Canadian Committee on Corrections.

Chester Cunningham -- Mr. Cunningham is Executive Director of the Native Counselling Services of Alberta, an organization concerned with Natives in conflict with the law.

Claude Edwards -- Mr. Edwards is a former member of the Public Service Staff Relations Board and former President of the Public Service Alliance of Canada.

Patricia Ware -- Mrs. Ware is a Director of the John Howard Society of British Columbia and the Elizabeth Fry Society of British Columbia. She is familiar with The Correctional Service of Canada's institutions on the West Coast.

William Westlake -- Mr. Westlake, recently retired, was a career member of The Correctional Service of Canada and was the Service's first Senior Deputy Commissioner.

At our Committee's first formal meeting on August 7, 1984, we established a work plan that would enable us to meet the reporting date of November 30, 1984.

We also established a small administrative and research staff which included: Frank Porporino, Executive Secretary; Martine Larocque, Administrative Assistant; Robin McGee, Research Assistant; Jacqueline Grenier, Receptionist/Word Processor Operator and Ted Tunis, Colin Freebury, and Robert Tompkins of the Bureau of Management Consulting.

By necessity, our review of the management and operation of the Service has proceeded as a broad sweep rather than as a detailed investigation.

In addition to analyzing extensive documentation pertaining to particular issues, the Committee gathered information and views from a wide array of correctional specialists. We welcomed briefs from various criminal justice organizations and volunteer groups across the country. Many of these submissions were excellent. We also met with correctional experts from other jurisdictions and interviewed a range of former senior officials of the Service to assist us in developing a historical perspective.

We met with the Auditor General of Canada and with representatives from Treasury Board, the Office of the Comptroller General, and the Public Service Commission to obtain a central agency overview of the management of the Correctional Service of Canada. We met with the former Solicitor General, the Honourable Mr. Robert Kaplan, and had discussions with the Deputy Solicitor General and the Chairman of the National Parole Board. We were also briefed extensively by the Commissioner and Executive Management Committee of The Correctional Service of Canada, and met individually with most of the senior managers at National Headquarters, and with the former and current Inspectors General.

The Committee decided that it was important to visit as many institutions as possible and consult with a broad spectrum of individuals at the operational level. Members visited 28 institutions, a number of parole offices, the various branches of the national staff training college, and each of the Regional Headquarters of both The Correctional Service of Canada and the National Parole Board. We toured institutions at all levels of security and observed staff and inmates at work and in recreational areas and vocational or educational training programs. We also visited a number of specialized facilities within the Service such as regional treatment centres, Special Handling Units and minimum security farm operations.

At each institution, we met with the Warden, the Assistant Wardens, the Inmate Committee and other inmate groups, as well as representatives of the Union of Solicitor General Employees and the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada. We also met with members of local Citizens' Advisory Committees and with their National Executive in Ottawa. At the Regional Headquarters, we met with the Regional Deputy Commissioners and the various functional managers. Overall, we interviewed more than 300 line staff and some 50 Regional Managers.

To supplement our evaluation of the three reports we were asked to review, we met with Dr. J. Vantour, the Chairman of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults in the Ontario Region, with Dr. E.H. Botterell, the Chairman of the Study Team on Suicides in the Atlantic Region, and with Mr. R. Stewart, the Correctional Investigator.

The consultations proved most valuable. Issues and concerns that related to our mandate were addressed in a frank and thoughtful manner. Although differences were apparent, consistent views were expressed on a number of policy and management questions.

We recognize that no outside committee can be omniscient, no matter how diligently it seeks to inform itself. However, we conclude that in most respects The Correctional Service of Canada is functioning well.

We were impressed with the significant advances that have been made since the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, in 1977, described the Correctional Service of Canada as being in a "state of crisis". International standards for the provision of services have been met or exceeded. Numerous policies and safeguards have been implemented that are consistent with a "duty to act fairly". These have greatly increased openness and accountability. It is apparent that over the past few years The Correctional Service of Canada has been effectively transformed into an organization that is professionally managed with systems and controls to ensure responsible and efficient expenditure of resources.

At the same time, our analysis of the recent evolution of the Service, and our assessment of the attitudes and concerns of institutional staff, suggest that a turning point has been reached.

In contrast to the observations of the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee, we did not sense widespread overt hostility or deep distrust between staff and inmates, or between staff and management. We were struck with the degree of job satisfaction, commitment and team spirit that we noted among many staff. However, frustrations stemming from a combination of factors that are affecting institutional operations were clearly and consistently articulated.

The Committee noted convincing evidence that the very administrative controls and organizational structure which allowed steadfast progress to be made could now be adversely affecting staff morale and jeopardizing the achievement of the dual objectives of humane custody and effective programming.

Whether or not a correctional system continues to work well and improve depends, in the final analysis, on the attitude and morale of correctional staff and on the quality of relations that develop between staff and inmates.

The Committee firmly believes that if the Service continues in its centralized management orientation, the quality of relations and involvement between staff and inmates will deteriorate. In this regard, we share many of the observations of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults in the Ontario Region and agree that some fundamental changes in management practices are needed in order to address some of the sources of violence in our federal institutions.

We are not oblivious to the fact that there are financial implications arising from our recommendations. We have not had the time nor the resources to cost proposed changes. However, we intuitively feel that there will be significant benefits, particularly a reduction in the incalculable "human costs" of prison violence.

Our report is structured as follows. Chapter II reviews the evolution of the management of the Correctional Service of Canada from 1960 to the present. This gives an important perspective to the observations we make throughout the report.

In Chapter III, we examine the management of corrections today and offer recommendations for some organizational improvements.

Chapter IV addresses the Committee's concern about the violence which has characterized many institutions in recent years. We offer some recommendations which will reduce institutional unrest.

Appendices to this report include a study we commissioned to analyze the work load of Wardens, and an overview of the status of the recommendations of the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System.

We wish to thank all those individuals who offered their helpful assistance throughout the course of our work.

In particular, we would like to identify Lucien Gosselin, our liaison officer with The Correctional Service of Canada; and our own remarkable administrative, research and consultant team who put this all together.

CHAPTER II

A HISTORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, 1960 TO 1984

This chapter presents a brief history of the management of the federal correctional service during the past 25 years. It is based on interviews with a number of present and retired employees, and a review of annual reports, management studies, major inquiries and other related documentation. Among those interviewed were Commissioners Allen MacLeod, Paul Faguy and Donald Yeomans, and former heads of security, personnel and inmate programs.

Public organizations typically move through stages whereby the focus of management concerns shifts from issues related to mandate and program goals, to others related to regulation and control. The recent history of The Correctional Service of Canada shows that it is no exception. Although there have been common management concerns, three distinct stages are apparent - reform, adjustment, and control.

Reform: 1960 to 1969

Prior to 1960, the Canadian Penitentiary Service was led and organized according to a para-military model intended to perform a largely custodial and punitive role. During the 1950s, renewed interest in inmate reform led the government to form a Correctional Planning Committee to design a new program and organization. The Committee's report stressed the rehabilitation of inmates through "scientific" techniques, and the value of well selected, well trained, and career-oriented staff. It became the basis for a revision of the Penitentiary Act and Regulations in 1962 and far-reaching changes in the Service, including:

- construction of diversified and geographically dispersed institutions;
- reorganization on a functional basis at all levels;
- establishment of regional directorates; and
- classification and assignment of inmates to appropriate institutions.

The Chairman of the Correctional Planning Committee and author of its report, Allen J. MacLeod, was appointed Commissioner of the Penitentiary Service in 1960. He was given a clear mandate by the Minister of Justice, the Honourable E.D. Fulton, to implement the Committee's recommendations, particularly in view of the "alarming rate" of increase in the number of inmates, including juveniles.

To facilitate management, a second member of the Planning Committee, Colonel J.R. Stone, was appointed to the newly created position of Deputy Commissioner. Thus, Mr. MacLeod was able to delegate responsibility for operations and devote himself to explaining and gaining support for the proposed changes to the organization.

The key to Mr. MacLeod's success as Commissioner was his commitment to ideals and his engaging inter-personal style. He believed in prison reform as a righteous cause which should involve all levels of the Service and society. Accordingly, in a radical departure from previous practice, Mr. MacLeod spent a large share of his time away from National Headquarters meeting with institutional staff; inmates; and community, professional and political representatives to discuss problems and ideas. Wardens and, later on, Regional Directors were made part of the process of change through regularly scheduled conferences and special committees to review the implementation of plans.

A major concern of the Correctional Planning Committee was that the relatively small proportion of inmates (about 30%) who were considered serious security risks should be housed separately from those most likely to benefit from more relaxed living conditions and rehabilitation programs. Consequently, a construction plan was prepared which would provide each region with a reception centre; medical and psychiatric hospital facilities; a special detention unit; institutions of maximum, medium and minimum-level security, and the required administrative components. In 1963, Cabinet approved a "Ten-year Development Plan", with the stated premise that "the mainspring of corrections is the exercise of proper human relationships between correctional staff and inmates."

By that time four medium and 15 minimum-level security institutions had been opened, and two institutions had been converted from maximum to medium-level security. In comparison, five years earlier there was a total complement of only nine maximum-level institutions.

Furthermore, steps were taken to make inmate living conditions more like those outside institutions. "Home-like" visiting arrangements and more "civilian-like" clothing were introduced for guards as well as inmates, evening hours were freed for social activities, and recreation programs involving people from the community were extended.

During the second half of the decade, however, a number of external factors detracted from the implementation of the development plan. First, the inmate population started to decline from the peak reached in 1964. As a result, the Service was unable to use several hundred allocated person-years. Treasury Board expressed concern that the building program was too ambitious and, therefore, plans for several institutions were halted. This was followed by a staffing freeze as part of a government-wide economy measure in 1969.

Second, in 1966, a new Department of the Solicitor General was formed with the intention of achieving a measure of coordination between certain elements of the Criminal Justice System. The Penitentiary Service was separated from the Department of Justice and made part of the new Department along with the National Parole Board and the RCMP.

Third, management-staff relationships were changed. By 1967, the Treasury Board had assumed the role of employer, and employee unions were certified as the Public Service Staff Relations Act was applied to the Penitentiary Service. In 1969, the Public Service Employment Act also was applied to the Service and the Public Service Commission became its appointing authority.

Fourth, the rehabilitation function of the Penitentiary Service came into dispute. On one hand, some maintained there was insufficient emphasis given to rehabilitation. For example, in 1967, a special joint committee of Parliament recommended a delay in the construction of additional maximum security institutions until the Canadian Penitentiary Service prepared:

> ... a detailed statement of the program it proposes to conduct in such institutions, with particular reference to programming directed to behavioral change, and that every effort be made to relate requirements ... to the best knowledge available concerning programming for behavioral change in the correctional context. (p.402)

On the other hand, the application of psychological and social work techniques in prisons was being severely criticized as being unethical and ineffective. The professional literature contained many articles reflecting this view, as in an article titled the "Tyranny of Treatment" in the April, 1968 issue of the Canadian Journal of Corrections, which began with the statement that:

> During the last few decades ... persons with a "treatment" orientation have been gaining more and more authority in the administration of correctional programs; on the other (hand), research has been establishing with greater and greater precision the ineffectiveness of the methods which they espouse. (p.378)

In 1969, the Canadian Committee on Corrections, chaired by Mr. Justice Roger Ouimet, noted in its report "mounting evidence that treatment in the community may frequently be much more effective" than in penitentiaries. And, although the Committee's report generally supported continued efforts to rehabilitate inmates in penitentiaries, this, and other, statements of doubt reflected a growing uncertainty of purpose.

Consequently, by 1969, the spirit of change which characterized the Penitentiary Service during the previous decade had faded. Humanitarian concerns, the master development plan, and Mr. MacLeod's enlightened, entrepreneurial style of leadership had brought the Penitentiary Service into the modern era. But this approach to correctional management was unable to cope with all of the changes. In effect, a stage of organization reform and growth was ending. A stage of adjustment was beginning.

Adjustment: 1970 to 1977

A new Commissioner, Paul Faguy, was appointed in 1970. One of his first priorities was to address the criticisms which had been leveled at the Service for its failure to rehabilitate inmates. Accordingly, an Associate Deputy Commissioner position was created with combined responsibility for inmate training, treatment and security and "evaluation of the effectiveness of existing programs in line with modern correctional theory". John Braithwaite was appointed to the position. Mr. Braithwaite had an M.S.W., had been Warden of a provincial correctional institution in British Columbia, and had written the part of the Committee on Corrections' report dealing with prisons.

Under Mr. Faguy's leadership, a number of initiatives were undertaken to further liberalize inmate living conditions and privileges, and to do away with overt measures of control and punishment: numbers were removed from inmate clothing; all restrictions on the number of letters an inmate was permitted to write or receive were lifted; and corporal punishment and the use of diets for punishment were abolished.

Programs were developed further in the direction of group and community-based treatment. For example, the Living Unit concept, involving the assignment of non-uniformed staff to work closely with small groups of inmates, was implemented at several medium-security institutions by 1971. In the same year, community-based residential centres were given contracts to accommodate certain offenders.

At about the same time, however, the overriding priority in the Service became again the problem of overcrowding. Inmate numbers were rising and, by 1973, would reach the 1964 peak. Moreover, there was a noticeable increase in the number of difficult and dangerous offenders, drugs were beginning to become an aspect of prison life, and inmates were becoming more and more militant in demanding rights and privileges. All of this was happening in the context of a shortage of facilities and staff, due to the earlier decision to cut back on the construction program and staffing.

The situation came to a head in 1971 when a major riot took place at Kingston Penitentiary. During the next five years there followed an unprecedented series of serious disturbances which caused increasing political pressure for action. The Service responded by postponing the closing of some older institutions, trying to acquire more facilities quickly, and attempting to speed up the parole process. In addition, specialized capabilities were expanded, as evidenced in the growth of Security Operations.

The first Security Directorate was created at National Headquarters in 1971. To begin with, the Director's primary role was to plan and oversee an increase in static security measures, particularly the installation of gun towers and double-fencing at medium-level institutions. This was followed by the development of five-man tactical support teams at each Regional Headquarters, the introduction of new weapons, the development of new procedures for managing crises such as hostage takings, and the establishment of a Crisis Centre at National Headquarters. Such initiatives involved the development of new directives and instructions, the expenditure of large amounts of additional funding, and the hiring and training of more staff, which in turn required more supervision. By 1976, the Security Directorate had expanded to a Branch with thirty staff, under two Directors and a Deputy Commissioner.

The same process of rapid growth in role and size took place in other areas of the organization. In 1973, the Solicitor General created the Office of the Correctional Investigator to act as inmate ombudsperson. The following year, the Service implemented formal inmate grievance procedures. Two years later a Directorate of Inmate Affairs was established.

Also in 1973, steps were taken to deal more effectively with the media attention arising from prison violence and to promote the initiatives being taken by the Service. The small Information Services Division was reorganized and expanded into three sections.

The Personnel Division (which prior to 1967 comprised only a Chief and a secretary, plus a few pay clerks for Headquarters staff) was enlarged to a Branch to deal better with the unions, improve human resource management, and implement government personnel rules and regulations.

The growth in size and number of functional units at National Headquarters was matched in the regions. Overall, the increase in establishment of the Service and in the number of inmates grew as shown in the following chart. Person-year estimates and number of inmates on register are as of the beginning of each fiscal year. The Regional Headquarters figures include provision for about 35 person-years at staff colleges.

	1968/69	1976/77	% Increase
National Headquarters	161	316	96%
Regional Headquarters	265	684	158%
Institutions	4,695	7,410	58%
Total Staff	5,121	8,410	64%
Number of Inmates	7,027	8,971	28%

In addition to the priorities discussed above - program development and coping with overpopulation and crises - management undertook to develop a new organization role and structure. In 1973, the Solicitor General appointed a Task Force to plan an integrated Federal Corrections Service, including the Canadian Penitentiary Service and the National Parole Service. The work of the Task Force extended to preparing an action plan for decentralization and to reformulating the traditional role and responsibilities of the federal government in corrections.

Extensive management studies resulted in a number of recommendations for the decentralization of the two Services. Under the direction of a new Commissioner, André Therrien, appointed in 1975, and in anticipation of the proposed Federal Corrections Agency, the recommendations regarding regional offices were adopted and assigned to a newly formed Operation Planning Division for implementation. Subsequently, a number of divisions proceeded to delegate operational authority.

In the view of the Task Force, the "rehabilitative ideal" had raised unattainable expectations, placed unrealistic pressures on the correctional staff, and allowed the community to avoid accepting their share of responsibility for preparing inmates to return to society. The Task Force maintained that the offender should be "convicted and sentenced on the basis of his criminal behavior, not on the basis of some underlying personality disorder or deprived socio-economic condition". (p.71)

> By implying that the offender is "sick" through causes beyond his own control, this approach minimizes the offender's responsibility for his own criminal behavior. The approach gives correctional practitioners a strong inducement to employ coercion in the guise of humane treatment, and enforce participation in treatment programs as a requisite to release... . The resulting distrust among offenders of the institutional treatment program further undermines the possibility of effecting fundamental behavioral change. (p.27)

Therefore, the Task Force recommended a new approach, to be called the Opportunities Model, whereby responsibility for improved attitudes and behavior was to be shifted from the Service to the individual offender. Programs to prepare offenders for their return to society were to be developed by institutional and community (Parole Service) staff together with the inmate, on a contractual basis.

The report of the Integration Task Force was submitted to the Senior Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC), chaired by the Deputy Solicitor General, and made public by the Solicitor General in March, 1977. Subsequently, the Penitentiary Service and Parole Service were integrated into the Correctional Service of Canada.

As the Task Force was concluding its work, a series of events occurred which were to affect the implementation of its recommendations on programming and decentralization.

In 1976, three more riots took place at separate institutions, to cap off the series of violent incidents which had begun in 1971. Alarmed at the continued incidence of violence, Parliament approved the formation of a Sub-Committee to study the Penitentiary Service and make recommendations to bring matters under control.

In its report, published a year later, the Parliamentary Sub-Committee stated that a crisis existed which "could only be met by the immediate implementation of large-scale reforms". (A summary of the Sub-Committee's recommendations, and the Service's action on these, can be found in Appendix B of this report.) As a basis for reform, the following principles of management were recommended:

1. A central aim of the decentralization of the system should be to decrease bureaucracy and increase line staff as much as possible.

2. Authority to take or initiate action should be delegated, or assigned in the first instance, as close to the level of action as possible.

3. When authority is delegated, responsibility and accountability must follow.

4. Penitentiaries must be under the control of management at all times.

They also declared that, with regard to programs:

> Only the wrongdoer can bring about reform in himself, since he is responsible for his own behavior; but the penitentiary system must be structured to give positive support to his efforts by providing certain essential conditions: discipline, justice, work, academic and vocational training, and socialization. (p.160)

Shortly following publication of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's report, Commissioner Therrien died. In many ways, his death marked the passing of another stage of organization development.

From 1970 to 1977, the management of the Penitentiary Service had attempted to deal with an overpopulation of inmates, to develop new approaches to treatment, to respond to and stop violence at the institutions, to apply discipline under the terms and conditions of newly defined staff-management and inmate-staff relationships, and to decentralize and delegate authority to the field. It was too much. The essentially consultative and non-directive leadership style of senior management, and the shortage of relevant management skills throughout the organization during this period, meant it could not cope with the incessant crises, political pressures and conflicts between interest groups.

Control: 1978 to 1984

In late 1977, a new Commissioner, Donald R. Yeomans, was appointed with a mandate to bring the Correctional Service under control. Notably, this was a mandate not inconsistant with the government-wide move to greater control, arising out of the recommendations of the Auditor General and the

Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. One of Mr. Yeomans' first moves was to create the position of Senior Deputy Commissioner, to which he appointed Bill Westlake, a highly respected officer with experience at all levels of the organization. In this way, he was able to focus on the critical issue of corporate controls, as well as compensate for his own limited experience with corrections.

Impressed with the need for the Service to develop an improved data base, Mr. Yeomans upgraded the Planning Directorate to a Branch and appointed a new Deputy Commissioner with a strong background in information systems. Soon after, there followed a major revision of the inmate population forecasting methodology, and a cost-benefit analysis and program-impact study of construction plans. The latter resulted in a considerable reduction in cost estimates.

Further to a recommendation of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, the Management Review Directorate was upgraded to a Branch under the direction of an Inspector General. He soon assumed responsibility for the supervision of a process of accrediting institutions according to the standards of the American Correctional Association.

The Commissioner decided that the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's recommendation that Wardens report directly to him was impractical, due to the large and growing number of institutions. Wardens continued to report to Regional Directors, as had been the case since 1974, but they were given an enhanced formal role in policy making equal to that of the Heads of functional branches. Henceforth, Regional Heads, as well as some Functional Heads, would be known as Deputy Commissioners, and both would participate equally in the Senior Management Committee. The full Committee began to meet in Ottawa on a monthly basis, and weekly on a telephone conference line. A formal system was implemented for the tracking and control of all Committee decisions.

The inmate assessment process was standardized and codified in the Case Management Manual developed in 1978. Three years later the Manual was revised and Regional Reception Centres were dropped from the process, except in Quebec, and the Penitentiary Placement Report and Security Classification Review Matrix were introduced. Thereafter, inmates were to be assessed by a Parole Service Officer at the detention site following sentencing, and by a Case Management Team at the institution six months after arrival, and then at least on an annual basis. It was intended that data from this process would be used in the planning of facilities and programs on a national basis, once automated systems and technology were available.

The implementation of a national policy on protective custody was another initiative designed to take advantage of the eventual availability of automated data systems. Inmates requiring special protection from the general population were becoming a particular problem as their number increased to about nine per cent of the population by 1982, thereby putting pressure on existing facilities. The Offender Programs Branch developed a new policy that permitted the transfer of inmates at risk between regions to institutions where they could function in the open population. Such transfers required centralized decisions based on data regarding the inmate, the antagonists and available, "safe" space.

These and many other initiatives served to organize the Service to the extent that (in marked contrast to the report of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee) studies by the newly established Comptroller General in 1979 and by the Auditor General in 1981 found no major problems with the management of the Service. In fact, both the Comptroller General and the Auditor General were highly pleased with the steps taken to plan, control and report on the use of resources, and encouraged the Service to continue developments, with particular emphasis on financial information systems.

On the program side, in 1978 responsibility for implementation of the Opportunities Model recommended by the Integration Task Force was assigned to the newly formed Offender Programs Branch. Renewed emphasis was given to the Living Unit program and initiatives were undertaken to develop more community-based and education programmes, such as literacy and life skills training. A university education program was developed, partly based on an earlier pilot project at the University of Victoria and partially funded by the Donner Foundation. There was increasing emphasis on Individual Program Plans (IPP), a contractual concept developed jointly by community (Parole Service) and institutional case management staff.

Other recommendations of the Integration Task Force were not implemented. Decentralization and the delegation of operational authority to the institutional level had been planned on the basis of an extensive staff training program designed to include all levels of the Service and provincial counterparts. Without vastly improved skills, the Task Force argued, institutional staff and managers would be unable to plan, direct and account for the increasingly complex financial and human resources under their control. However, the planned staff training program never took place, instead, management became preoccupied with other priorities: the development of control systems, confrontational aspects of management-union relationships, and a defensive reaction to the serious criticisms of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and subsequent media attacks.

Despite all the efforts of senior management to implement controls within the correctional system, the Service was struck again by the problem of overcrowding. The construction program had been delayed in 1979/80 due to two changes in government, and government restraint programs cut back the number of staff. In 1981 and 1982, there was a sudden surge in the number of inmates and a significant increase in the number of minor and major disturbances, including the Archambault riot, one of the worst in Canadian history. The number of inmate and staff grievances, and inmate suicides and murders rose steeply. Once more, the Service was forced to scramble to acquire additional space and speed inmates through the system.

In 1984, a group chaired by Dr. J. Vantour was formed to study 7 inmate murders and 21 serious assaults in the previous year at three institutions in Ontario. In their view, the most fundamental contributing factor to inmate violence at the high-security level institutions under study was the "lack of meaningful communication - both between management and staff and between staff and inmates". This they attributed to a "non-interventionist approach - the normalization of the inmate's life - which has been translated into a lack of a sense of purpose; and the requirements for accountability with resulting decline of local autonomy and the perception of staff as powerless ... ." (p.77)

The Vantour report, and two others released about the same time - one on a series of inmate suicides in the Atlantic region, and another on the Archambault riot - prompted the Solicitor General to initiate the current review of management of the Service.

Since 1978, the Correctional Service of Canada has been concerned primarily with gaining control of operations and use of resources, consistent with the recommendations of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and other government-wide initiatives. To a great extent, this goal has been accomplished.

The growth of corporate systems since 1978 is reflected in the continued increase in the establishment at National Headquarters, as shown in the following table. Person-year estimates and number of inmates on register are as of the beginning of each fiscal year. The 1984-85 figure for institutions excludes 650 person-years for the Parole Service District Offices, which only became part of the Correctional Service in 1978.

	1977-78	1984-85	% Increase
National Headquarters	332	546	65%
Regional Headquarters	680	737	8%
Institutions	7,871	8,828	12%
Total Staff	8,883	10,111	14%
Total Inmates	9,208	11,682	27%

Centralized data systems have resulted in an emphasis on centralized decision making. Despite efforts to involve the field in the decision making process via structured consultations with Regional Deputy Commissioners, the net effect of these systems has been to involve Headquarters in operations at the institutional level. This, in turn, has raised concerns regarding the role of Wardens and their Assistants in managing institutions and, thus, in ensuring both security and program delivery.

Summary and Conclusion

From 1960 to 1984, the management of the Correctional Service of Canada has developed through stages of reform, adjustment and control, as summarized in Table 1. Generally, this has been a period of progress. For a large segment of the prison population, living conditions have improved significantly. Employee and inmate rights have been established. Some programs intended to improve the chances of inmates returning successfully to community life have been developed. There is greater coordination between institutional and parole staff. And, administrative and financial matters have been brought under control.

On the other hand, periodic inmate overcrowding and violence remain a problem. Program delivery has not met expectations. The Service continues to have difficulty in finding and developing suitably qualified staff. Also, the danger exists that continued emphasis on resource planning and control will detract from fulfilling the basic, twofold function of the Service: custody and security, and rehabilitation.

In view of these continuing challenges, the Service should seize the opportunity to enter a stage of revitalization, whereby it builds on past achievements and focuses anew on correctional ideals and purpose. In the next two chapters of this report, we recommend a number of principles and changes to help achieve this goal.

TABLE 1

STAGES OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, 1960-1984

	Stage	Management Concerns	Management Style	Approach to Planning	Organization Structure	Corporate Decision Making
1960-69	Reform	- Mandate - Construction - Inmate Welfare - Crowding/ Violence ('60-'64)	- Entrepreneurial - Focus on Ideals	- Comprehensive Plan	- Deputy Commissioner - Functional - Regional Directors	- Non-structured
1970-77	Adjustment	- Security - Staff Relations - Inmate Rights - Treatment - Integration with Parole Service - Crowding/ Violence ('71-'76)	- Non-Directive - Consultative - Focus on People	- Functional - Incremental	- Functional - Senior Management Committee - Regional Directors	- Non-Structured
1978-84	Control	- Planning and Control - Standardization - Program Opportunities - Technology - Crowding/ Violence ('82-'84)	- Directive - Focus on Systems and Rational Analysis	- National Norms - Data-Based Systems - Functional	- Functional - Senior Management Committee - Regional Deputy Commissioners - Executive Committee	- Structured - Data-Based - Centralized

CHAPTER III

MANAGEMENT OF CORRECTIONS TODAY

Our investigations have centered on two main issues, management of the organization and management of violence. This chapter deals with our observations and recommendations on the way the Correctional Service of Canada is managed today. We are convinced that there is a link between good management, strong leadership, and the atmosphere in correctional institutions. Furthermore, we believe that our recommendations on the management of corrections today will help reduce some of the tensions and hostility that lead to violence.

We could not help but be impressed with the scale of the Service and the range of its programs. It quickly became evident to us that our timeframe precluded an in-depth operational analysis of all aspects of the organization. We were able, however, to make certain observations, based on our visits and interviews, that appeared consistently across the country.

These observations revealed to us a corporate management style characterized by control mechanisms, centralized data-based decision making, and a homogeneous approach to the solution of institutional problems. This style was appropriate in response to the state of the Service in 1977. The organization has come a long way. We will propose that 1984 calls for a different style, and a revitalization of the management climate.

Our suggestions in this chapter are designed to prompt the Service to relinquish some of its tight controls and adopt an integrated style of management that will merge well conceived, responsive systems with a true concern for human, institutional, and regional diversity.

The Committee realized that the importance that we attached to our observations reflected our understanding of the relationship between the structure and operations of the Service and its mission and a common set of principles we collectively adopted. It may be helpful to state our observations on the mission and our principles, as they form the contextual framework for our analysis and recommendations.

Mission

The Penitentiary Regulations state that the mission of the Service is "the custody, control, correctional training, and rehabilitation of persons committed to penitentiary". Historically, this multi-faceted statement has posed a dilemma. Staff hired to work in specialized areas are bound to relate to one part of the mission more than the other. Custodial officers, for example, are more inclined to adopt the security intonations of the mission while program staff tend to recognize the rehabilitative aspects.

We were pleased to observe that there seems to be less of a problem today in integrating the two thrusts at the institutional level than had been noted in previous reports, including the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee. We were concerned, however, to detect the trend of national functional managers to create inordinate emphasis on administrative systems and controls. This often confuses, blurs and detracts from the true mission in the field.

The mission articulated in the Regulations does not reflect today's societal and operational realities. If the Service is truly to fulfill its custodial mandate and at the same time cope with the historical dilemma of how to best prepare inmates for reintroduction to society, it must continually articulate and reinforce, by precept and example, a mission that is understood and respected at all levels.

On many occasions we were exposed to a wide range of programs that the Service offers to inmates (e.g., academic, vocational, indentured apprenticeship). We were unable, in our time frame, to formally evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. We recognize, however, that programming is key to the institutional environment and the development of inmates toward eventual reintegration in the community. A clear mission must underlie such programming efforts.

We are aware of, and support, the process currently under way in the Service to clarify a formal mission statement. We urge that this be carried through to an early completion.

And now to the principles that the Committee developed in the course of its deliberations. We recognize that these are not exhaustive in terms of the whole field of corrections, but we believe that the acceptance of these principles is crucial to the revitalization of the Correctional Service of Canada at this point in its history.

The Principles

1. Corrections is a Human Enterprise

With 10,569 employees and about 12,000 inmates in custody, there are close to 23,000 human beings in daily direct involvement with the organization. Untold thousands of third parties (spouses, families, volunteers, and victims) have an additional stake in the business.

The Service's policies and operations must, first and foremost, acknowledge and analyze their impact on the human elements of the system. All the possible interfaces must be considered; staff/staff; staff/inmates; inmate/inmate; inmates/staff/community.

2. The Institution is the Keystone

The institution is the most important organizational component of Correctional Services. All components of National Headquarters and Regional Headquarters must be, and be seen to be, in existence to serve the institution. In particular, the functional elements of National Headquarters and Regional Headquarters must offer, not impose, their services.

3. The Warden Must be the Leader

   The Warden is the leader of each institution, and must have, and be seen to have, the authority to run it. At the same time, the Warden must be held accountable for his/her actions.

4. Regional and Cultural Uniqueness

   Regional and cultural uniqueness are important components of corrections and must be respected in operational decisions.

5. Good Programs are Good Security

   We feel strongly that good programs contribute to good security and to the protection of society, both while the inmate is incarcerated and after release. At the same time, we accept that good programs can only be operated in a safe and secure environment.

   It follows that impediments to good programming must be eliminated and it is from this reference that many of our recommendations on resource management, control systems, and organization evolve.

In the course of our investigations we made observations in three fundamental areas of the organization: Institutional Leadership; Human Resource Management; and Organization and Senior Management. Our commentary in each of these areas should be read from the perspective of the above basic principles.

1. INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Committee observed that the management of correctional institutions has become exceedingly demanding and complex. We believe that the morale and effectiveness of a correctional institution is a function of leadership, and that, as in any organization, institutional leadership is related to real and perceived authority. We are concerned about the many bureaucratic demands which detract from the Warden's authority. Just as troubling is the apparent corporate view that the successful Warden is the one who "beats the system" and "answers questions later". This does not inspire confidence in senior leadership.

i) Warden's Role

We observed Wardens and Superintendents with little actual authority and no perceived authority to manage their institutions. Institutional authority has been usurped by regional and national functional managers assuming line roles; by a functional budgeting system; by limited input into staff selection; by constraints regarding the deployment of personnel; and by Commissioner's directives and functional instructions that increasingly prescribe not only what to do, but direct how to do it.

We are satisfied that safeguards now exist to adequately protect staff and inmate rights and that systems have been developed to monitor resource usage. With this in mind, we feel that the time has come to give the Warden more authority and allow him or her to truly coordinate and lead the institution.

The discipline, morale and conduct of an institution are directly dependent on the leadership and perceived authority of the chief operating officer. **We recommend that the Service promote a concept of leadership and actively delegate operating authorities to institutional Wardens. (Recommendation 1)**

ii) Warden's Work Load

The Committee was concerned with the amount of time a Warden has available to devote to institutional priorities. A formal analysis of the Wardens' perceptions of their work priorities, time usage, and work load was commissioned and is included as Appendix C.

One of the major observations of that study was the conflict between the perceived operational priorities of the Wardens and the imposed priorities of National and Regional Headquarters. Most of the problems that a Warden faces in managing time and work load emanate from this basic conflict.

Our own investigations and interviews corroborate the Work Load Study.

We recommend that a Warden's institutional priorities take precedence over external demands. (Recommendation 2)

iii) Directives

The Correctional Service of Canada has over 471 National Directives instructing institutions on how to carry out daily activities ranging from the conduct of strip searches to greeting visitors at the front gate.

We do not question the need for central direction over policy areas. But we do question the need for central direction of operational details.

Institutions should be told what to do, not how to perform daily activities. We found that operational directives were among the greatest causes of friction between the institutions and National and Regional Headquarters. Corporate policies, systems and directives must not wither the vitality of institutions. **We recommend that National and Regional directives be reviewed to ensure that they provide guidelines without specifying operational details. (Recommendation 3)**

iv) Standards

The Correctional Service of Canada has been making great advances in developing standards for delivering many elements common to all institutions - food services, duty rosters, etc. These standards usually prescribe a modus operandi and a cost formula. We feel that this is an appropriate role for National Headquarters to play.

We do not agree, however, with the arbitrary imposition of these standards and associated systems. Institutional managers feel that in many areas their operational discretion has been reduced, to the detriment of local creativity and innovation.

The Committee recognizes that institutions are each unique and individual, composed of different mixes of inmates, staff, programs and architecture. This individuality must be acknowledged and the Service must be responsive to it.

There is a need for national standards, but they should be limited to serving the needs of institutions; those that do not serve this need should be abandoned.

National standards and associated systems should be recommended to institutions as possible solutions to their operational problems. Managers should be permitted to innovate within the standards, provided that their costs do not exceed the calculated standard costs. **We recommend that National Headquarters continue to develop national standards, but refrain from their unilateral imposition. (Recommendation 4)**

v) Automated Systems

The Correctional Service of Canada has enthusiastically embraced the advent of new technology in the development of automated information systems including the Offender Information System, the Warden Information System and the Offender Based Cost Reporting System.

We support the Service in its use of automated information systems. However, we are concerned about the extent to which these systems are being used as control mechanisms to serve the centre of the organization at the expense of time and autonomy in the field. Many institutional managers expressed to us their frustration with the inability of system developers to respect the needs and autonomy of institutions.

We recommend that the field participate in all systems development and that sign-off from all five Regional Deputy Commissioners be required before implementation. (Recommendation 5)

vi) Line/Function Relationships

The Committee observed many instances where Regional and National functional managers seemed to be assuming line roles in institutions. They are attempting to manage in absentia through directives and the imposition of large numbers of unrelated statistical norms. We reiterate here our belief that the institution is the keystone of the system and the Warden is the leader. Functional managers should remind themselves daily that they exist to serve the institutions.

We recommend that the Warden have final authority over the utilization of allocated functional resources within the institution. (Recommendation 6)

vii) Functional Work Plans

We heard from Assistant Wardens that they were assigned "anticipated results", akin to objectives, by National Headquarters, based on statistical norms in each functional area. In many cases, these were too numerous to reasonably expect one officer to accomplish. In addition, several appeared to be contradictory or impossible to achieve in the context of a particular institution.

This has led to a feeling of frustration on the part of institutional staff and a lack of commitment to institutional priorities. In addition, it compounds the problem of work load created by national systems and audits referred to in the Warden Work Load Study. In our view, work plans and objectives must reflect the institutional reality, using norms for comparison, not as objectives.

Equally worrying to us was the deleterious effect this exercise has on the development of Assistant Wardens. Wardens should be drawn from the ranks of Assistant Wardens who have learned their trade in a supervisor/subordinate relationship. They must gain experience in setting and meeting local priorities and objectives. Simply working to national norms is not sufficient. The creation and implementation of functional work plans must be performed by the Assistant Warden under the direction of the Warden within the framework of goals established in concert with National and Regional Headquarters.

We recommend that functional work plans be developed on the basis of achievable and worthwhile objectives, in consultation with, and for subsequent review and evaluation with the Warden, within the framework of goals established in concert with National and Regional Headquarters. (Recommendation 7)

viii) Resource Management

The Service has recently adopted a functional budgeting system. Institutions no longer assemble an annual budget. Each Warden in effect receives eight functional pockets of money, calculated centrally, usually from standard cost formulae relating to the volume (e.g., number of inmates) at each institution.

Under this system, functional managers in National and Regional Headquarters have become territorial over their national or regional resource pool. The Warden, as operating manager, effectively has no discretion to move money or person-years between functional areas or to manage accumulated surpluses. Each functional budget is monitored centrally and a large part of institutional time is spent explaining variances.

Functional budgeting has removed an important vestige of authority from the Warden. Not only is the Warden excluded from the budget formulation process, he or she has no real expenditure control. Under such a system, it is difficult to instill a sense of genuine accountability.

Institutional budgets should be developed and coordinated within an institutional framework.

We recommend that:

Wardens and Regional Deputy Commissioners be given responsibility and authority to develop budgets within ceilings negotiated by National Headquarters with Treasury Board.

Wardens be given the authority to make reallocations within approved budgets.

Regional Headquarters review budget to actual performance with Wardens. (Recommendation 8)

ix) Accountability

We have already recommended in various ways that Wardens should be given greater latitude and authority to manage their institutions. This role does not come unfettered. As central authority becomes less pervasive, Wardens will not be able to depend on directives to determine every response to a problem. They will be required to exercise managerial discretion and judgement.

We are satisfied that there are sufficient mechanisms already in existence to hold institutional managers accountable. These mechanisms include: the Auditor General, the Comptroller General, the Correctional Investigator, the Inspector General, senior level inspections, operational audit, inmate and staff grievance procedures, accreditation standards, and the line reporting relationships. **We recommend that authority be counterbalanced by accountability. Accountability mechanisms should be reviewed so that they accomplish their task with minimal disruption to the institutions. (Recommendation 9)**

x) Functional Audit

Institutions are also subject to a multitude of functional audits. Not only are these time-consuming, particularly in the follow-up stage, but their very number implies a lack of trust in managers to get the job done according to the abundance of standards and directives. This is self-defeating, detracts from the Warden's sense of responsibility and, thus, affects staff morale. **We recommend that functional audits of institutions be streamlined, re-ordered, and clarified. (Recommendation 10)**

2. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The nature of staff/inmate relationships is affected significantly by the attitudes, values and skills of the institutional staff. The Committee, therefore, was concerned by some recent moves in the area of human resource management within the Service.

i) Human Resource Planning

The Committee was somewhat surprised that the Correctional Service of Canada, which has pioneered systems development in many management areas, has resorted to ad hoc human resource planning. We saw little indication, even in current issues such as recruitment and early retirement, of a comprehensive forecast of supply and demand, including turnover, attrition, or promotion. Career planning seems to be non-existent for the majority of Service staff. Career frustration can contribute to employee dissatisfaction and alienation.

We recommend that the Service develop human resource planning techniques in tandem with its other resource planning programs. (Recommendation 11)

ii) Recruitment

In the past eight months, the Service has been pursuing a de facto recruitment policy to the correctional officer ranks of individuals with university degrees. The intake over this period has effectively excluded non-graduates from employment in the Service. Although non-graduates are entitled to apply, they are rarely invited to interviews. Even Community College graduates who have pursued Law Enforcement and Security programs are unlikely to be considered for employment.

We applaud the Service for its initiative in trying to upgrade the quality of its work force. We acknowledge the need for a mix of educational and social backgrounds. However, the rapidity with which this is being accomplished may be threatening some of the delicate human balances in the system.

We interviewed new university recruits who had sought correctional employment as a last resort and had no intention of making long-term commitments. We met community groups who resented being cut off from employment opportunities in their local institutions. And we perceived an understandable anxiety among long-term employees who could not meet the implied new standards. The Service may be trying to change its staff profile too drastically and too fast.

We recommend that human resource management provide for the recruitment of staff with a variety of backgrounds and qualifications, but with a particular emphasis on human relations skills and an interest in correctional work, rather than academic attainments per se. (Recommendation 12)

We were concerned over the trepidation among older, less educated staff, sensing that promotional opportunities and job security will be threatened. **We recommend that more attention be paid to the development of existing staff in order to help them meet evolving job standards and responsibilities and in preparing them for promotional opportunities. (Recommendation 13)**

iii) Female Recruitment

The Correctional Service of Canada is currently pursuing staffing targets for female staff. Over the past 12 months, the Service has received applications from 2,778 males and 916 females. They have appointed from this group 214 males and 223 females. No one could accuse the Service of lack of zeal in its response to employment equity. The Committee endorses the concept of employing females as correctional officers. We were encouraged to hear that female staff are playing an important role in the day-to-day life of institutions. They may even bring a refreshingly different approach to dealing with confrontational situations.

We are concerned, however, with the manner by which the Service is introducing females to the work environment. Although on a national basis, roughly equal numbers of males and females have been recruited, there are imbalances in the number of females being assigned to some regions and institutions, particularly in the Pacific. Any change in a staff profile must be sensitive to effects on the work environment. We saw shifts where entire ranges were staffed with female guards. We met inmates who felt that female staff were invading their privacy. We took particular note of the fact that to date all female recruits are inducted into minimum and medium security institutions. This has effectively stopped the transfer of existing staff from maximum down to medium or minimum institutions, or between minimum and medium. Although there was general acceptance of female staff as co-workers, we found a great deal of resentment among existing male staff against these new impediments to their own transfer opportunities.

Although the Service's actions may be consistent with government policy, our observations led us to believe that in the volatile atmosphere of an institution, the over-zealous application of an equal employment opportunities program could be destabilizing and create unacceptable risks. This is in contrast to the beneficial effects the addition of female staff have, and will continue to have, in institutions. **We recommend that there be more careful consideration of institutional realities when introducing female staff into institutions housing male inmates. (Recommendation 14)**

iv) Native Recruitment

The Service has been singularly unsuccessful in recruiting native people. Although it was suggested to us that native people have a cultural aversion to custodial positions, we also suspect the current recruitment policies (e.g., university graduation) effectively exclude native people from consideration. This results in large numbers of native inmates being kept by non-native officers, and contributes to difficulties in staff/inmate relationships.

We recommend that the Service recruitment and staffing procedures be designed specifically to include native people for employment consideration in career positions, particularly in native-intensive institutions. (Recommendation 15)

Representations made to us by native organizations suggested an alternative avenue for native involvement in the Service that we feel is worthy of further investigation. The Service could contract several of their current programs to credible native groups active in the Criminal Justice System. This could have two potential benefits for the Service. In the short term, these contracted services would provide programming which is more sensitive to the needs of native inmates. In the long run, native people who gain experience in corrections through the native non-governmental organizations would be better qualified and suited for potential employment directly within the Service.

We recommend that the Service investigate the possibility of contracting more native programs from native groups active in the Criminal Justice System. (Recommendation 16)

v) Early Retirement

Proposals providing for the early retirement of institutional staff have been under consideration for many years. We are informed that Treasury Board and the previous government gave their support in principle to the concept. We understand that it is still under consideration and hope that the current government will give it urgent attention.

The Committee recognizes the potential for mid-career "burn-out" of staff in a volatile and stressful environment such as a correctional institution. Given the importance that we place on the staff/inmate relationship, it is obviously undesirable to have staff continuing to work in an untenable position.

In our opinion, given the reduced pension benefits and similar experience elsewhere in the public and private sectors, there probably will not be a dramatic number of staff opting for early retirement. The fact that the policy exists, however, will provide an important psychological safety valve to institutional staff.

We recommend that the current proposals for early retirement of correctional staff be legislated as quickly as possible. (Recommendation 17)

vi) Toward a Correctional Family

We support any efforts the Service might make toward better integration of staff in all correctional and professional areas at all levels of the Service. All employees should feel that they are working for common goals as part of a larger team of correctional professionals. We recognize that the public service system of job classification and determination of bargaining units can make this cohesion difficult to achieve.

We support any efforts toward integration as opposed to fragmentation. To this end, we advocate common orientation programs and the greatest possible uniformity of working conditions at all levels of the Service. **We recommend that ways and means be found to reduce barriers to staff unity and that a review of any divisive personnel policies be undertaken. (Recommendation 18)**

vii) Separate Employer Status

We are mindful of the recommendations of the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee on the separation of the Service from the Public Service of Canada, with the status of separate employer that this would entail.

In the course of our investigations, we could find no strong evidence to suggest that at this stage such a move would solve any of the current management problems in the Service. Consequently, we are reluctant to make any recommendations for change in the existing public service statutory arrangements (other than early retirement) that would be unique to the Correctional Service of Canada.

viii) Staff Relations

We were encouraged to find better labour-management relations than those described in the report of the 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee. The mechanisms are now in place for continued development of constructive communications between the two groups.

There is, however, some unevenness in the application of good staff relations practices. Some management representatives have not fully accepted the reality and usefulness of the employees' unions. There are still some elements of the union who believe in the use of regular confrontational tactics.

This is a matter of some concern because, at the time of writing, the collective agreement is being renegotiated after a hiatus of more than two years due to the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act (1982). Management's freedom to amend operational policies, which was previously limited by an informal agreement with the union, is but one potentially difficult issue for these negotiations.

We recommend that the Service maintain a corporate policy of commitment to, acceptance of, and openness with unions; keep them informed of initiatives; and involve them in the development of policies affecting staff. (Recommendation 19)

In addition, we note and approve of the current efforts to train all supervisors in the principles of staff relations and the techniques of effectively dealing with employees. We hope that this will continue to be an ongoing priority program.

ix) Inmate Relations

In the same vein, much of what we discovered in the area of Staff Relations applies equally to inmate relations.

When inmate Committees are functioning well, they can make an important contribution to the well-being of the institution. However, we found unevenness in relations between staff and inmate committees and we saw varying levels of commitment on both sides.

We recommend that the Service maintain a corporate policy of commitment to, acceptance of, and openness with inmate committees; and to the extent possible, keep them informed of initiatives and involve them in the development of policies affecting inmates. (Recommendation 20)

x) Community Relations

In the course of its travels, the Committee was struck by the size and importance of the community resources available to the Service. In this section we are only going to address the unique relationship between Service Management and Citizen Advisory Committees (CAC). In almost every institution we visited, we attempted to meet with the CAC. As well, the full Committee met with the National Executive of the CAC in Ottawa.

We feel that the CAC's and other community agencies are a valuable human resource that is making, and we hope will continue to make, an important contribution to the well-being and atmosphere of correctional institutions. We did detect, however, an unevenness in the approach to, and acceptance of, the role and influence of CAC's across the country. This is unfortunate and a waste of a valuable volunteer resource. We understand that each CAC must develop its own relationship with its institution, and we respect this autonomy. We do feel, however, that the Service must reinforce its corporate attitude toward volunteers.

We recommend that the Service maintain a corporate policy of commitment to, acceptance of, and openness with Citizens Advisory Committees; and to the extent possible, keep them informed of initiatives and involve them in the development of policies affecting the staff, the inmates and the community. (Recommendation 21)

3. ORGANIZATION AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT

i) Institutional Organization

As stated earlier, the institution is the most important organizational component of the Service. The internal structure of the institution must be responsive to, and serve the needs and interests of, the inmates, the staff and the Warden.

We were concerned to find that some institutions have up to nine Assistant Wardens reporting to the Warden. This number seems to be more a replication of the functional structure of National and Regional Headquarters than it is a reflection of the desires of the institutional leaders. We share the concerns that many managers expressed to us over the utility of the current structure. The span of control seems excessively wide, placing extra burdens on the time of the Warden. We understand that a task force is currently operating within the Service with an ultimate goal of revising the organizational structure at the institutional level. **We recommend that the Service complete its review of institutional organization as quickly as possible. (Recommendation 22)**

ii) Role of Regional Headquarters

The Committee is sensitive to the regional and cultural uniqueness and diversity within Canada. Any organization the size and scope of the Service must reflect the significance of this regional element. We are aware that, on occasion, the role of Regional Headquarters has been questioned (e.g., 1977 Parliamentary Sub-Committee). Various organizational options have been suggested which generally imply a removal of Regional Headquarters and the substitution of a centralized, national structure.

We feel that Regional Headquarters have an important role to play in reinforcing regional character, coordinating regional functions, and acting as representatives of institutional concerns to National Headquarters.

The only member of Regional Headquarters who should have direct line authority over a Warden or Superintendent is the Regional Deputy Commissioner. Other managers at Regional Headquarters are there to provide functional guidance and advice to institutions. Regional managers have no line function to play in their relations with institutions. They must represent their institutions to National Headquarters and ensure that policies will suitably represent the needs of their region.

We recommend the continuation of Regional Headquarters, provided that their raison d'être is to serve the institutions. (Recommendation 23)

iii) Line/Function Size

We are concerned with a relative imbalance in the growth and size of functional groups at Headquarters compared to institutions. In the past seven years (according to Main Estimates), the number of person-years at National Headquarters has increased by at least 65 per cent (332 to 546) and at institutions by only 12 per cent (7,871 to 8,828). In the same period, the number of inmates has increased by 27 per cent (9,208 to 11,682). Consistent with the priority role the institutions should assume in the Service, **we recommend that the establishment at National Headquarters be promptly reviewed, in the hope of redistributing some resources to the field. (Recommendation 24)**

iv) Senior Management Roles

In the opinion of the Committee, the Correctional Service of Canada has two major organizational roles; the internal role of operating institutions, and the external role of providing correctional policy input to the development of the overall Criminal Justice System.

The operational functions of the Service are clear and are the primary concern of many other sections of this report. The Committee feels, however, that the importance of the relationship between corrections and other criminal justice players has not been fully developed by the Service's senior management. It has been preoccupied, quite correctly, with putting its own house in order. With this task well under way, National Headquarters should now turn its sights further afield, much in the way it has done in the recent past in respect to Federal/Provincial correctional issues.

We recommend that the Commissioner's role be augmented to provide leadership to the whole field of corrections in Canada. (Recommendation 25)

As the leader of the Correctional Service of Canada, the Commissioner is, and must remain, the direct line authority to the Regional Deputy Commissioners and, through them, the Wardens.

But the Commissioner must, as well, provide direction with a renewed emphasis on articulating and communicating:

1. corporate correctional policy as it relates to the overall Criminal Justice System; and

2. a corporate mission that is purposeful, integrated, and consistent with the basic corporate functions.

This new emphasis has two immediate implications for the Commissioner. First, he will need to be directly supported by a group that will offer strategic policy, coordination and planning support; and second, the Commissioner will have to delegate authority over operational matters to an even greater extent than in the past.

1. Policy and Planning Directorate

The Committee was surprised to discover that the Policy and Planning function was subsumed beneath a Deputy Commissioner and assigned to an officer whose responsibilities included systems development, program evaluation, work load and post standards, and policy and long-term planning.

This grab-bag of functions at the third management level is inconsistent with the priority we feel must be placed on policy and planning in support of the Commissioner.

We recommend that a Policy and Planning Directorate be established, reporting directly to the Commissioner. (Recommendation 26) It must encompass the roles of mission articulation, strategic planning, external policy at the Criminal Justice System interface, coordination of operational policy, and short and long-term planning. Appropriately, formal research to be conducted in support of correctional policy development should be performed under the direction of this Directorate. Many of the roles mentioned here are performed in some manner elsewhere in the Service. These functions should be consolidated and report to the Commissioner.

The Commissioner should ensure that all policy created in this Directorate is reviewed and approved by a Senior Management Committee, comprised of Deputy Commissioners. The position established as the head of the Directorate should be seen as advisor to the Commissioner and the Senior Management Committee.

2. Associate Commissioner

This new emphasis in the Commissioner's office will have significant implications for officers reporting directly to him. Whereas he cannot delegate authority for the external interface with the Criminal Justice System, and should not delegate authority for the development of the mission and policy elements through which he provides direction, he can delegate authority for internal operational matters. There may well be a requirement to delegate the authority for the daily operations of the Service even further than is now the case. This will substantially enhance the current role of the Senior Deputy Commissioner. In line with the increased responsibilities of the position and to emphasize its importance, **we recommend that the position delegated responsibility for daily operations be designated as Associate Commissioner. (Recommendation 27)**

Although ideally both the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner should be career correctional officers, **we recommend in the strongest possible terms that the Associate Commissioner be appointed from within the Service. (Recommendation 28)**

It seems apparent to us then that the first executive level of the Service is the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner. We recognize that organization charts inevitably have to take into account historical and personality factors. We don't presume to propose an ultimate organization for the Service below the first level. We have recommended that the Commissioner should be directly supported by a Policy Directorate. It seems appropriate for him to chair a Policy Committee comprised of the various Deputy Commissioners. All senior operational functions, including systems and administration, should report to the Associate Commissioner. And, in view of the emphasis we put on the Service as a human enterprise, we feel a strong case could be made for Human Resource Management to operate as a function separate from Administration and Financial Management, but playing an equally senior role.

v) Solicitor General Secretariat/National Parole Board

The Solicitor General of Canada is the political authority under which the Commissioner of Corrections operates. The Solicitor General is supported by a Ministry Secretariat that encompasses and coordinates the four operating arms of the Department - the Correctional Service of Canada, the National Parole Board, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

The Ministry Secretariat includes a small Corrections Policy unit and a Corrections Research unit. We are aware that these and other elements in the Ministry Secretariat inevitably must interface with the Correctional Service of Canada. We expect that there will be a need for coordination with the proposed Commissioner's Policy and Planning Directorate. Although a review of the Ministry Secretariat was not included as part of our mandate, we do recognize the importance of this relationship.

We recommend a prompt review of the relationship between the Service and the Ministry Secretariat. (Recommendation 29)

At the same time, we were struck by the interrelationships of the different arms of the Ministry, particularly between the Correctional Service and the National Parole Board. In our understanding, the role and operations of the National Parole Board have not been fully reviewed since its creation in 1959. We feel that it may be time to review the role of this important player in the Criminal Justice System and, in particular, its relationship with the Ministry Secretariat and the Correctional Service of Canada.

We recommend a review of the role, operations, and relationships of the National Parole Board. (Recommendation 30)

CHAPTER IV

COUNTERMEASURES TO PRISON VIOLENCE

We have outlined the administrative changes which are needed at this stage in the evolution of the Correctional Service of Canada. This chapter outlines further changes in policy and operations which may help to counteract institutional violence.

Good management can set the context for a redirection of energies toward the human element of corrections. This can go a long way in fostering a sense of community and cohesiveness within institutions which should help to reduce conflict and violence. However, for violence to become less common, the dilemma of reconciling constructive freedom for inmates with order and control within institutions must be struggled with daily in all programming and security decisions. Management and staff must work concertedly to enhance the social fabric of institutions in ways that reduce both the opportunities and incentives for violence.

Our recommendations deal with some of the most immediate issues which should be addressed to improve the social climate of institutions. Continued study and focused planning will be needed for the Service to meet the difficulties of managing an increasingly violence-prone population of offenders.

We recommend that research into the nature and causes of prison violence be actively promoted, and initiatives to reduce violence be supported and evaluated on an ongoing basis. (Recommendation 31)

A brief overview of the scope of the problem of violence in federal correctional institutions follows. Our recommendations to counteract violence are then grouped under three headings: Inmate Population Management, Supervision and Control, and Programming for Prevention. The last section titled "Managing Aftermaths of Violence", discusses how management should respond in controlling events following a major crisis. Issues of responsibility and accountability in this regard were brought into focus by allegations that staff had mistreated inmates following the tragic riot at Archambault Institution on July 25, 1982.

1. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Violence and the threat of violence have always been a facet of living or working in correctional settings. Although the incidence of particular forms of violence will vary over time and across settings, we believe that any level of violence is cause for concern and that a correctional service should aim to reduce violence to the greatest extent possible.

Trends in the incidence of different types of violence within Canadian federal institutions for the period 1977 to the present are shown below.

	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84*
Average Inmate Population	9376	9320	9294	9401	9908	10777	11372	11788
Inmate Murder	7	5	11	8	8	6	7	13
Inmate Suicide	11	6	9	10	12	11	16	14
Staff Murder	0	4	0	1	0	3	1	2
Assaults on Fellow Inmates	N/A	53	152	172	247	303	389	345
Attempted Suicide/ Self-Inflicted Injury	N/A	92	209	311	373	356	329	383
Assaults on Staff	N/A	33	62	64	104	114	121	110

* as of October 31, 1984

The frequency of assaults on fellow inmates has increased steadily in recent years at a pace disproportionate to the growth of the inmate population. A substantial increase in the number of inmates requiring protective custody has been one consequence of this rising level of inter-inmate violence. Although serious or fatal assaults on staff members have been less common, a trend toward greater violence against staff is also indicated. Of the 25 correctional staff killed throughout the 150 year history of the Service, 15 have been killed during the past 10 years.

The complexity of factors and conditions that can precipitate different kinds of violence in correctional institutions has been underscored by the Report of the Study Team on Suicides in the Atlantic Region chaired by Dr. H. Botterell, and the Report of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults in the Ontario Region, chaired by Dr. J. Vantour.

The Botterell report focused on the needs of mentally disordered or disturbed offenders, noting that these individuals are at "higher-risk" for experiencing severe crises during imprisonment. The Vantour report emphasized the compounding effect of the changing nature of institutional environments (e.g., overcrowded and transient populations), the characteristics of offenders (e.g., younger and more prone to drug use), and the array of both external influences (e.g., the ascendance of inmate rights) and internal operational policies (e.g., security post standards) that have increasingly impinged on the quality and consistency of the custodial function.

Although the two reports examined different forms of violence, common themes were emphasized and both reports called for a redoubling of efforts to develop broadly based measures to prevent violence. This Committee's suggestions follow.

2. INMATE POPULATION MANAGEMENT

i) Alternatives to Incarceration

Our Committee is convinced that the normal tensions of prison life have been seriously exacerbated in recent years by the problem of overcrowding. The average inmate population in federal institutions has increased by 26 per cent since 1977. Most institutions are operating either above or very close to capacity, and the entire range of services and programs available to inmates is being heavily taxed.

During our visits to institutions across the country, we were struck by the conditions in some living areas where inmates were "double-bunked" in cells or open dormitories. Yet we share the view of the Vantour Study Group that the physical discomforts of congested living are "only one facet of the phenomenon" (p.45). Overcrowding has a myriad of consequences for a correctional service which negatively affect custody and programming, increase the restlessness and idleness of the population, and generally create stress in the environment within institutions.

The construction of new facilities is one response to the problem. However, this is not only a costly proposition, but it may only alleviate the problem temporarily. Admissions will soon fill these facilities unless continued efforts are made to reduce recidivism and unless effective alternatives to incarceration are developed and used.

For its part, the Service can ensure that it contributes through the development and testing of more community-based programs and such alternatives as remote access correctional communities. However, the problem is not one which the Correctional Service can solve on its own.

Our criminal law, together with the policies and practices of the police, judiciary and parole board, determine how many people are incarcerated and for how long.

We recommend that the Ministry of the Solicitor General work even more actively and creatively in developing policies that influence each step of the criminal justice process so as to encourage the use of alternatives to incarceration. (Recommendation 32)

ii) Classification of Offenders

The Committee is concerned that certain policies to classify offenders, adopted by the Service in recent years, may be further aggravating the problem of overcrowding. Throughout the course of our consultations in the field, we were repeatedly alerted to the fact that a rapid turnover and inappropriate "mix" of inmates was adversely affecting the ambience of many institutions, compromising the effective delivery of programs and services, and influencing the quality of staff-inmate relationships.

The destabilizing effect of a constantly transient inmate population was highlighted by both the Botterell and Vantour reports. Transience contributes to violence by making custody more onerous, regimented, and depersonalized. As resources and services for more vulnerable inmates are increasingly strained, the chances increase that inmates will experience stress-related symptoms and become disruptive or suicidal. Inter-inmate violence also becomes more likely as the frequency of territorial intrusions and incompatible groupings increases and trading relationships, friendships and social hierarchies are disrupted.

The movement of inmates also detracts from the ability of staff to perform their primary role. Movement into or out of institutions ties up a range of institutional staff in the administrative work of reception and discharge. An indicator of the volume of work involved is the fact that in the fiscal year 1983-84, when the inmate population stood at 11,031, there were 14,423 transfers between institutions!

The transferring of inmates is directly related to classification policies, particularly Direct Penitentiary Placement and Cascading. In our view, such policies must respect the need to preserve relationships within institutions and encourage continuity of programming. Steps should be taken to reduce inmate movement and restore some stability and order within institutions. Suggestions for a review of classification policy follow.

a) Direct Penitentiary Placement

Other than in the Quebec region, the Service no longer operates separate reception facilities to assess and orient offenders beginning their terms. Offenders who receive federal terms remain under provincial custody until they are assessed and classified by Community Case Management Officers. The most appropriate security level for initial placement is determined using specific "benchmark criteria" based on such factors as the nature and seriousness of the individual's criminal activity, and the length of the sentence being served. Individuals are then transferred directly to a particular institution.

The Committee believes that regional reception facilities can play an important role in assessing and properly classifying offenders. Reception facilities can provide a needed period of decompression for disoriented newcomers and can serve to motivate some individuals for program involvement. Orientation and reception services (e.g., dental and medical examinations) can be provided with greater economy and free the resources of institutions to focus on program delivery. Furthermore, criminal life-style and activities, educational and vocational needs, and overall psychological functioning, vulnerabilities and factors which may motivate violence can be assessed more thoroughly. Reasoned recommendations for placement can then be made which balance security and program concerns.

Although the Direct Penitentiary Placement policy has simplified the processing of offenders on admission, security concerns may be overriding program needs. As a result, large numbers of offenders may be sent to institutions for which they are not suited. This can trigger disruptive behavior that may colour the remainder of an individual's sentence. In this regard, appropriate placement of offenders at commencement of sentence is vital for counteracting violence.

We recommend that the Service implement some form of centralized reception facility in each region of the country. (Recommendation 33)

b) Cascading

The move to a Direct Penitentiary Placement process also involved a change in the security classification of institutions from three to seven levels (S1 to S7). Furthermore, the practice of transferring inmates to lower levels of security as their sentence progressed (i.e., cascading) was formalized, and criteria were established setting out the length of time that should be served by different types of offenders in different levels of security.

The Committee was impressed by the attempts to structure decision making with regard to transfer of inmates. However, we wonder whether it is possible to differentiate offenders along seven levels of security, whether the designations accurately reflect gradations in the security risk that individuals pose, and whether the policy of a regular review of individuals for transfer to lower security levels has not contributed to the excessive movement which has characterized the Service in recent years.

Our Committee agrees that offenders should be afforded some increased freedom and a normalization of their environment prior to release. In this respect, the Service's policy of cascading is essentially sound, and we understand that it is intended to be cost effective. However, should offenders be relocated if this entails an interruption of vocational, educational training, or other self-development programs? We observed that transfers which interrupt program plans occur much too frequently.

We were also concerned to hear that many individuals may be cascaded prematurely to accommodate inflow, often resulting in a failure to adapt and a subsequent return to higher levels of security.

We recommend that the Service review its policy of cascading to ensure that the timing of transfers is appropriate to, consistent with and influenced by program needs. (Recommendation 34)

Options should also be examined to reduce the need for transfers between institutions. For example, the criteria for placement of offenders in lower security level institutions (e.g., currently S2 and S3) should be reviewed so that more non-violent and first-time offenders could be placed in these facilities following the reception process. Programs and services in these facilities should be enhanced accordingly.

In some institutions, gradations of internal security could be developed (e.g., separate units allowing variations in privileges and freedom of movement), and inmates could be moved through phases as their sentence progresses. This would allow continuity of program involvement, provide staff with more concrete information and evidence of progress, and generally enhance the stability of institutional environments.

Finally, for individuals whose program needs necessitate a transfer to a different institutional setting, a concerted effort should be made to minimize the degree of disruption. Personal belongings, case files, medical records and other necessary information should accompany the individual. Furthermore, programs should be provided to ease the transition of coping with new surroundings (e.g., by encouraging more active and formal involvement on the part of inmate committees and other inmate groups such as the Native Brotherhood).

c) Regional Transfers

Our Committee was particularly disturbed to observe that many inmates are transferred from one region of the country to another, thereby seriously disrupting family and other community connections. For example, we noted large numbers of native offenders in the Atlantic region who had been transferred from the Prairies, and anglophone inmates from various parts of the country who had been transferred to Quebec. During the fiscal year 1983-84, a total of 1,183 individuals were transferred across regional boundaries.

We feel strongly that each region of the country should house its own inmate population. Transfers of inmates across regional boundaries to alleviate overcrowding is self-perpetuating and violates one of our basic principles: the Service must recognize the significance of the regional diversity of this country and strive to preserve the unique cultural climate within each region.

We recommend that the policy regarding inter-regional transfers be revised so that all inmates remain in the region where they are sentenced unless:

- **an individual requests a transfer to another region because of language barriers or to re-establish family ties;**
- **an individual must be transferred to a specialized facility (i.e., a protective custody institution or special handling unit) that is not available within the region. (Recommendation 35)**

In our view, the transfer of inmates across regional boundaries for disciplinary purposes too often relocates the problem and creates new difficulties.

We recommend that inter-regional transfers not be used as a disciplinary measure. (Recommendation 36)

Dislocation across regional boundaries creates particular problems for female offenders because of the availability of only one federal facility in Kingston, Ontario. Such dislocation not only disrupts the offender, but also affects family or children that are left behind. Gradual reintegration prior to release is also made more difficult by the distance from important community connections.

During our visit to Kingston, we were pleased with the efforts that have been made to renovate the Prison for Women and introduce a range of programs and services. However, we believe that suitable regional facilities could better serve the needs of female offenders. Whether through renewed federal-provincial discussions or examination of such concepts as co-educational facilities, **we recommend that continued efforts be made to regionalize the accommodation of federal female offenders across the country. (Recommendation 37)**

iii) Regional Accommodation Requirements

A prerequisite for the effective management of offenders is the availability of accommodation at appropriate levels of security.

The Committee was disturbed with the variance which we observed across regions in terms of the availability of cells at each level of security. In particular, we noted an uneven distribution of available accommodation from region to region at the S6 level (the proportion of S6 accommodation ranges from 12.8 per cent of total capacity in the Prairie region to 40.6 per cent in the Atlantic). We think that this situation has serious implications for the system as a whole.

First, because of the limited number of maximum cells, there is a tendency to move maximum-type inmates quickly to lower security level institutions. This contributes to unrealistic expectations and resentment on the part of individuals who are left behind in the higher security environment. Unrest often results.

Second, because of the influx of inmates from maximum security into medium security environments, more restrictive security measures have to be imposed (e.g., limits on movement within the institution). As well, some programs may have to be curtailed because the degree of risk that can be tolerated is reduced. Orienting the institutional program to the higher risk inmates engenders opposition and hostility from the majority of the inmate population. This may contribute to increased tension, an escalation to even more restrictive security and a disruption in the delivery of normal programs and services.

Third, in order to deal with the excess of maximum security inmates and manage that disruptive segment of the population, inter-regional transfers are effected. The difficulties of an inappropriate cultural mix of inmates must then be dealt with and the bitterness that results from being uprooted from family and friends may lead to even more hostility and violence.

Previously, we argued that the various regions of the country should manage their own populations as much as possible. This requires that the distribution of cell capacity by security level should be consistent with the security needs of the inmate population.

We recommend an immediate review of the distribution of cell capacity by security level in each region. The actual and planned distribution should match the current and forecasted security needs of that region. (Recommendation 38)

iv) Construction of New Institutions

Historically, correctional institutions in Canada have been located, constructed and operated more out of a need for regional economic development than for a concern over the best fit into the program needs of the system.

The basic functions of the Service are to provide suitable custody and programming. This should be accomplished within the context of regional cultures and the maintenance of familial and other community relationships.

We recommend that the design and location of any new institutions be dictated by the requirements of the Service to provide suitable custody and programming, and the need for proximity to ancillary services. (Recommendation 39)

Although we recognize that cost factors must be considered, we encourage the Service to refrain from over-expansion of existing structures and to maintain its expressed policy of operating institutions with capacities of no more than 450 inmates.

3. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

i) Minimum Post Standards

The Report of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults in the Ontario Region highlighted the fact that such factors as the ease of access to makeshift weapons, the flow of drugs into institutions, the quantity and value of personal effects available for commerce, the mass movement of inmates from location to location, and the architectural faults that interfere with supervision may contribute in various ways to inter-inmate violence.

Similar observations were noted during our tour of institutions and our discussions with staff. Although loss of control over factors that may increase the opportunities for inter-inmate violence did not impress us as a systemic problem, we are concerned about the overemphasis on static security measures (e.g., barriers and control centres) which we noted in some higher security institutions. This can lead to a climate of defensive withdrawal from more direct supervision because when static security is accentuated, tension and unrest will increase. We believe safer and more relaxed environments can be achieved with a balance of dynamic means of control (e.g, meaningful interaction between staff and inmates).

We wish to emphasize that, in our view, the staff do not lack willingness to exercise a more dynamic custodial function. Rather, we think that restrictions in the growth of custodial personnel have underscored safety concerns and, in many cases, curtailed the resources available to supervise various inmate activities. We repeatedly encountered situations where there was no provision for effective direct supervision of high-risk areas (e.g., recreation areas) and where the manning of critical control points (e.g., visits and correspondence) was optional, depending on the availability of correctional officers on that particular shift. Where overcrowded conditions prevail, such situations are particularly hazardous.

The Committee believes that steps should be taken to encourage more direct supervision of inmates.

We recommend that minimum post standards be reviewed to ensure adequate supervision of high-risk areas within institutions and the staffing of critical control points during each shift. (Recommendation 40)

ii) Barriers to Supervision

Many of the institutions visited by the Committee were not ideally designed for effective direct supervision of inmate living units, recreational or work environments, and various high-movement areas throughout the institution. Realizing that there are cost factors which would make some kinds of architectural modifications impractical, we think that in the future more attention should be paid to aspects of institutional design so that direct supervision is neither obstructed nor discouraged.

The occurrence of violent incidents should be carefully monitored to identify violence "hot-spots" within institutions (i.e., areas where a relatively high proportion of violent incidents occur).

We recommend that means of modifying physical design features that are impeding effective supervision be considered, and where this is impractical, electronic surveillance methods be introduced. (Recommendation 41)

iii) Post Assignments for Correctional Officers

Throughout our report we have emphasized the importance of the delicate relationship between staff and inmates in institutions. Program effectiveness and control are fundamentally derived from an accumulation of knowledge about particular individuals; knowledge about how they can be expected to think, behave and react in certain situations. The uncertainty and unpredictability of interaction with strangers is inherently stressful. In the prison environment, the stress can become acute. As a result, even the slightest provocation can easily turn the alienation and frustration which is experienced into violent acts.

The daily interaction between front-line correctional officers and inmates can potentially result in the most vital and meaningful relationships that are developed within correctional institutions. In its 1967 Task Force Report on Corrections, the U.S. Commission on Law Enforcement and Justice observed that correctional officers:

> ... may be the most influential persons in institutions simply by virtue of their numbers and their daily contact with offenders. It is a mistake to define them as persons responsible only for control and maintenance. They can, by their attitude and understanding, reinforce or destroy the effectiveness of almost any correctional program. (p.96)

In recognition of the value of a human relations approach in managing offenders, the Service implemented the Living Unit Program in most medium security institutions, beginning in the early 70s. Non-uniformed living unit officers were introduced into inmate living units to perform both counselling and security duties.

Our Committee has noted that the program has not been uniformly successful. The ambivalence inherent in being responsible for both the control and counselling of inmates has led to some difficulties. The management of inmates involves maintaining a very delicate balance between familiarization which can lead to exploitation and unacceptable risks, and that which contributes to constructive change. However, the feeling among staff and management is that, generally, the Living Unit Program has worked well, and still holds promise.

The program was not implemented in a number of higher security institutions (S5 and S6), and the current practice in supervising inmate living units is to move correctional officers into and out of units according to a standard duty roster. Concerns were consistently expressed to us that this policy of constant rotation hinders efforts to "get to know inmates", particularly as you compound the problem with a high rate of turnover in the inmate population.

Our Committee is aware that, for several years now, the Correctional Service has been examining the merits of the living unit, the team concept, the functional unit, and other models. A hybrid model is in the process of being initiated at Drummond Institution in Quebec. A variant of the living unit model has been in operation at Matsqui Institution for about a year. We commend this experimentation.

The Committee is also concerned that the Living Unit Program in some institutions may not be functioning as well as it should. By relegating some correctional officers to perform only perimeter security and control post duties, a sense of separation of interests and alienation may have been fostered among front-line staff.

In order to allow security officers more opportunity to interact directly with inmates, we recommend that means be examined to permit these officers to work together with living unit officers in supervising inmate living units. (Recommendations 42)

Further, we recommend that the policy of rotation of correctional officer work assignments in non-living unit institutions be modified, with a view to strengthening staff/inmate relationships. (Recommendation 43)

iv) Controlling Drug and Alcohol Abuse

The increasing popularity and availability of various types of drugs within institutions is generally accepted as a major contributing factor to incidents of violence. The use of certain drugs can significantly increase the likelihood of disruptive behavior and violent outbursts. Some individuals may become quite depressed and suicidal during periods of withdrawal. Furthermore, the debts that are incurred as a result of drug use and the "muscling" activities that surround the trafficking of these substances within institutions can lead to considerable inter-inmate violence.

On the basis of our discussions in different institutions across the country, we agree with the Study Group on Murders and Assaults that the problem of drug use within federal institutions merits particular attention.

The prevalence of the problem undoubtedly varies between institutions, and for particular institutions, the problem may vary over time. Although we are convinced that all types of drugs are used, the limited official statistics we were able to obtain suggest that soft drugs and tranquilizers such as valium are used most commonly.

The Committee realizes that measures to humanize correctional institutions and increase contact with the outside have made it more difficult to control the influx of drugs. Although the rights of inmates and visitors must be respected, **we recommend that the Service adopt a more determined approach which consistently sends signals to the inmate population, staff and visitors that drug use will not be tolerated. (Recommendation 44)**

In this regard we suggest:

- that systematic records be maintained of the frequency of drug confiscations and the number of incidents of inmates being under the influence.

During periods of suspected high drug use in institutions, we suggest that within legal bounds:

- provisions be made to conduct thorough searches of the institution and more frequent searches of inmates and visitors;
- urinalysis or blood tests be conducted to confirm drug use where there is reasonable behavioral evidence of intoxication; and
- more severe disciplinary measures be imposed on individuals found using or possessing drugs.

We also agree with the recommendation of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults that the importation of drugs into institutions should be made a criminal offence. The Service should prepare a position to support such changes to the criminal code. Furthermore, there should be intensified training of staff to assist them in detecting symptoms of drug use and dealing with inmates who are under the influence.

In some institutions, the problem of "home made brews" is also prevalent. Greater vigilance should also be exercised in controlling alcohol preparation and use in institutions.

Such hard-line measures might deter certain segments of the inmate population and reduce the growth of the problem. However, complementary interventions are essential to deal with addicted or chronic users. Estimates of the proportion of offenders who have abused drugs regularly prior to incarceration range as high as 50 per cent. An even more substantial number have experienced serious problems as a result of alcohol abuse. Although a recent survey of drug and alcohol programs within the Service suggests that progress is being made, **we recommend that comprehensive and intensive drug and alcohol abuse programs continue to be developed. To this end, we urge the Service to make use of the full range of available community resources, both professional and volunteer. (Recommendation 45)**

v) Special Handling Units

The Correctional Service's Special Handling Unit (SHU) Program was introduced in 1977 as a means of dealing with "particularly dangerous" offenders; typically younger hostile individuals who have behaved violently in the community and continue to do so while in prison. The SHU program has been the subject of considerable controversy, receiving focused attention from lawyers, prisoners' rights groups, and various private sector organizations concerned with correctional issues.

The Committee received a number of thoughtful submissions which commented on the SHU program. Our own analysis and review of these opinions convinced us that there will always be a small segment of the inmate population that cannot be dealt with in a regular institutional setting. To attempt to do so would impose a degree of control over the majority of inmates that would be unwarranted and retrograde. Consequently, we see little alternative but to maintain the SHU concept.

On the other hand, we feel strongly that every effort should be made to ensure that the SHU experience does not give rise to even greater bitterness and hostility. To the extent that programming can be provided, we urge that this be done. In this regard, we agree wholeheartedly with the recommendations (numbers 19 to 27) set out in the report of the Study Group on Murders and Assaults in the Ontario Region (see Appendix D).

We were pleased to observe that the new SHU facilities in Quebec and Saskatchewan have made adequate provision to offer a range of programs. It is now incumbent on the Service to use these facilities to provide the most humane custody possible. More frequent staff-inmate interaction should be promoted, particularly in the later phases of the program. Furthermore, disturbed offenders should be given adequate access to psychiatric and other mental health services.

We are also concerned that as more SHU space becomes available, individuals may be found to fill it. We urge the Service to limit expansion of such facilities as much as possible.

We recommend that the Special Handling Program be retained, but that it be carefully monitored to ensure that both the operational needs of the Service are being met, and the welfare and program requirements of inmates are being provided. (Recommendation 46)

4. PROGRAMMING FOR PREVENTION

i) Mental Health Resources

The Committee is concerned about the large numbers of mentally disturbed offenders who increasingly are becoming the responsibility of the Correctional Service of Canada. The trend toward deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill over the past decade, coupled with the sharp decrease in secure hospital beds in provincial institutions, has led to an influx of such individuals into federal institutions.

We think that this situation is seriously straining the mental health resources of the Service. We heard concerns that disturbed offenders disrupt the normal functioning of institutions, can irritate and provoke other inmates, and that they generally interfere with the delivery of programs because of the excessive attention they demand from staff.

Estimates of the proportion of inmates who suffer from some form of serious mental disturbance range up to 25 per cent. Although several specialized regional facilities are available, only the most chronic cases can be accommodated on a long-term basis. Most cases must be quickly returned to their home institution. We are concerned that seriously disturbed individuals will be even more disrupted by such "bus therapy" that does not attend to their underlying problems in a systematic fashion. Administrative segregation often becomes the only possible means of managing these individuals within a regular institutional setting.

A further problem is that the Service's psychiatrically oriented facilities are hesitant to treat inmates who are not clearly mentally ill or who are particularly disruptive. There are many offenders who fall in the uncertain border between normalcy and mental illness, but who display both severe mental and behavioral problems. Greater attention needs to be focused on ways to provide services for this marginal population.

In order to effectively deal with the growing problem of mentally disturbed offenders, we **recommend that a careful review be conducted of current and planned resources for the delivery of mental health services within each region of the Service. (Recommendation 47)**

Our Committee was troubled to discover that little progress has been made to resolve the shortage of forensic psychiatrists in Canada. This appears to be an intractable problem and we wonder to what extent the Service might challenge the medical schools of Canada in the search for a solution. The possibility of greater use of clinical psychologists as an alternative might also be examined. We understand that the current ratio of psychologists to inmates is 1 to 150. The need to provide a greater range of specialized programs for mentally disturbed offenders within institutional settings suggests that a ratio of 1 to 100 may be more appropriate.

ii) Coordination of Mental Health Services

The Committee believes that the coordination of mental health services within institutions is critical to the successful prevention of violent incidents. The Atlantic Suicide Study highlighted this point with respect to the prevention of suicide.

Our review of the delivery of medical, psychological, chaplaincy, and case management services suggests that improved coordination is needed to intervene more effectively in a range of crises and conflicts that may lead to violence. A 1980 Correctional Service of Canada Steering Committee reinforced this point noting that:

> the majority of mentally and behaviourally disordered cases have to be dealt with in an institutional setting and there is little evidence of an integrated approach to the management of these cases, using all available human resources in the organization. (p.28)

We were pleased to learn of the recent efforts that have been made to provide comprehensive staff training programs that encourage a multidisciplinary approach to suicide prevention. This is a sound strategy.

We recommend that continued attention be focused on mechanisms to ensure effective collaboration in all aspects of health care within institutions. This should include the possibility of a change in organizational structure to reflect and support a professional multidisciplinary orientation. (Recommendation 48)

iii) Programming for Natives

Natives constitute up to 30 per cent of the inmate population in at least one region of the Service. Since 1960, the growth rate of the native population in federal institutions has doubled that of the non-native population. Moreover, relative to non-natives, only a small proportion of natives are approved for conditional release programs (e.g., temporary absences or parole), and most are released on Mandatory Supervision. The recidivism rate for natives also is higher than that for non-natives.

Native offenders are removed from their tribal areas and culture and forced to adapt to prison conditions designed for a non-native population. The alienation and resentment which results can often lead to violence.

Although we observed that there has been a recent enhancement of programs and services for native offenders in some institutions (e.g., Native Liaison and Native Elders programs), we believe the Service should strive to be much more responsive to the unique needs of this disadvantaged segment of the population. In this respect, **we recommend that every effort be made, through educational programs and other means, to increase awareness and acceptance of the spiritual and cultural needs of natives at all levels of the Service. (Recommendation 49)**

Information on the entire range of native community resources should be made available to both staff and inmates, and more systematic use should be made of these resources in developing and providing needed programs and services. Finally, we believe that staff-inmate relations will always remain somewhat strained in institutions run by non-natives and populated by large numbers of native inmates. As such, **we recommend that the Service work toward the establishment of more work camps and community correctional centres for natives. Furthermore, the feasibility of separate medium-level security institutions designed for native inmates and operated and managed by native staff should be considered. (Recommendation 50)**

iv) Long-Term Offenders

With the introduction of Bill C-84 in 1976, individuals sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder must now serve a minimum of 25 years before being eligible for parole. Fears have been expressed, both by correctional workers and concerned citizens, that the hopelessness which can set in may drive these individuals to extreme violence. The Archambault incident of 1982 is a sad reminder of what can occur; two lifers ended their own lives after precipitating a rampage of violence which led to the brutal killing of three correctional officers.

As of October 31, 1984, there were 275 individuals serving mandatory 25-year life sentences. It has been estimated that the number will swell to 800 by the year 2000.

Although many of these individuals may choose to cope as well as possible with their sentences, a segment will certainly present particular difficulties. Those with a history of violence preceding their murder conviction may be especially difficult to control. Close to 16 per cent of the group of 25-year lifers have had to be placed in Special Handling Units. Many others have been unable to fit into regular institutional settings; 25 per cent of the group are being held in protective custody.

We are concerned that unless suitable programming is developed and other humane alternatives are found, the growing number and unique problems of long-term offenders will increasingly strain the resources of the Service.

We recommend that issues relating to the management of long-term offenders receive the particular attention of the Commissioner's Policy and Planning Directorate. (Recommendation 51)

5. MANAGING THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE

i) Managing the Aftermath

The report of the Correctional Investigator examining the aftermath of one of the most tragic and violent incidents in the history of the Service - the Archambault riot of July, 1982 - was a major factor which led to the creation of our Committee.

Serious allegations that staff had mistreated inmates following the Archambault incident were reported by various organizations and publicized extensively in the media. This seriously affected the attitude and morale of both staff and inmates and created doubts in the eyes of the public with regards to the credibility and professionalism of the Service.

In our view, the Service must be constantly aware not only of its duty to act fairly but of its responsibility to ensure that it is at all times perceived to act fairly. In this regard, we were disturbed by the failure of management at all levels to quickly address the need for an exhaustive investigation of the charges of mistreatment of inmates during the Archambault aftermath. This has left a lingering cloud of suspicion concerning the ethics of staff members and the ability of management to exercise control.

The Report of the Correctional Investigator also failed to deal adequately with the central issues of accountability, responsibility, and the conduct of officers. Depending on the reader's perspective, the report appears biased in favour of either staff members or inmates. By not presenting a complete assessment of the allegations of staff mistreatment, it regrettably failed to set the record straight in unequivocal terms.

Two years after the event, our Committee was hardly in a position to conduct a further investigation of the Archambault aftermath. Rather, we have focused our concern on what should be done in the future to effectively manage an institution following a violent incident.

We were heartened to learn that the Service has recently set out clear policy in this regard (see Appendix E). Several directives have been issued detailing procedures to be followed in such areas as:

- the establishment of special outside observer teams who shall report in writing to the Warden and the officer in charge following each shift;
- the establishment of post-emergency recovery teams to restore institutional services as quickly and efficiently as possible;
- the relocation of staff directly involved in the incident;

- the transfer of the principal inmates involved in the incident, when this is deemed necessary;
- an increase of staff in designated areas; and the monitoring of designated areas by support staff from other facilities;
- the attendance of an Assistant Warden during each shift to visit designated areas;
- the regular briefing of all staff by the Warden and the pre-shift briefing of staff assigned to designated areas;
- allowing inmate access to doctors, chaplains, and legal counsel;
- the monitoring of the physical health of inmates;
- the briefing and counselling of staff members; and
- the security of records documenting the activities of the institution.

We note with favour the Service's apparent recognition of the need for independent third-party monitoring of institutional operations during the aftermath of a violent incident.

We support the continued use of independent observers and suggest that they could include both RCMP personnel and trained, knowledgeable citizens from the local community. (Recommendation 52)

Most important to us is the message that management gives to staff and inmates with respect to expected standards of behavior. **The Service must clearly enunciate a philosophy and policy which reinforces the rule of law in all institutions, at all times, under all circumstances. It must be made clear to staff and inmates alike that, while the Service will protect them, it will not condone any unwarranted and unlawful use of force. Both staff and inmates must realize that violations will result in swift and certain disciplinary action. (Recommendation 53)**

These expectations for high standards of behavior and respect for the rights of staff and inmates must be consistently reinforced, in words and in deeds, at all levels of the Service.

We also believe that the Correctional Investigator must play a central role in ensuring that correctional staff abide by stated policy. This position must always be seen as a true, independent ombudsperson. Doubt over the independence of the Office of the Correctional Investigator has been expressed many times by private sector organizations and by the Office of the Correctional Investigator. Currently, the Correctional Investigator reports to the Solicitor General through an Order in Council.

We recommend that the Correctional Investigator report directly to Parliament. (Recommendation 54)

We are also concerned that the obligations incumbent on the Correctional Investigator be made abundantly clear. There should be no question as to when that office should act, how quickly, and with what authority.

We recommend a review of the mandate of the Correctional Investigator. (Recommendation 55)

Furthermore, we recommend that the Office of the Correctional Investigator have the ability to function in both official languages. (Recommendation 56)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT

TERMS OF REFERENCE

PREAMBLE

Three recent studies conducted on behalf of the Correctional Service of Canada have resulted in recommendations and observations pertaining to management and organizational matters in certain federal penitentiaries. These studies are: the Atlantic Suicide Study which deals with several suicides in the Atlantic Region, the Vantour Study, which deals with several murders and serious assaults in the Kingston-area penitentiaries, and the Correctional Investigator's Inquiry into the aftermath of the Archambault riot of 1982. These should be reviewed to determine whether any of their findings and recommendations bearing on the management of the institutions have service-wide application.

The work of the Committee should not, however, be confined to the management and associated problems identified in the three reports, although it should use these as its starting point. The Committee should address the question of how the institutions are run, how the various programs are delivered, and what values prevail in the institutional environment that in any way affect the effective operation of the institutions. To this end the members of the Committee should feel free to deal with anything relevant to its mandate and to consult at any level, inside and outside the Service, to obtain useful information or insights.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

- Review the reports and, in the light of their contents and current correctional theories and practices, comment on how institutions are run, and how programs are delivered in the institutions of the Correctional Service of Canada;

- Assess the full implications of the recommendations at all levels of the Service, including the regional and national headquarters level;

- Determine the extent to which the current mission of the agency is understood and is applicable and, if appropriate, redefine the mission and assess what impact any change will have on management and operations at all levels;

- Review the powers of the warden and the organization of the institutions, with particular emphasis on the extent to which decision-making is constrained by centralization, the functional lines of authority, and other internal and external constraints;

- Assess the workload of the wardens and institutional managers, and determine the extent to which administrative burdens adversely affect the substantive work, and make recommendations to improve this balance;

- Make any other pertinent observations and recommendations that will improve the effectiveness of the institutional and regional management;

- Interview staff at all levels, meet with any interested parties or groups, and accept any briefs;

- Present a report to the Solicitor General on the conclusion of the study, within four months.

UPDATE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE 1977 PARLIAMENTARY SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN CANADA

Since its appearance in 1977, the Report of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada chaired by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan has been subject to serious public scrutiny. The first response was made by then Solicitor General Francis Fox, who discussed the way in which the 65 recommendations would be initially addressed by his Ministry. Subsequent progress reports on the implementation status of the recommendations were presented to the Solicitor General in 1979, 1980 and 1981. The most recent update was provided by the Correctional Service of Canada, Policy, Planning and Administration Branch, in August of 1984. This update is made on the basis of the information contained in those progress reports, as well as supplementary statistics provided by the Service.

Of the sixty five recommendations, thirty five have been fully implemented. Twelve have been implemented "with reservations stated", or in a significantly modified state from the original recommendation. Nine have been accepted for long-term implementation, and two recommendations have been categorized as "special". Seven recommendations were rejected. Table 1 gives a precise breakdown of the number and status of recommendations for each subject area.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee's report spanned twelve chapters. The recommendations were clustered to address several core questions: the purposes of imprisonment, correctional staff, organization and management of the Penitentiary Service, internal justice, work education and training, socialization, and pre-release and parole. This report presents a qualitative update on the recommendations made in each category. Where possible, current statistics are reported to enable a comparison between the situation of today and that of 1977.

The Purposes of Imprisonment

The report made two recommendations regarding the purposes of imprisonment. A recidivism rate of eighty per cent was cited in noting that incarceration had failed in its dual purpose of containing the offender and providing long-term protection to society. Furthermore, figures on the proportion of federal inmates by major offence suggested that there was an over-use of incarceration for non-violent offenders. Thirty five per cent of the federal prison population in 1977 were incarcerated for non-violent crimes. According to the Sub-Committee's report, the above factors warranted a recommendation that "the Criminal Justice System should be re-examined with a view to enlarging the alternatives to incarceration" (p. 37). The Service has accepted this recommendation for long-term implementation, and some progress has been made on it.

At present, the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the Ministry of Justice are jointly undertaking a fundamental, comprehensive review of all federal criminal legislation in Canada. One of the sub-projects concerns

TABLE 1
STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE PARLIAMENTARY SUB-COMMITTEE OF 1977

	Number of Recommendations	Implemented	Implemented "with reservations" or in modified form	Long-Term Implementation	Special	Rejected
Overall	65	35	12	9	2	7
General - Preface	1	1	0	0	0	0
Correctional Staff	15	8	4	3	0	0
Organization and Management	10	5	3	1	0	1
Justice Within Walls	10	7	1	0	0	2
Work, Education and Training	5	4	1	0	0	0
Socialization	6	5	0	0	1	0
Institutions	14	4	3	3	0	4
Pre-Release and Parole	1	0	0	1	0	0
Conclusion	1	0	0	0	1	0

sentencing and alternatives to incarceration. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill (C-19) which contains sentencing proposals (including alternatives to incarceration) was brought before Parliament in February 1984. However, the Bill died when the Session ended. In addition, the Consultation Centre of the Ministry of The Solicitor General helps to support demonstrations and innovative projects on alternatives to incarceration in the provinces. Such projects include victim-offender reconciliation programs, fine option programs, bail verification and supervision and community service orders. Essentially, the initiative required to fully implement this recommendation is outside the auspices of the Correctional Service of Canada.

The breakdown of the current inmate population by major offence indicates little change: non-violent offenders still constitute 35 per cent of the total population. The percentage for each category has remained relatively stable over time, with two exceptions. The percentage of persons incarcerated for violent crimes has climbed slightly from 55.7 per cent to 59.3 per cent, while the number of narcotic-related offences has dipped from 10 per cent in 1977 to 5.7 per cent in 1984. Overall, however, the statistics indicate little progress in the efficacy of those alternatives to incarceration instituted since 1977. Clearly, more initiative in the criminal justice system is needed in this area.

The second recommendation, that the federal government should commence dialogue with the provinces so as to standardize correctional operations, has been implemented. Heads of Corrections from all governments meet semi-annually to discuss mutual concerns. As of April, 1984, 13 Correctional Service of Canada institutions, 19 parole districts and 15 Community Correctional Centres have been granted accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. Of these, 13 are due for re-accreditation.

Correctional Staff

The chapter of the report pertaining to correctional staff contained 15 recommendations (Numbers 3 to 18). Of those, 9 are considered fully implemented, 3 have been implemented in modified form, and 3 await long-term implementation. Responses to many of the specific recommendations were subsumed under a global attempt to improve the personnel management of the Service. A series of discussions between the Correctional Service of Canada and the Union of Solicitor General Employees (USGE) has resulted in the following changes:

a) a Code of Conduct for staff, setting out standards of discipline and procedures for dealing with infractions, was issued in 1979; the Code is presently under revision and is expected to be promulgated in November 1984 (responding to Recommendation No. 9);

b) a standardized thirteen-week induction training program (CORP) for correctional and living-unit officers was introduced in 1980. A total of 1,418 CXs and LUFs have undergone training to date, constituting 31.5 per cent of the total work force.

Living-unit officers receive an additional 4 weeks of specialized training: 716, or 65 per cent of the LUF work force have had this training (Recommendation No. 6);

c) mandatory 5-day refresher training for all security officers, to be updated annually, has been implemented. In the 1983/84 fiscal year, 58.7 per cent of CXs had completed 5 or more days of training. However, 41 per cent did not achieve the "minimum" 5 days; in fact, a full 18 per cent of CXs received less than a single day of refresher training last year (Recommendation No. 7);

d) prospective recruits are now required to pass a full security clearance (Recommendation No. 4);

e) a general orientation course for all non-CX employees, to be completed within 6 months of starting an appointment, was implemented in 1981. As of October 1984, 25.6 per cent (1,375) of the total number of non-CX personnel had taken this course;

f) minimum qualifications for entry into the CX group were raised initially from successful completion of grade ten to successful completion of secondary school (Recommendation No. 4);

g) university graduation as a requirement for entry into the WP group up to the WP-3 level was eliminated, so that CX staff with commensurate experience are able to compete for WP positions. Now, however, the requirement has been reintroduced for both CXs and WPs (Recommendation No. 9);

h) a National CX Recruitment Program, initiated through a professional recruitment team, has resulted in the creation of a national inventory of candidates; the Program emphasizes post-secondary education in corrections or related fields as a desirable entrance requirement (Recommendation No. 4);

i) there is now a two year probation period for new employees, including initial training and on-the-job observation (Recommendation No. 10);

j) a National Staff Training Council was introduced in 1981 to oversee the entire staff training program in the Service;

k) special allowances for the surviving families of both Correctional Service of Canada staff and RCMP officers killed in the line of duty were approved by Treasury Board in May 1981;

l) a "no deals" rule has been fully implemented such that no agreement that would represent an ultimate benefit to the hostage taker(s) is permitted in hostage negotiations (Recommendation No. 15);

m) the Service has established well trained and well equipped Regional Emergency Response Teams, as well as an Emergency Response capacity at all S3 to S7 institutions. In addition, a staff member outside the Emergency Response Team (usually the psychologist) is specially trained in hostage negotiation. Institutional Emergency Response Teams are trained primarily in tactical procedures for major disturbances and the removal of violent inmates (Recommendation No. 16);

n) the Service has developed a phased implementation plan to allow women equal access and opportunity for admission and advancement throughout all areas of Correctional Service of Canada operations. Of 768 CX and LUF appointments made between August 1981 to the present, 30 per cent have gone to females. Recent policy has accelerated this process. In the 1982/83 fiscal year, 46 per cent of appointees to first level CX and LUF positions were female.

These changes resulted in the effective implementation of eight of the Sub-Committee's recommendations. Some, like the mandatory five day refresher training, may not be fully realized in practice.

Early retirement, staff pay, promotion and dismissal, and exclusion from the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) are issues that have been grouped together to be addressed generally for long-term implementation.

In a discussion paper prepared for Cabinet by Service representatives, three proposals were made: the formulation of a "Correctional Group" composed essentially of CX and WP groups; an early retirement plan for employees with "operational service"; and separate employer status for the whole of the Correctional Service of Canada. The latter recommendation entails that the Service must be responsible for collective bargaining, classification, travel and relocation directives, staff training and development and hours of work. Only the first two proposals were granted Treasury Board "in principle" approval, as it was thought the objectives to be achieved through separate employer status could be met through the creation of the Correctional Group (CG). At present, a small Task Force has been established to collaborate on the drafting of Regulations, develop a classification plan for the CG, and discuss and resolve remaining issues with Treasury Board and USGE representatives.

Although the effected alterations address most of the Sub-Committee's recommendations, some smaller elements have been excluded. The recommendation made with respect to the basic qualifications of correctional officers includes "a minimum of three years experience in a field involving extensive person-to-person relationships" and that "selection procedures must carefully consider the psychological attributes of prospective recruits" (p. 51). The April 1980 progress report claims that the former item was established as an admission criteria: there has been no evidence of this in subsequent policy directives. The second of these "sub-recommendations" was not addressed in any of the progress reports. (Currently, however, the Service is in the process of developing a recruiting policy that attributes 600 out of a possible 1,000 points for interpersonal skills to a potential candidate.) Appointees above the initial CX level are not "required to spend a period of six months gaining experience in security before assuming their positions", as the Sub-Committee suggests in Recommendation 9 (p. 51), but only take a general orientation course.

Recommendation 8 states that "a sufficient number of training positions must be established" to allow training and continuing professional education of custodial officers "without depriving institutions of necessary staff" (p.55, Parliamentary Sub-Committee report). It also called for this number to be established annually. In the April 1980 progress report, the Service reported that it had "identified the need for 246 training person-years for custodial staff ... plans have been developed to make the person-years available through provision in main estimates" (p.5). However, subsequent follow-up indicated that no additional training years have been approved by the Treasury Board for the period 1977/78 to 1984/85, nor has the Service requested any since 1981. (The 1985/86 request of 124 person-years was refused). In actuality, the Service has a continuing allotment of only 100 person-years (PYs) for CX training, which forms part of its TB approved custody-of-inmate activity person-year base. The Service considers this insufficient and presently uses overtime to compensate for shortcomings in PY allocation. Although the recommendation was given the label "implemented" in 1980, this may not be the case.

The Sub-Committee's recommendation that both staff and inmates wear identification also was only partially effected. In most institutions, staff must wear name tags, but inmates need only carry ID cards. Recently, a project to affix inmate names to their clothing was initiated at 16 S3 and above institutions. However, the Quebec and Pacific Regions have not been involved: identification, as yet, is not a global requirement.

The action taken on two other recommendations may not correspond exactly with the Sub-Committee's proposals. The development on the non-CX orientation course is cited as the Correctional Service of Canada's response to the Sub-Committee's recommendation that "as far as possible, all staff members should have dual responsibility for security and programs". Supposedly, mutual responsibility has also been effected by the Services Living Unit Policy, and by having the Deputy Commissioners of Security and Offender Programs both report to the Senior Deputy Commissioner.

The Service followed up on the call for "regular programs of exchange of manpower for periods up to a year or two with penitentiary systems in other countries" (No. 12) by implementing it such that only senior level staff are involved, often for only short visits or international conferences.

Some statistics are available that illustrate the progress and efficacy of the Correctional Service of Canada's responses to these recommendations. They also allow a comparison with the information cited in the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's report.

One of the Sub-Committee's chief complaints regarding the Service was the low caliber of correctional staff, which they believed the product of poor staff training and recruiting. A high turnover rate (i.e., the number of persons leaving) among the CX group was cited as an indicant of morale problems within the Service. In 1974-75, 421 correctional officers separated. Only 4 per cent left because of retirement; 12.5 per cent resigned for "outside employment" and over 56 per cent left for "personal reasons". The problem was particularly acute in the Pacific region: almost 48 per cent of all separations occurred in B.C. This situation has significantly changed. Separations of CXs and LUFs numbered 221 in 1982/83. The proportion of separations by region has also altered such that there are no significant regional disparities. Of those that did leave, 33 per cent retired; 7 per cent left for outside employment; "personal reasons" accounted for 19 per cent of total separations, and 5 per cent resigned without giving a reason. Overall, the turnover rate has declined from 8 per cent in 1974 to 4 per cent in 1982.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee was also concerned with the high turnover of Classification Officers relative to Correctional Officers. In the fiscal year 1976/77 the average turnover of Correctional Officers was 7.7 per cent. Classification Officers turned over at an average rate of 16.1 per cent - a difference of 8.4 per cent. The high separation rate for Classification Officers, according to the Sub-Committee, was "due to the fact that they prefer to work in the provincial systems or the Parole Service" (p.50). Although the available statistics cannot be compared directly with those of 1977 (due to alterations in the personnel categorization), they nevertheless indicate that the difference in turnover rate between CXs and WPs has been ameliorated. During the past year (1983/84), the average turnover for the WP group was 6.44 per cent, only slightly higher than the 4.81 per cent figure for the CX group. The most significant change occurred in the Prairie region.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee was also concerned by the relatively high proportion of young officers leaving the Service at that time. Almost 33 per cent of the separations in 1974/75 were made by individuals in the 20-24 age band. Turnover was also high among those over 30; only 4.9 per cent of total CX separations were due to retirement. Today, 60 per cent of all CXs separating are over the age of 30. However, retirement now captures over 30 per cent of all separations: this indicates that the proportion of separations in all categories has significantly decreased. Comparative data are presented below:

SEPARATIONS BY AGE BAND

Fiscal Year	16-19	20-24	25-29	30+	Retirement	Total
1974/75*						
Total	17	138	98	147	21	421
%	4.0	32.7	23.2	34.9	4.9	
1982/83						
Total	2	33	42	70	73	220
%	0.9	15.0	19.0	31	33	
1983/84						
Total	5	52	29	133	Not	219
%	2.2	23.7	13.2	60	avail.	

* Parliamentary Sub-Committee's data

It appears that more officers have been staying within the Correctional Service of Canada in recent years, and many more are making it to retirement. The Sub-Committee stressed that correctional staff must be "well-selected, well-motivated and well paid" (p.50). An improvement with the latter factor may be partially responsible for some of the figures. In 1974, a first level CX at the lowest rate of pay earned $11,050 annually. Today, the same individual makes $21,533. The substantial upgrading in benefits and salary called for by the Sub-Committee and effected by the Correctional Service of Canada and Union of Solicitor General Employees has more than likely contributed to the longevity of incumbent staff.

The attractiveness of a career in corrections appears to have increased since 1977. Then, according to the Sub-Committee's report, "the job attracted semi-skilled and unskilled individuals ... without any ... significant motivation to work in prisons". Approximately 8 out of 10 persons entering employment as a CX, the report stated, "are either retired military personnel or younger men unemployed at the time" (p.49). Only in the Maritimes was there a waiting list for CX employment.

This situation also has been radically changed. The waiting list of applicants to correctional staff positions has swelled to over 3,000. Moreover, a considerable 'mix' of candidates are interested. The following figures illustrate the distribution by sex and educational level of those seeking entry into the Correctional Service of Canada.

CURRENT NUMBER OF APPLICANTS FOR CORRECTIONAL STAFF POSITIONS
(SEPT. 2 - OCT. 15, 1984)

REGIONS		Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	Pacific	Total
University	M	150	138	110	237	122	757
Graduates	F	48	88	44	194	56	430
Post	M	16	148	106	6	97	373
Secondary	F	1	36	18	2	23	80
Other	M	94	339	262	426	87	1208
Educational Levels	F	11	51	55	92	2	211
TOTALS		320	800	595	957	387	3059

Organization and Management of the Penitentiary Service

Ten recommendations were made concerning the way in which the Service is managed and organized (Nos. 19 to 28). Of those, five can be considered to be implemented. Three have been implemented in modified form; one has been accepted for long-term implementation "with reservations stated", and one has been rejected.

The Sub-Committee's report opens this chapter with several comprehensive statistical computations of the staff/inmate ratio in 1977. These were reported for each region, each level and type of staff, by security level, and by the number of positions authorized by the Treasury Board. The findings led the Sub-Committee to recommend that "a rigorous post analysis must be carried out in all maximum and medium security institutions to eliminate overmanning of posts" (No. 19). The Correctional Service of Canada completed a post analysis in 1980, which "although [it] did not generate significant person-year savings", produced an improved rationale for security operations (p. 11 April, 1980 Report). Another more thorough post analysis was conducted between August 1982 and March 1983.

This chapter also called for security to be controlled at the level of National Headquarters, and for the appointment of an Inspector General (Recommendations 23 and 28). Both of these changes have occurred. A number of responses were made as a consequence of the recommendation (No. 25) stressing that the penitentiary system should be "open and accountable to the public". In 1978, the Communications Branch was established, and charged with a specific mandate to encourage participation by citizens and organizations and ensure the Service's sensitivity to their concerns. Liaison with outside agencies include those with the Canadian

Criminal Justice Association, Citizens Advisory Committees and an Advisory Committee on Inmate Employment. The Strategic Planning Committee and the Assistance Committee on Minimum Security Institutional Design, both comprised of non-Service personnel, were established at this time. Arranged visits, public newsletters, submission of data to the CCJA Bulletin and continued dialogue with the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs are also cited as examples of the Correctional Service of Canada's willingness to be "open and accountable to the public" (p. 17, October 1979 Report).

Recommendation 27 states that "employees who perform supervisory or confidential functions should not be entitled to belong to unions", that management matters should never become the subject of collective bargaining, and that compulsory arbitration must be the only means of dispute settlement (p. 81). The Union of Solicitor General Employees has formally agreed to the exclusion of all CX8s in maximum security institutions where the "team concept" is in place. Discussions continue as to further exclusions at the National and Regional Headquarters level. In response to the subject of compulsory arbitration, it was asserted that this is not a discretionary matter for the Service or Treasury Board; rather, it is a decision made by Bargaining Agents. This recommendation has been given "implemented" status. However, its condition is subject to alteration contingent upon another recommendation in this chapter: Number 26 calls for the Canadian Penitentiary Service (now the Correctional Service of Canada) to be an independent agency not subject to the Public Service Employment Act nor the Public Service Staff Relations Act. This agency "should resemble the RCMP in its discipline and professionalism" (p. 79, Parliamentary Sub-Committee Report). As discussed in the previous section, this item is no longer an issue, as the Correctional Group legislation is hoped to reflect the intent of the recommendation. Moreover, the now-established Code of Conduct is thought to answer the professionalism requirement. For these reasons, No. 26 has been given the label "accepted, with reservations, for long-term implementation".

The three remaining recommendations in this chapter have been implemented in a significantly altered form from the intentions of the Sub-Committee. Recommendations 20, 21 and 22 each call for decentralization of decision making to the institutional and regional levels.

Recommendation No. 20 states that the institutions must "be clearly defined by a vertical management system with short lines of authority". To this end there must be "no intervening line authority between directors of institutions and the Commissioner of Penitentiaries" (p. 73, Parliamentary Sub-Committee Report). The Correctional Service of Canada responded by making the Regional Director General an intermediate reporting level, as "it is not practical to have over 50 Wardens report to the Commissioner" (p. 11, April 1980 Progress Report). This recommendation also called for "a carefully conducted internal role analysis", done in writing, which would clearly define the responsibility and the authority of each position. Although a project to develop a separate management guide was initiated, it was not completed due to subsequent changes in organizational structure. These alterations were later incorporated into Commissioners Directives and Divisional Instructions.

Recommendation 21 is concerned with Wardens' authority. It has six parts, each of which is addressed separately in the April 1980 progress report. Wardens are not fully responsible for the selection and hiring of staff up to the management level, as suggested by part 'a' of the recommendation, but participate on a Selection Board. The latter is comprised of Regional Headquarters staff and "representation from one or two institutions on a rotational basis". Institutions are "consulted" when trainees are placed (p. 13, April 1980). (As long as the Service is under the Public Service Employment Act, Wardens cannot have total control over hiring.) A similar system operates for promotional competitions. With the implementation of the Code of Conduct in 1979, however, Wardens were granted authority to recommend discharge of staff for disciplinary infractions.

Part 'b' of recommendation 21, which suggests that Directors of institutions should have authority and responsibility for the provision of personnel services, was rejected on the basis that these services can be more effectively provided by the region or a local personnel administrator. Part 'c' which calls for the creation, delegation and transfer of term positions by Wardens (within budgetary limitations) was also rejected in favour of the present system, in which those operations are affected by the region. The danger of over or under utilization of person-year resources and the greater "overall flexibility" of regional level are cited as the reasons for maintaining the status quo.

Part 'e', which asks for Warden responsibility and authority over in-service staff training, is answered with the statement that most training is done at the staff college, but "there are now staff training positions in the institutions and more are being established". It is unclear whether this statement addresses the question of Warden authority. Part 'f' concerns Warden jurisdiction over program planning. This recommendation is agreed with only to the extent that the institution can work "within the bounds of the Service's national policies" (p. 14, April 1980). No examples of the Director's latitude within this description are cited in the 1980 progress report.

Recommendation 22 is concerned with the relationship of the Regional Headquarters to the institution. It states unequivocally that regional offices must not have line management responsibility. Divisional instructions must be abolished, and the Commissioners Directives stating that Regional Headquarters may direct institutions (CDs 102 and 106) must be rescinded. It has six additional sub-recommendations specifying that regional offices should have responsibility and authority for:

a) the planning, development and construction of new institutions in the region;

b) the training of manpower for the region (shared with institutions);

c) regional consultation and discussion;

d) purchasing and stores (shared with institutions);

e) personnel services, accounting and budgeting (shared with institutions); and

f) the auditing of institutions in the region.

The policy adopted by the Service with respect to these suggestions is also different from the original recommendation. Parts 'b', 'c', 'd' and 'e' are considered fully implemented. However, parts 'a' and 'f' are in modified form: planning and construction of new institutions and the formal auditing functions were both centralized at the level of National Headquarters. There is, however, some consultation with the regions on institutional planning. Also, regional reviews and management audits are currently developing into joint Regional and National ventures. With respect to the other suggestions, the April 1980 report asserts that only the Regional Director General (RDG), and not the regional staff, has line authority over institutional Directors. Later, RDGs were elevated to the status of Regional Deputy Commissioners. CDs 102 and 106 were "amended to reflect the new organizational plan" (p. 15, April 1980). No action was taken on the abolition of Divisional Instructions.

One recommendation in this chapter, No. 24, was rejected by then Solicitor General Francis Fox. It promotes the establishment of a five-member board to make policy, appoint the Commissioner, and make annual reports to Parliament through the Solicitor General. The proposal was rejected for several reasons, the principal one being that of maintaining ministerial responsibility. The matter was raised again in a Private Members Bill in Parliament on June 11, 1984 (Hansard Vol. 127 No. 104).

Many of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's recommendations stemmed from a concern "for the apparently excessive staffing of Canadian penitentiaries" (p.68). They cited a staff/inmate ratio for 1977 of 1:0.994, better than one to one. Today the ratio is much greater, indicating that the total number of staff has decreased in proportion to inmates. Presently, the total population of Canadian Penitentiaries (excluding HM Penitentiary NFLD and federal prisoners in provincial institutions) is 11,998. The total number of positions authorized by Treasury Board for the Correctional Service of Canada is 10,761 person-years. Of those, 25 are related to major capital projects and 693 to the supervision of parolees and mandatory supervision cases. This leaves a total 10,043 person-years for incarcerated inmates. The ratio of staff involved in inmate-related work to incarcerated inmates is 10,043:11,998, or 1:1.195.

The Sub-Committee noted that there were a number of authorized positions held in reserve in 1977. If these were deducted, the inmate/staff rate was not significantly reduced. Today, however, there are no person-years held in reserve at National Headquarters, Regional Headquarters or institutions. For 1984/85, the Service has overallocated person-years by approximately 2 per cent above TB approved levels in order to meet current operational requirements and compensate for lapses due to staffing delays. The following data illustrate the authorized person-year increases (including Parole Service) since 1977:

	Requested	**Approved**	**Change**
Base Year 1977/78	-	9,720	-
1978/79	10,437	10,213	493
1979/80	11,155	9,872	(341)
1980/81	9,983	9,729	(143)
1981/82	9,795	9,795	66
1982/83	10,041	9,795	0
1983/84	10,141	10,095	300
1984/85	10,988	10,761	666
Net Increase			1,041

No additional person-years were approved by Treasury Board for training during the above period.

Due to changes in the legislation since 1977, the Correctional Service of Canada is now responsible for the supervision of offenders on parole or mandatory supervision. For this reason, two ratios can be computed: the staff/inmate ratio (referring to those actually incarcerated) and the staff/offender ratio (referring to the total offender population). To facilitate comparison with the Sub-Committee's data, only the former will be reported.

Since 1977, the number of National Headquarters staff has increased substantially in proportion to the inmate population. On April 12, 1977, it was 1:26.555. On October 12, 1984, it was 1:20.754. With respect to Regional Headquarters staff, the comparative ratios are as follows:

	April 12, 1977	**October 12, 1984**
Atlantic	1:22.195	1:16.493
Quebec	1:18.526	1:16.879
Ontario	1:14.604	1:16.424
Prairies	1:27.424	1:25.469
Pacific	1:11.459	1:12.962
Overall	1:17.137	1:17.189

The data indicate that although the overall ratios are relatively constant, there have been some changes with the regions. All regions except the Pacific and Ontario regions have increased the number of Regional Headquarters staff; this is particularly true of the Atlantic region.

Comparative staff-inmate ratios at institutions, within each region, is as follows:

	April 12, 1977	**October 12, 1984**
Atlantic	1:1.283	1:1.631
Quebec	1:1.358	1:1.337
Ontario	1:1.550	1:1.675
Prairies	1:1.470	1:1.368
Pacific	1:1.055	1:1.230
Overall	1:1.288	1:1.431

Other than in the Quebec region, the increase in institutional staff has not kept pace with the increase in the inmate population. Thus, while National Headquarters has burgeoned and Regional Headquarters has remained constant, institutional staff have decreased in proportion to the inmate population.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee was also interested in the percentage of correctional and living unit officers, compared to total institutional staffs, within each region. A comparison between its data and that of today indicates that the proportion of CXs to other institutional staff has decreased:

	1977	**September 30, 1984**
Atlantic	51.6	53.2
Quebec	62.8	56.4
Ontario	56.3	52.6
Prairies	57.7	50.9
Pacific	54.3	51.7
Overall	57.4	53.0

The Quebec and Prairie region have made the most significant changes. Some caution must be taken when interpreting these results: either the number of CXs has decreased, or the number of non-CXs (WPs, administrative personnel, instructors, etc.) has increased. At any rate, in proportion to non-CX staff, there are fewer CXs today than in 1977.

Further discriminations can be made. Comparative staff/inmate ratios at each security level are as follows:

	April 12, 1977	**October 12, 1984**
Maximum security	1:1.147	1:1.067
Medium security	1:1.372	1:1.616
Minimum security	1:1.865	1:2.490
Community Correctional Centres	1:2.624	1:3.965

The proportion of staff to inmates has increased somewhat in maximum security institutions and decreased substantially elsewhere.

Proportionally, most of the growth in person-years has occurred at National Headquarters, as opposed to the institutional level. This may lend credence to the Sub-Committee's concern that the Correctional Service of Canada was becoming too "top heavy". The findings do not support the seventh principle stated by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee that "a central aim of the decentralization of the system should be to decrease bureaucracy and increase line staff as much as possible"(p.73, Parliamentary Sub-Committee Report).

Justice Within the Walls

Chapter seven of the Sub-Committee's report is concerned primarily with the establishment of the "Rule of Law" within Canada's institutions. The development of consistent, accountable disciplinary process was its central objective. To this end, the report made ten recommendations: seven have been implemented, one has been implemented "with reservations", and two have been rejected.

The Sub-Committee's investigations led it to conclude that "the penitentiary authorities...do whatever they want without any accountability to the requirements of natural justice or the due process of law" (p. 87). To reduce the likelihood of arbitrary abuses of power, the report proposed several procedures to increase the accountability of decision makers and allow greater avenues for inmate grievance and appeal. The following changes were made in response to those recommendations:

a) the appointment of independent chairpersons in all maximum and medium institutions, to preside over disciplinary hearings (Recommendation 30);

b) the establishment of Segregation Review Boards at all maxiumum and medium institutions; a review of each case every 30 days, with written notification to the inmate of the Board's decision (Recommendation 31);

c) the provision of legal materials in the libraries of all maximum and medium security institutions, as well as the availability of more extensive collections at Regional Headquarters (Recommendation 34);

d) the development of a new Warrant of Committal that clearly indicates the intent of the sentencing court when imposing sentence, thereby removing any ambiguity as to length time an inmate will spend in an institution; inmates may see this warrant and receive a copy of the sentence calculation (Recommendation 35);

e) the establishment of an inmate grievance procedure, for which representatives from all institutions had been selected and trained (Recommendation 36). In the calender year 1983, there were 10,699 inmate grievances dealt with. Of these, 1,230 (11%) went to the Director's level, and 608 (5.7%) went past to the Regional Headquarters level. The final level, the Commissioner, received 297 (2.7%) grievances. It would seem that most complaints are resolved before coming before the Warden.

f) the continuation of a Correctional Investigators' function, with a permanent link to the Service established through the Inspector General's office (Recommendation 37);

g) the promulgation of a Commissioner's Directive outlining policy with respect to the status, objectives, establishment and continuation of inmate committees; the positions of chairperson and secretary are both considered full-time assignments (Recommendation 38).

Only a few caveats must be added to the above changes where they do not fully meet the Sub-Committee's recommendations. Independent chairpersons are not as yet operative in minimum security institutions, as disciplinary action for incidents within these institutions is meted at higher security prisons. The Sub-Committee called for a bi-annual review of the functioning of the Administrative Segregation Review Boards. This has not occurred; rather, its operation is audited by the Inspector General. The grievance system is "similar to the one set out in MacGuigan's recommendation", (Oct. 1979 Progress Report). Although provision is made for "range-by-range" representation on Inmate Committees, as suggested in Recommendation 38, minority representation is not in effect as yet.

One recommendation with respect to internal discipline is labelled "implemented with reservations stated". Recommendation 32 proposes that gas should not be used against a single inmate. Rather, a resisting inmate should be physically overpowered by a team of guards. The Correctional Service of Canada responded by amending policy accordingly, and by insisting that detailed records of the use of gas be kept and National Headquarters alerted regarding each incident. However, staff throughout the Service unanimously preferred the use of gas, pointing out that the alternative could well endanger lives or risk serious injuries to both staff and inmates in some circumstances. For this reason, the Correctional Service of Canada has determined that gas may be used against a single inmate in special situations. From January 1, 1980 to September 30, 1984, there have been 247 incidents reported from Correctional Service of Canada institutions in which gas was used to subdue a single inmate.

Two recommendations related to internal discipline were rejected. The first, Recommendation 29, affirmed that "Commissioner's Directives must be consolidated into a consistent code of regulations, having the force of law for both staff and inmates". For the Service, the difficulty arises in the term "having the force of law". A decision made in the Supreme Court of Canada (Martineau vs. Matsqui Institution), indicated that CD's do not have this "force" with respect to inmates. An additional reason for rejection was that "the potential complications and costs are enormous, and cannot be borne at this time" (Hon. Francis Fox, August 1977). It was hoped that the need to operate the system in a manner consistent with natural justice was sufficiently recognized through the establishment of independent chairpersons and grievance procedures. The second rejected proposal (No. 33) recommended that the transfer of inmates be effected through bilateral negotiation between the Institutional Directors involved. It was also suggested that commercial aircraft never be used for inmate transfer. The Service rejected this recommendation on the basis that transfers "are a regional and national concern" (p. 23, April 1980). Instead, they issued a new Commissioner's Directive specifying that reasons for a transfer must be given to an inmate, and that transfer decisions may be reviewed via the grievance procedure. Furthermore, the use of commercial aircraft for non-dangerous inmates was defended on the basis of its cost effectiveness.

Work, Education and Training

This chapter opens with a discussion on the need for meaningful activity in institutions. It cited statistics of relatively low inmate involvement in prison industry, vocational and academic programs. Production figures also led the Sub-Committee to conclude that "the CPS has been woefully inefficient in its handling of prison industry" (p. 108). Five recommendations were made on the basis of the Sub-Committee's investigations. Of these, four have been implemented as they stood, and one has been adopted "in modified form".

The first of these recommendations (No. 39) states that products of inmate labour should be allowed to compete on the open market, after full consultation with industry and labour. The Service responded by developing their industries program in two areas:

1. The overall revitalization of the Correctional Service of Canada's Industries Program encompassing:

    - establishment of a marketing and sales organization;
    - establishment of a more effective manufacturing organization and appropriate controls;
    - establishment of a Staff Training and Development Program; and,
    - launching a major effort in plant upgrading and cost effectiveness improvement; in order to

        - greatly increase the number of jobs which are similar to those available in private industry; and
        - improve revenue/cost performance.

These measures appear to have been effective. Sales revenues of prison industries have tripled since the 1977 amount of $3,193,652. Prison industries reached their peak in 1982/83, bringing in $9,429,000, but dropped to $8,210,000 the following year. Generally speaking, prison industries have grown at a rate of one million dollars a year.

2. The negotiation of "joint venture working arrangements" with private sector manufacturers to supply components that are not available in Canada and are procured "offshore" or from the USA by Canadian manufacturers. The overriding criteria for this program is that the Correctional Service of Canada should not encroach upon or compete with the private sector. At least five joint venture projects have been implemented in five different institutions since 1977. The Correctional Service of Canada often faces difficult competition from foreign firms who can undersell them considerably. The recent recession also has hampered CORCAN's growth in this respect.

Interpreting the Sub-Committee emphasis to be on "increasing productive opportunities" for inmates, the Service also expanded its farm production program.

Recommendation 41 has also been given "implemented" status. It underscored the need for a graduated system of incentives based on labour productivity. These incentives should include earned remission and bonuses for improvement and piecework. Working inmates should then be required to pay room and board at reasonable rates. The Service responded to this by implementing a new inmate pay program designed to "equitably provide inmates with pay according to the work done" (p. 21, June 1981 progress report). All inmates who participate in education, vocational training, institutional services, employment programs, industrial production and other programs under the Correctional Service of Canada's direction are elligible. The Service uses an indexing formula based on the minimum wage, generated by Statistics Canada, to compute the amount deducted for room and board. The objectives of the Pay Program are outlined in the June 1981 progress report. It was designed to:

a) pay each inmate according to the job and work performance;

b) identify and classify all inmate jobs;

c) establish nationally consistent policies, guidelines, rules and regulations governing pay;

d) give the inmate the responsibility as an employee and consumer to purchase many of his own goods from his earned monies;

e) provide an incentive for inmate cascading from maximum to minimum institutions;

f) encourage inmates to learn a trade, to obtain and retain a job while in the institution, with a view to prepare themselves better for eventual release.

There are five levels of pay. All working inmates are paid Level 2 to Level 5, depending on the level at which the job is classified (based on criteria such as skill, knowledge and training). Inmates receiving Level 1 are unemployed inmates (employable inmates for whom no work is available) and those in administrative segregation, reception, certified sick leave, or outside court. Pay levels 2 to 5 represent rates of $3.15 to $7.55 a day. The rates for each level also depend on the security level of the institution. Statistics for 1984/85 illustrate the percentage of inmates employed at each level:

PERCENTAGE OF INMATES EMPLOYED AT EACH PAY LEVEL BY DEPLOYMENT

	Level 1	**Level 2**	**Level 3**	**Level 4**	**Level 5**
Unemployed & Not Available	100				
Industries		10	30	30	30
Education & Training		50	50		
AgriBusiness			35	35	30
Automated Document Processing				80	20
Technical Services including Food Service, Works & Engineering and Institutional Services		30	35	20	15
Socialization including Inmate Committee, Arts & Crafts Recreation, etc.		30	35	25	10
Forestry			30	40	30
Construction			10	50	40
Administration Support including E&T Teaching Assistants, Health Care, Administration & Finance Clerks, etc.		10	20	35	35
Average Distribution (Nationally)	19	11	22	29	19

The majority of inmates are paid at level 4, which amounts to substantially more money than the 75 cents per diem cited by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee. Generally speaking, the recommendation regarding better pay incentives can be considered implemented.

The Sub-Committee also called for review and pilot studies to be done regarding work incentives. Five incentive programs have been initiated since 1977. Recommendation 42 stresses the need for Provincial Licencing and certification of institutional apprenticeship programs; Recommendation 43 calls for the availability of academic education and correspondence courses.

The 1980 progress report states that the Senior Management Committee instigated an upgrading plan that "addresses a wide range of problems ...including the problems raised by Recommendations 42 and 43 and their accompanying texts" (p. 30, April 1980). Any inmate may take a correspondence course, "if academically qualified, if deemed likely to be beneficial, and if the cost is within reason" (p. 36, October 1979 Progress Report).

Despite the fact that baseline comparisons are not available, it is estimated that approximately less than one-half of vocational programs were accredited in 1977. In order to achieve provincial accreditation for students, it is normally required that vocational teachers and/or instructors acquire teaching certificates. With the reclassification of teachers, all vocational programs have since been accredited. As well, many new vocational programs have been added and accredited. This is not to say that an inmate who has completed this course would be licenced to practice his trade in that province: many trades require a year or more of on-the-job apprenticeship, which is impossible for most inmates. However, as the 1980 progress report states "as much as practicable, provincial arrangements for licencing and/or certification of training programs are implemented" (p.30).

The Correctional Service of Canada maintains 79 academic/vocational programs. All are accredited except the basic adult education program, which is not of that status at 13 of the 24 institutions at which it is offered. Of the total inmate population, 14.7 per cent are engaged in academic or vocational training. (This percentage has not changed since 1977.) Given the substantial progress made by the Service in this area, Recommendations 42 and 43 fully deserve the "implemented" label.

Only one recommendation from this chapter, No. 40, was implemented in modified form. It called for the establishment of a national prison industries corporation, with the "full cooperation of business and labour enlisted in providing guidance and implementation toward the fullest possible work opportunities in penitentiaries" (p. 109 Parliamentary Sub-Committee report). The Correctional Service of Canada responded by affirming that "the concept of a formally incorporated national prison industry corporation is not considered to be a viable alternative at this time" (p. 20, June 1981). Instead, it established an Advisory Committee on Inmate Employment comprised of senior officials from labour, industry and government. It is chaired by the Executive Director of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, and provides guidance on policy, organization and implementation of inmate work opportunities. In addition, a private sector sales force has been established, including salespersons in each of the five regions.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee claimed that "the number of inmates required for maintenance in an institution should not normally exceed 20% of the population" (p.107). Today, 23.9 per cent are engaged in food service, institutional service and the operation, maintenance and construction sectors of Works and Engineering. Another 5.2 per cent help in clerical, medical, financial or administrative jobs. Agri-businesses account for 2.8 per cent of inmates; prison industries, 9.3 per cent; and offender programs 9.4 per cent. An additional 14.7 per cent are in academic and vocational training. Six percent of inmates are rated "unemployed". Data on inmate deployment was not available for the remaining 13.8 per cent of the inmate population.

Socialization

The Sub-Committee's recommendations on socialization stemmed from a 1976 Solicitor General study entitled "Analysis of Programs in Federal Corrections". The latter document categorized the extant programs by type, by region, and by level of security. The Sub-Committee also reviewed therapeutic communities and living units, the need for increased social interaction and community involvement, and staff attitudes to programs. Their analysis led them to make six recommendations (Nos. 44 to 49). Of these, five have been implemented, and one has been given "special" status.

Recommendation 44 concerns the budgeting process: institutional budgets should be designed to allow personnel more independence in the development and establishment of training programs. The only response to this is found in the October 1979 progress report: "Program staff are encouraged to develop innovative inmate programs and a special project fund has been established" (p. 36). It is unclear whether this response was what the Sub-Committee intended. Nevertheless, the Service has given 44 "fully implemented" status.

In Recommendation 46, the Sub-Committee stressed the need for the team concept "and especially the Living Unit Concept", to become "the ordinary theories of staff management at every institution" (p.122). Living units have been introduced at all medium-security institutions, with two exceptions. In those facilities where this was not feasible, an attempt was made to implement the team concept. However, a comparative study conducted on correctional models indicated that the team concept was not applied consistently throughout all institutions, was expensive, and the expected results were questionable. For these reasons, the Correctional Service of Canada has decided to examine alternatives to the team concept. Overall, however, Recommendation 46 can be considereed fully implemented.

The Sub-Committee felt that social interaction should be maximized in prison life. To this end, they made Recommendation 47 a blanket proposal, calling for common inmate dining, more contact visiting, and greater time allowances out of cells. Conditions of socialization should be "as much like those of the outside community as possible" (p.123 Parliamentary Sub-Comittee report). In response, the Correctional Service of Canada:

a) established common dining in all institutions except Dorchester, Laval, and the Regional Reception Centres in Ontario and Quebec;

b) implemented contact visiting at all institutions; and

c) increased time spent out of cells by all inmates except those in dissociation and protective custody.

Hence, Recommendation 47 can be considered in place.

Recommendations 48 and 49 were made to increase community involvement in corrections. The former calls for increased access to the institution by outside agencies; the latter outlines the role and composition of Citizens' Advisory Committees (CACs). Both are considered implemented by the Correctional Service of Canada. According to the Service's 1980 progress report, over 50 organizations, excluding the chaplaincy and vocational groups, are actively involved within institutions. In addition, policy requires that CACs exist for all institutions except the Regional Psychiatric Centre in Ontario.

The recommendation given "special" status is No. 45: it calls for the immediate introduction of the social therapy technique developed by the Oak Ridge Division of the Ontario Mental Hospital at Penetanguishene into all medium and maximum security institutions. This is to be done "to the extent that it is possible to separate entirely the inmates in social therapy from the rest of the prison population". The recommendation also asks that new institutions be built "with the need for small completely contained units in mind" (p. 122). The Service unequivocally replied that it was not prepared to fully introduce the program on such a broad basis. Its viability in an institutional setting as opposed to a mental hospital needed to be thoroughly tested. To this end, the Service's Senior Management Committee approved the implementation of a pilot Social Therapy Program at the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Pacific). The program commenced in December 1979 with 26 participants. Subsequent evaluation has pointed out some important differences between the program operated in the Psychiatric Centre and that of Oak Ridge. In the latter, the patients are usually certified or held under warrant of the Lt. Governor. Release of an individual depends on decertification which, in turn, is related to performance and participation in programs. Because penitentiary sentences are usually determinate and do not provide the same degree of motivation for participation that exists in the Oak Ridge program, there is nothing to compel the patient to continue participating if he finds the Centre program unpleasant. Hence, the Service has determined that the global application of the Oak Ridge Model would be inappropriate. Although the Service had planned the adoption of the project at RPC (Pacific) at other institutions, the urgency of more immediate operational problems arising out of the dramatically increased inmate population, (e.g, double-bunking), forestalled any action on this matter. The 1984 progress report adds that the necessary long-term resources needed for implementation are not available at present.

It is extremely difficult to make meaningful comparisons or attributions concerning socialization in Correctional Service of Canada institutions. This is partly because data collection varies from region to region, in both form and content. Terminology is not standard. Moreover, the categories utilized in the study quoted by the Sub-Committee are seriously questionable, by the members' own admission. They found "many apparent discrepancies in the statistics"...and warned that "the categorization is ...variable and sometimes internally illogical" (p.115). For these reasons, meaningful comparisons between current socialization programs and those existing in 1977 cannot be made.

However, some useful information was submitted by various Regional Headquarters and the Director of Chaplaincy. Considerable progress has occurred in the area of spiritual development, with no less than six special projects instituted for 1984/85. The recruitment and training of Chaplains, as well as their job descriptions, have undergone substantial upgrading. Similarily, the data from the regions point to an increase in the number of social development programs. Of particular noteworthiness is the implementation of a Native Elders Program in all institutions in the Prairie region.

Institutions

Chapter 10 of the Sub-Committee's report is concerned with the development and specialization of institutions. A total of 14 recommendations were made: 4 have been implemented; 3 have been partially implemented, or effected in modified form; 3 await long-term implementation; and 4 were rejected.

The implemented recommendations were fairly straightforward:

a) controlled epileptics are now allowed in minimum security institutions (Recommendation 51);

b) institutional menus have been reviewed on the basis of Canada's food guide to ensure adequate nutrition (Recommendation 53);

c) adequate records of all medications purchased and distributed in the institution are in place, and filed at National Headquarters (Recommendation 54); and

d) two studies have been completed on the feasibility of penal colonies, and the establishment of a Limited Access Correctional Community is still under consideration (Recommendation 63).

Those recommendations awaiting long-term implementation each are concerned with the establishment of provisions for special inmate populations: protective custody inmates, females, and sex offenders. Recommendation 57 calls for the establishment of a small number of maximum security institutions (each containing a medium security section) for inmates requiring protective custody (PC). Three institutions are now being used exclusively or in part for protective custody inmates. These facilities and their actual inmate count (as of October 19) are as follows: Saskatchewan, 459; Kingston, 383; and Laval, 157. At any given time, a number of offenders are held in segregation at all major institutions undergoing assessment for transfer to PC. Protective custody inmates represent 8.5 per cent of the total inmate population. Were they returned to their region of origin, the following distribution would result:

Pacific	Prairies	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic
134	378	346	212	92

These figures are the "on register count" and originate from the 1984 Offender Population Forecast (84/85).

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee made a number of recommendations with respect to the handling of female offenders. They suggested that the Prison for Women be phased out immediately; that until then facilities, space and a life-skills program be provided; that small cottage-type institutions be established in at least three of the regions; and that alternate residential arrangements be made if there were not enough women for Community Correctional Centres to be established. However, finding alternatives for the housing of federal female inmates implied by a phasing out of the Prison for Women depends upon cooperative arrangements with the provinces and private agencies. At present, provisions have been made with provincial agencies through the female offender Exchange of Services Agreement. Some of these have fallen through due to resource problems. As viable alternatives have proven illusive, the Prison For Women has upgraded its facilities and programs considerably. Twelve educational/vocational, 4 special/recreational, and 11 social/cultural programs are now in place, in addition to psychological services and chaplaincy.

Recommendation 59 underscores the need for several separate institutions for the treatment of sex offenders, with admission on a voluntary basis. The progress reports do not discuss the possibility of new institutions. Rather, the Service has adopted as a goal "the provision of specialized treatment programs to all inmates who require treatment and who wish to take advantage of the opportunity to receive treatment for their sexual dysfunction" (p. 9, August 1984 progress report). This goal will be achieved by the continuation of treatment programs at Regional Psychiatric Centres and by the establishment of programs at selected institutions traditionally housing the majority of sexual offenders.

The Sex Offender Treatment Program at the Ontario Regional Treatment Centre will continue to identify and assess all existing and incoming inmates in the Ontario region who have been convicted of sexual offences. On the basis of the assessments, inmates will be offered access: to the four-month multi-faceted treatment package; for less serious offenders; to brief, behaviourally-oriented treatments of less than two months duration;

or to the PCU Sex Offender Program under development through contract with Queen's University Department of Psychology. The RPC (Prairies) provides a five to six month treatment program which has been operational since September 1981. Treatment techniques include group therapy focusing on the acquisition of appropriate skills cognitions and knowledge, behavior modification techniques, and individual therapies. Finally, the treatment program at the RPC (Pacific), which has a psychiatric orientation and is of 18 months to 2 years duration, has been evaluated in comparison to the shorter behaviourally-oriented programs offered by the other two centres. The evaluation identified that the needs of some sex offenders were not being met by the existing program. In an effort to better accommodate the needs of a greater number of sex offenders, the program is being restructured into modules, each module having an objective, strategy, and evaluation technique. Overall, there are 111 beds available for sex offender treatment in the Service. It must be noted, however, that a salient obstacle toward progress in this regard lies in the reticence of sex offenders to self-identify or volunteer for treatment.

The lengthy time frame required for fuller development of these projects warrants the long-term label.

Three of the recommendations in this chapter (Nos. 56, 61 and 62) have been implemented in modified form from the Committee's initial suggestion. Number 56 calls for the establishment of special institutions for violent, disruptive or resistant inmates. These should have all the programs and services available at maximum security institutions. In response, the Service established two "Special Handling Units" (SHU) for this kind of inmate. In addition, it approved a SHU program based "on the principle that inmates must have the possibility to earn their release from these units" (p. 39, April 1980).

There are four phases to the program:

I) assignment, assessment and orientation;
II) limited association;
III) increased association, leading to transfer from the unit; and
IV) a probationary period with a maximum security population.

However, the Correctional Service of Canada did not support providing all the programs and services available in regular maximum security institutions to the SHU inmates. To do so, they believed, "would remove all incentive to cooperation or change" (p. 40, April 1980 progress report).

There were 34 inmates in "supermaximum" security prior to November of 1974. Since then, 352 inmates have been admitted to the Special Handling Units. Of those, 242 have been transferred to phase 4, and 33 were released on mandatory supervision directly to the street.

Admission and release figures have substantially increased in recent years. Statistics for each year are as follows:

NUMBER OF INMATES ENTERING AND LEAVING SHU'S 1978-1984

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	TOTAL
Admissions	2	20	57	74	85	67	47	352
Transfer to Phase IV	5	24	29	27	58	60	39	242
Release on Mandatory Supervision	1	0	0	0	8	10	14	33

Recommendation 61 also is implemented in modified form. It calls for "at least one separate institution" to be "provided for youthful offenders [i.e., those under the age of 18] on a selective basis" (p. 145). At least one wilderness camp should be established for native peoples and northern residents. The Service determined that the best alternative for this recommendation is to enter into Exchange of Service Agreements with the provinces. Natives are a category of offenders they "seek to transfer". The provinces, however, have not been very cooperative: only 3 young offenders have been transferred since 1982. In the meantime, they transfer youthful offenders who are not suitable for provincial exchange to medium security institutions that have extensive training programs particularly Springhill, FTC, Warkworth, Drumheller and Mission. It should be noted that this last action is in direct opposition to the Sub-Committee'sintention, which was to separate youthful offenders from older inmates as much as possible. The number of transfers so made are as follows:

TRANSFERS FOR INMATES UNDER THE AGE OF 18 AT TIME OF TRANSFER FROM 1 JAN. 1982 TO 19 OCT. 1984

TRANSFER INTO INSTITUTION	NUMBER	TOTAL
Springhill	65	65
Federal Training Centre	3	3
Warkworth	7	7
Drumheller	4	4
Mission	2	2
Provincial	3	3
Specialized Wilderness Camps	-	-
		84

Recommendation 62 suggests that an experiment be conducted in which the Citizens' Advisory Committee is expanded to a 12-member board of governors which would appoint the Director and senior administrative staff. The Service completed two research studies on the feasibility of this concept: both resulted in its rejection. Nevertheless, the April 1980 progress report states that "the Service is committed to expanding and strengthening the role of Citizen's Advisory Committees". Hence, this recommendation also deserves "modified" status.

Four recommendations (Nos. 50, 52, 58 and 60) pertaining to institutions, were rejected by the Service. The first, Recommendation 50, argues that new institutions should be small (200-250 inmates) and clustered so as to share functions. This is not cost-effective for the Service, nor do they believe size is a determinant factor in the achievement of institutional goals. Instead, it has adopted a policy of operating institutions with a 350-450 inmate capacity in the clustering concept, thereby hoping to effect economies of scale.

Recommendation 52 concerns the establishment of Reception Centres in every region. Part of their reasoning for this was "a bottleneck in the system" ... such that "minimum security institutions are operating below their capacity while maximums and mediums are overcrowded" (p.132).

The Correctional Service of Canada rejected this in favour of its more cost-effective Penitentiary Placement Program. The policy and procedures laid out in 1980 in the Case Management Manual provide that inmates be maintained in receiving institutions, and are accommodated apart from the normal inmate population during their orientation phase. This is thought to capture the spirit of the Sub-Committee's recommendation. It must be noted, however, that a Regional Reception Centre was retained in the Quebec region. Also, the concept is now under review by the Offender Programs Branch. Statistics on the present situation indicate that the population in medium security institutions has substantially increased:

Security Level	**1977**		**1984**	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Maximum* (S6, S7 and Multi-level)	3775	40.4	3638	30.53
Medium (S3, S4 and S5)	4634	46.7	6062	50.86
Minimum** (S1 and S2)	1205	12.9	2041	17.13

* includes regular institutions, medical facilities and the Prison for Women

** includes regular institutions, camps and CCCs.

In Recommendation 58, the Sub-Committee proposed that Regional Psychiatric Centres should be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Correctional Service of Canada and placed under the Federal Ministry of Health and Welfare. This was rejected on the basis that these services could be provided internally. The April 1980 progress report claims that "the spirit of the recommendation, namely that these Psychiatric Centres be operated as 'hospitals', has been acted upon" (p. 41). Hospital accreditation of various RPCs confirms this fact.

The high rate of drug abuse in British Columbia led the Sub-Committee to recommend that a special institution be established there for the treatment of drug addicts (No. 60). The concept was rejected, as "the wider problem of drug abuse is under the Department of Health and Welfare", and because compulsory treatment of addiction (as distinct from compulsory abstinence) was ruled illegal in British Columbia. However, a recent inventory of special addictions programs indicates that the Correctional Service of Canada has made significant progress in this regard.

Pre-Release and Parole

The Sub-Committee's investigations into the parole system and pre-release programs indicated that these services were the subject of considerable contention among staff, inmates and the public. Decision-making was seen by many as arbitrary, "especially in parole revocation without notice or reasons". They reported that "there is much resentment that mandatory supervision places dischargees under conditions similar to parole for a period of time equal to that of their earned and statutory remission" (p. 152). As a result of their findings, the Sub-Committee made the single recommendation (No. 64) that the parole system be reviewed to lessen these arbitrary aspects. The Service has accepted the proposal for long-term implementation. The August 1984 Progress Report outlines the studies and reviews that have been done to expediate and standardize parole:

a) the implementation of changes to the Parole Act, effected by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1977, which included a number of procedural safeguards covering both pre-release and post-release Board operations and decisions;

b) the commissioning of the Conditional Release Study to provide a comprehensive review of all types of conditional release, their strengths and weaknesses as well as a number of recommendations to increase the effectiveness of release practices in Canada. This study has been reviewed by both the National Parole Board and the Service, and a joint plan of action has been developed;

c) a fundamental examination of the entire area of early release and remission by the Correctional Law Review, a component of the Criminal Law Review. Included in this review will be determination of objectives for early release, how it should operate, and who, (i.e., what body), should effect it. The First Consultation Paper has been circulated and written responses invited. Person-to-person consultations are currently taking place. Draft legislation is expected by 1986;

d) the development of guidelines for recommendations relating to conditional release. The National Parole Board has recently approved a conditional release assessment project; the project will be initiated on a pilot basis during the fall of 1984. The project is designed to ensure greater uniformity among institutional and community staff assessing eligibility for conditional release programs and to expedite the case preparation process so that release decisions may be made at the earliest possible legal date;

e) the negotiation and signing of an administrative agreeement between the Service and the National Parole Board. Since 1980, subsequent negotiations have led to the resolution of a significant number of outstanding issues, and has resulted in a new Administrative Agreement that establishes the nature of information and services that the Correctional Service of Canada provides the National Parole Board and vice versa; and

f) the establishment and refinement of standards for residential centres offering structured and specialized programs, as well as sheltered workshops providing services to offenders in the community. On the basis of these standards, per diem rates have been established and funding alternatives developed to ensure that the private sector will be able to deliver residential and non-residential services. Ongoing negotiation with the private sector has led to the signing of approximately 275 contracts with private aftercare agencies.

Conclusion

The Parliamentary Sub-Committee Report ends with a reaffirmation of the importance of dealing with crime and criminality. "A major commitment to fundamental reform" is necessary before justice can be achieved (p. 156). The Sub-Committee recommended that the Penitentiary Service should continue to be supervised by Parliament, and that such supervision should take place in the context of the whole legal system. To this end, they recommended that the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs should have a permanent reference during the 30th and 31st Parliament to enable it to review the implementation of this report in the context of the criminal justice system.

This recommendation (No. 65) is given "special" status by the Service. There was, in fact, no permanent reference established for the 30th and 31st Parliaments. However, according to the June 1981 progress report, "the Service is continuing to keep Members of Parliament aware of the progress it is making" through such general mechanisms as Part III of the Main Estimates and the Solicitor General's Annual Report to Parliament. "The institutions", it adds, "are open to Members of Parliament at all reasonable times" (p.32, June 1981 progress report).

In conclusion, it would appear that the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of 1977 have been relatively well implemented. However, some of those proposals labelled "implemented" by the Service might be better classified as "implemented in modified form". Moreover, once a recommendation is so labelled, subsequent development is not tracked by future progress reports.

Of particular importance is the fact that some key issues remain unresolved. Some of the concerns raised by the report that still challenge the Service include:

- the problem of dual responsibility among staff for both Security and Programs;
- the continuing need to recruit correctional staff with interpersonal skills;
- the responsibility and authority of Wardens;
- early retirement and the Correctional Group issue;
- the continuing need for clarification of the relationship of Regional Headquarters vis-à-vis the institutions;
- the need to consolidate and streamline Commissioner's Directives;
- concern over the issue of Regional Reception Centres; and
- the continuing need for programs for special populations (e.g., young offenders, females, sex offenders, violent inmates and drug addicts).

INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Status
1.	Solicitor General Should Act on Report as Matter of Utmost Urgency	Implemented
IV	THE PURPOSES OF IMPRISONMENT	
2.	Enlarging the Alternatives to Incarceration	Long-term implementation
3.	Standardized Federal/Provincial Correctional Officers	Implemented
V	THE CORRECTIONAL STAFF	
4.	Basic Qualifications for Correctional Officers	Implemented
5.	Mandatory Retirement	Long-term implementation
6.	Initial Training Course for Custodial Personnel	Implemented
7.	Continuing Professional Development for Custodial Personnel	Implemented
8.	Provision of Training Positions	Implemented in modified form
9.	Staff Appointments above Initial Level	Implemented
10.	Probationary Period for New Recruits	Implemented
11.	RCM Police Model for Staff Pay	Long-term implementation
12.	Use of International Exchange Visits	Implemented in modified form
13.	Dual Responsibility for Staff in Program and Security Matters	Implemented in modified form
14.	Identification of Staff and Inmates	Implemented in modified form
15.	No-Deal Ruling for Hostage Takings	Implemented
16.	Establish Emergency Response Teams	Implemented
17.	Females as Correctional Officers	Implemented
18.	Transfer/Retirement/Dismissal of Unsuitable Personnel	Long-term implementation

INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Status
VI	ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PENITENTIARY SERVICE	
19.	Post Analysis	Implemented
20.	Vertical Management System with Short Lines of Authority	Implemented with reservations stated
21.	Responsibilities and Authority of Directors of Institutions	Implemented with reservations stated
22.	Responsibilities of Regional Offices	Implemented in modified form
23.	Security to be Controlled at National Headquarters	Implemented
24.	Appointment of the Commissioner of Corrections	Rejected
25.	Corrections Must be Open and Accountable to the Public	Implemented
26.	Independent Agency Status	Long-term implementation
27.	Entitlement to Belong to Unions	Implemented
28.	Inspector General Must be Appointed	Implemented
VII	JUSTICE WITHIN THE WALLS	
29.	Consolidation of Commissioners Directives	Rejected
30.	Appointment of Independent Chairpersons	Implemented
31.	Administrative Segregation Review Boards	Implemented
32.	Gas Not to be Used as a Normal Practice	Implemented with reservations stated
33.	Transfer of Inmates by Directors	Rejected
34.	Legal Material in Institutional Libraries	Implemented
35.	Clarification of the Calculation of Sentences	Implemented

INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Status
36.	Inmate Grievance Procedure	Implemented
37.	The Position of Correctional Investigator	Implemented
38.	Inmate Committees	Implemented
VIII	WORK, EDUCATION AND TRAINING	
39.	Products of Inmate Labour to Compete on Open Market	Implemented
40.	Prison Industries	Implemented in modified form
41.	Graduated System of Incentives	Implemented
42.	Licensing, Certification and Apprenticeship Programs	Implemented
43.	Academic Education and Trades Training	Implemented
IX	SOCIALIZATION	
44.	Budgets to Allow More Independence in Establishing Programs	Implemented
45.	Oak Ridge Model	Special
46.	Team and Living Unit Concepts	Implemented
47.	Social Interaction Must be Maximized in Prison Life	Implemented
48.	Increased Access by Outside Groups	Implemented
49.	Citizen Advisory Committees	Implemented
X	INSTITUTIONS	
50.	Size of Institutions	Rejected
51.	Controlled Epileptics Should be Allowed in Minimum Security Institutions	Implemented

INDEX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Status
52.	Regional Reception Centres	Rejected
53.	Inmate Meals	Implemented
54.	Records of Dispensed Drugs	Implemented
55.	Prison for Women	Long-term implementation
56.	Special Correctional Centres (Special Handling Units)	Implemented with reservations stated
57.	Institutions for Protective Custody Inmates	Long-term implementation
58.	Regional Psychiatric Centres	Rejected
59.	Separate Institutions for the Treatment of Sex Offenders	Long-term implementation
60.	Separate Institution for the Treatment of Drug Addicts	Rejected
61.	Separate Institution for Youthful Offenders	Implemented in modified form
62.	Institutional Board of Governors	Implemented in modified form
63.	A Study on the Feasibility of Penal Communities	Implemented
XI	PRE-RELEASE AND PAROLE	
64.	Review of Parole Systems to Lessen Arbitrary Aspects	Long-term implementation
	CONCLUSION	
65.	Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs	Special

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The focus of this study was on the work load of the wardens, what factors determine their work and how they spend their time, what priorities the wardens perceive in order to manage the institutions, and what constraints are inhibiting said management.

An executive time management method was applied to gather the information. This method does not produce time and work measurement standards in the industrial engineering sense. However, it does produce the wardens' perceptions of how they see their position as chief executive officer of the institutions.

It was found that wardens have an excessive number of demands made on their time, both from the internal management needs of the institutions and from the external directions they receive from National Headquarters through the Regional Offices.

This demand has resulted in the wardens' two principal concerns. The first is that, given the number of directives, there can be conflicting objectives between the operational requirements of the institutions and the functional objectives which have an impact on institutional management. The second is that much of the wardens' time and work can be filled too easily by responding to demands from Regional Headquarters - to the detriment of the leadership they provide and their visibility within the institution.

In addition to these primary concerns, it was found that there is frequently conflict between the day-to-day operational requirements of the institution as perceived by the wardens and staff, and the implementation of functional directives that originate in National Headquarters. This situation forces the wardens to choose between the institutional needs and the functional managers' needs. The perception is that wardens' management performance is measured on functional compliance and not on the unique requirements of each institution. In some cases, this has led to a credibility gap: wardens feel they are doing a good job while, at the same time, National Headquarters lacks sensitivy to the day-to-day demand of operational management at the institution, and assesses wardens on compliance to directives rather than institutional results. This credibility gap was offset in Regions that have effective management communications between the institutions and the regional offices, and where the regional offices were seen as supportive of institutional management rather than as only a "mouthpiece" for National Headquarters.

The credibility gap was also offset by wardens who have a high degree of self-confidence, to the point where they place the institutional realities ahead of inoperable functional directives without fear of being able to support their decisions, and without fear of reprisal. It *is unfortunate, in many cases, that wardens have to justify effective operational management decisions to those who do not operate in an institutional environment.*

Finally, during the course of this study, it was observed that wardens were highly dedicated to running their institutions well and to seeking improvements. Also, there was evidence of their pride in belonging, as well as loyalty, to Correctional Services Canada.

It appears that improvements should be directed toward attaining recognition of the unique operational requirements of each institution by both Regional and National Headquarters. A shift away from measuring performances largely by compliance with national and standardized directives toward measuring results at a specific institution against objectives that are reasonable and attainable at that institution, seems desireable.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. TIME AND ACTIVITY ANALYSIS

The conclusions resulting from the analysis of time and activities are as follows:

1. Normal Work Week

It is not unusual for the majority of wardens to work 50 hours per week. At the same time, wardens attempt to contain their work week to between 40 and 50 hours. The flexibility in number of hours per week is largely dependant on the "mood" of the institution. This is subject to change at any time.

2. Discretionary Time

Seventy-five per cent of the wardens indicated that between 20 to 25 per cent of their time in a normal work week was discretionary. Discretionary time was identified as time within a normal work week that the wardens could use as they saw fit and when they wanted.

3. Activities That Consume Time

The majority of wardens indicated that what activities consumed their time in a normal work week were directly dependant on the "mood" of the institution. The activities fell naturally into two categories: (1) internal directed, such as staff and inmate meetings, and; (2) external directed such as RHQ meetings and response to RHQ requests. There was a distinct trend that wardens could use and wanted more time for internal directed activities, but this was precluded by external directed activities, particularly those deriving from RHQ.

4. Perception of Priorities

All the wardens indicated that they perceived their priorities as being focused on the daily management of the institution; namely, staff morale, inmate morale, visibility within the institution, and providing leadership to other managers. None of the wardens indicated that responding to RHQ requests, or processing documents, was a priority unless such actions could be related directly to the above four areas.

5. Time Wasters

Wardens identified four principal time wasters; that is, activities they are asked to perform or participate in because of the way the Service is managed, but which can consume wardens' management time and detract from their perceived priorities. These are

1. *the volume of paper;*

2. the number of requests and/or demands coming from RHQ with too short a turnaround time;
3. the volume of procedures and directives;
4. the number of audits and investigations.

6. Determinants

Two principal determinants cause the wardens to spend their time the way they do. The first is their own perception of what the institution's operations management requires of them each day. The second is the demands and requests that come from RHQ/NHQ - which the majority of the wardens felt were continuously increasing.

7. General Conclusion

It appears that the activity span required of the wardens to manage the day-to-day operations of the institution, and to respond to requests from RHQ/NHQ, is too great. This can result in a conflict of priorities between institutional needs and RHQ/NHQ needs. If such a trend continues unabated, it can lead to both management and organizational stress at all levels of the Correctional Services organization.

B. WORK LOAD ANALYSIS

The conclusions resulting from the analysis of work load and how it is managed by the wardens are as follows:

8. Work load

Wardens are not bothered by the amount of work they have to do, but by what causes the work, its sources, and its relevance to the institutions' needs.

9. Deadlines

The majority of wardens do not control the setting of deadlines. Such control rests primarily with RHQ/NHQ. This is aggravated by the short turnaround times given to the institutions to respond to deadlines.

10. Discretion

The majority of wardens have little discretion in adjusting deadlines. The exceptions to this are in Regions where the wardens considered communications to be very good between the institutions and RHQ.

11. Sufficient Support Staff

There was a division of opinion among wardens as to whether or not they had sufficient support staff. The majority of wardens felt they needed more flexibility in the type of support staff and the timing of utilization. Some wardens indicated the need for more authority to select the assistant wardens for their own institution.

12. Constraints

Wardens identified four areas of constraints that affect their capacity to manage the work of the institution. These are: human resources; authority and control; management communications; and administrative management. The majority of wardens identified authority and control, and administrative management (paper work and systems) as the two prime constraint areas.

13. Actions to Improve Work-Load Management

In order to improve their work-load management in terms of quality and results, wardens indicated that the following actions would be necessary: an increase in the autonomy of the wardens through the delegation of more signing authority; a reduction in the paperwork and the number of various types of audits; a simplification of the accountability process; and integration of functional management objectives with operational objectives at the institution.

14. General Conclusion

Wardens are not afraid of hard work nor of the actual volume of work they have to contend with. However, much of their work is in responding to demands for information from RHQ/NHQ. Assuming they had more autonomy, wardens maintain that they could reduce the amount of paperwork and have more control of the institution's management systems. This, in turn, would produce more qualitative results which reflect the unique requirements of each institution.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Report

The Bureau of Management Consulting was asked by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Solicitor General of Canada on the Management of Correctional Institutions to submit a report on wardens' work load.

BMC was directed not to propose recommendations, but rather to provide information to the Committee that would describe the wardens' work load. Such information would become part of a larger body of knowledge held by the Committee.

Because of the short time frame, BMC was instructed to concentrate on gathering information primarily from wardens. This was accomplished and the report reflects the results of this work. It should be noted that information was gathered on wardens' perceptions of their work. Time measurement was not performed nor was it necessary for the objective of this project.

A word of thanks is made to Mr. L. Gosselin of Correctional Services Canada who expedited access to the wardens, and to the wardens themselves who cooperated fully.

1.2 Organization of the Report

In addition to this introductory chapter, the report consists of three other chapters. Chapter 2, Time and Activities, presents the principal findings resulting from the responses to the questionnaire and interviews on what activities consume the wardens' time. Chapter 3, Work Load and Management presents the principal findings on work-load management. Chapter 4, Summary Remarks, concludes the report. The report did not call for recommendations and none are presented. However, in presenting the Summary Remarks, certain directions and/or ways and means to resolve issues are inevitable. They are presented as considerations for management or possible actions for future study. Chapter 4 is interpretative in that it reflects the perspectives the consultant has identified as being most important in terms of wardens' work load.

1.3 Methodology

An executive time management method was used to gather information on the work-load of wardens. This method is based on self-reporting. Two principal approaches were used. The first was to send a questionnaire to all wardens. This questionnaire is included as Appendix A. Appendix B is the list of wardens and institutions to whom the questionnaire was sent. Appendix C illustrates the number of responses from each region. Of a total of 39 wardens, 36 had responded by October 19, 1984 for a response rate of 92 per cent.

The second thrust was to interview a selected number of wardens. All wardens who were contacted agreed to the interviews and only one was missed because of unforeseen circumstances. A total number of 20 wardens, 51.3 per cent of the present warden population, were interviewed over a three week period. Most interviews occurred at the institution but, in a few cases where it was more convenient to the warden, interviews were held at a hotel in the region. The selection of wardens interviewed was based on two factors:

1. representation on a regional basis; and
2. representation by security level of the institution.

In this way, a national perspective of wardens' work load and issues could be presented.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather information on wardens' work load by using an executive time management approach. This approach reveals the principal activities that consume wardens' time, the priorities that they give to those activities, the factors that determine how and when they spend time and, from the wardens' perspective, activities that are perceived as hindrances or deterrents to the effective management of their time and work.

The purpose of the interviews was to confirm some of the consistent responses in the questionnaire, to clarify issues of work management that wardens felt were hindering better use of time, and to propose ways and means to possibly resolve some of these issues.

The information that follows is a composite of what the wardens revealed in both the responses to the questionnaire and the interviews. It should not be interpreted as coming from any one warden, nor as necessarily representative of all wardens in any one region. Because of the completeness of the wardens' responses, the information reflects an amalgamation of their work as well as the selectivity of the consultant in presenting the findings which address the subject of this report.

CHAPTER II

TIME AND ACTIVITIES

Introduction

Questionnaires were sent to a total of 39 wardens. Responses (by analysis time of October 19), were received from 36 wardens, representing a national response rate of 92.3 per cent. Representation from the regions was considered very good in terms of information and interpretation.

This chapter presents the major findings on time and activities resulting from an analysis of the responses and results of the interviews.[1]

2.1 Normal Work Week

Figure 1 illustrates the number of wardens relative to the number of hours worked in a normal week. There are two obvious clusters. On an average, 16 wardens worked between 50 and 55 hours per week, 18 wardens between 40 and 50 hours.

In general, wardens tried to contain their working hours to between 40 and 60 hours per week. Most of them felt that a 50 hour week was not necessarily unusual, and was both anticipated and needed because of the nature of the operations.

For a chief executive officer, 50 or 60 hours per week is not an unreasonable amount of time to allocate to the job. However, in the warden's situation, what was of concern was not the amount of time but the number of diverse activities with which they have to contend. A significant portion of these are initiated from outside the institutions. Spending excessive time on such activities detracts from the amount of time available for institutional needs, and can subsequently effect the quality of work at the institutional level.

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1. In some cases, the total responses in each figure may differ from the total respondents to the Questionnaire. There are two reasons for this (a) the respondents did not answer all the questions and/or (b) some information was added from the interviews.


Figure 1. Length of Normal Work Week

2.2 Discretionary Time

Discretionary time was defined as the amount of time in a normal work week, that the wardens could use as they saw best i.e., they could decide what to do and when to do it.

Of the 28 wardens who responded to this question, 22 of them indicated that 30 per cent or less of their time was discretionary. This represents 78.5 per cent of the respondents to this question.

Given the size and complexity of Correctional Services with its multitude of program objectives, this is a reasonable amount of discretionary time. However, 25 per cent discretionary time per week translates into approximately 1 day per week or 4 to 5 days per month. Considering the extent and scope of institutional operational activities, there is little room over a monthly period for slippage. If wardens do not manage their time tightly, they run the continuous risk of falling behind, with its subsequent frustrations.

Figure 2 illustrates the number of wardens and the percentage of discretionary time they felt they had each week.



2.3 Principal Time-Consuming Activities in a Normal Work Week

Because of the uniqueness of each institution and its specific on site day-to-day operational requirements, wardens allocate their time differently out of necessity. This time allocation can vary according to current priorities which change because of the nature of the operation of an institution. It must be kept in mind that any institution is a composite of human beings in close physical proximity, made up of many small groups with different and conflicting vested interests. The institution is a dynamic human organization within a confined physical space. As such, the day-to-day operational management needs can be constantly fluid. In this setting, wardens need to know that they are in charge and have the support and understanding of their superiors. Recognition of the several principal activities in which wardens must participate and be involved, and the constraints under which they operate, is one step toward this understanding. For those who have not actively participated in the day-to-day operational management and leadership requirements at an institution, the extent of activities may be difficult to comprehend.

Because of the variation in responses as to how each warden allocates their time, it was not meaningful to do cummulative summaries by activities.

Figure 3 illustrates two wardens' examples of the percentage of weekly available time allocated to principal activities.

Appendix D gives additional individual examples of the principal activities that consume the wardens' time. These particular examples were selected as illustrations because of their completeness and because they represent the range of activities wardens must carry out in order to do their job.

Figure 3 Individual Wardens' Examples of Percentage of Weekly Time Required to Perform Principal Activities

Activity	% of Available Time
Warden (1)	
1. responding to demands from the Region and Ottawa	40
2. attending various meetings	20
3. responding to correspondence	20
4. analyzing and planning for programs	5
5. planning for institutional administrative support services, e.g., finance, technical services	10
6. visiting the institution	5
Warden (2)	
1. meetings with staff	30
2. meetings with inmates	10
3. reports for RHQ/NHQ	15
4. reading of documents	20
5. correspondence	10
6. visiting the institution	15

2.4 Perception of Priorities

The purpose of this question was to solicit, from the wardens, what they perceive to be most important in terms of allocating time and attention to each week. Unlike the question on principal activities which identified how wardens' time is consumed, the responses to the question on priorities identify where the wardens believe their priority activity areas ought to be in terms of successful operational management of the institutions.

Across the spectrum of wardens, there was general agreement on what these priority activity areas should be. There was some variation in the order of priority, according to the security level of the institution (maximum, medium, or minimum) but this was not sufficient to negate the general order listed below.

Most wardens assumed that the institution was physically secure; but they did not take this for granted. Given physical security, there are several priority activity areas where the wardens believe they should spend time, in order to have a well-managed institution. These are:

- staff morale;
- inmate morale;
- visibility within the institution; and
- leadership.

Without doubt, the wardens' responses uphold the institutional management priorities that require full attention: staff and inmates morale; visibility of the warden within the institution; and leadership in terms of making or effecting management decisions. All these priority activity areas are directed toward the well-being of the institution on a daily basis. And well-being of the institution implies both staff and inmates.

Activities that are not in accord with these priority activity areas can consume time, to the potential detriment of the well-being of the institution. Responses to the next question on "time wasters" indicate some of the actions wardens are required to perform which require time to be spent away from the priority areas.

Figure 4 illustrates some specific examples of priority statements made by individual wardens.

FIGURE 4 - Examples of Priority Statements

Warden 1
monitoring the institutional security operations;
monitoring the case management system;
monitoring the medical department;
monitoring the physical plant; and
monitoring food and programs

Warden 2
visibility to inmates and staff by institutional tours;
Inmate Committee/interview meetings;
staff assemblies/interviews; and
senior institutional management meetings/interviews.

Warden 3
"any issue staff or inmate oriented which threatens the good order of the institution"

Warden 4
"The official functioning of the institution in accordance with prescribed policies and procedures. Therefore the most important factor given attention is the communication network and the maintenance of a 'team' approach to everyday management."

2.5 Principal Time-Wasters

As defined in the context of this report, "time-wasters" are activities that the wardens are asked to perform or participate in, but are not essential to the day-to-day operations of the institution.

Such activities are frequently considered necessary by both functional and line managers at other levels of the Correctional Services organization. Initiation of such activities results in additional work for the wardens and institutional managers. Wardens are expected to respond to and act upon such requests and demands. Often, such requests and demands are in accord with the priorities of someone other than the warden, and have little direct bearing on the operational needs of the institution. These requests come from multiple sources, usually originating at NHQ, and are passed on through RHQ for action at the institutional level.

Figure 5 is a sample list of such activities. The list is not exhaustive. However, it identifies some of the concerns of the wardens and the likely sources of these concerns. There is probably no item in this list that the wardens have not previously identified as requiring attention and improvement, particularly at their annual conferences. Yet, from the wardens' perspectives, the list and volume continues to grow. And from the wardens' perception, if they do not respond or act, they are considered to be less than good managers.

A 'caveat' needs to be noted here. Not all the wardens in all the regions found each item on the list a major concern nor of equal weight. Some of the wardens managed these "time-wasters" more effectively than others, with the result that the burden of such activities was diminished at the institutional level. This was particularly so in those regions where communications between RHQ and the institutions was considered excellent, and where the former was seen as a support to operational management at the institution.

Utilizing the data from the responses to this question and confirming the findings through interviews, one can determine that, on a national basis, the following factors are contributing significantly to the wardens' work load:

(1) the actual volume of paper work that requires the wardens' attention, estimated to have more than doubled in the past five years;

(2) the actual number of requests for information and demands for action coming from RHQ, with too short a turnaround time for response, and frequently for information which is already available elsewhere;

(3) the volume of procedures and directives, coupled with the frequency with which some of these are revised. Add to this the fact that many of the directives go beyond a statement of policy to be implemented and into the actual "how to implement" at the institutional level. There is sometimes a gap in the requirements for operational reality at the institution and the detailed implementation requirements stated in the directives;

(4) the number of audits, investigations and unannounced visitors, all requiring wardens' and institutional managers' time and work.

Of all the areas of information in this report, this one was of major concern to the wardens. It is threatening for several reasons. The continuous growth of such requests and demands not only adds to the wardens' work load, but consumes much valuable time which could be better spent in the institution. Wardens who do not respond positively and on time are seen to be less effective managers. And because wardens have raised several of these issues before, and there has been little change, they feel they are not being heard. It would seem timely to act upon several of the initiatives put forth by the wardens.

FIGURE 5 - Examples of Major and Repetitive Time-Wasters

1. Number of requests and demands from RHQ/NHQ.
2. Reviewing of requests for information which is already available from other sources.
3. Lack of reasonable timeframes for responding to questions, etc.
4. The actual volume of paper to be reviewed, responded to and processed.
5. The large number of directives (500 plus) and their complexity.

FIGURE 5 - Examples of Major and Repetitive Time-Wasters (Continued)

6. The excessive number of "checks", "balances", audits and inspections to which the institution is subjected.
7. Issues which need to be justified and rejustified "ad infinitum".
8. Drop-in visitors, even from RHQ, without prior appointments.
9. Preparing and responding to draft CDS's.
10. Investigation and committee requirements, unless they result in positive support for management and improvement.
11. Conflicting objectives among functional managers which complicate operational management and results achievement at the institutional level.
12. The imposition of administrative systems which are not realistic at the institutional level.
13. Too much correspondence.
14. Volume and duration of meetings and situations where several persons are involved in order to make a decision.
15. Delays in filling vacant positions.
16. The number of documents to be signed by the warden, and therefore the lack of delegated signing authority.
17. The extent of allowed redress for both staff and inmates, and therefore the corresponding paper processing requirements this entails.

2.6 Principal Determinants

In the context of this report, "principal determinants or factors that cause the warden to spend time" implies both activities and policies that constitute the major portion of the wardens' work.

In several cases, responses to this question correlated with responses to the question on priorities or to the question on time-wasters. What is significant in the responses is the underlying theme that the wardens act on what they believe to be the most important institutional requirements on any particular day. In other words, they take action on what they see as institutional priorities. Because of the nature of the operation and the uniqueness of each institution, these priorities can change on a daily basis. Issues (be they with inmates or staff) cannot be left unresolved or else they magnify and quickly affect the well-being of the institution.

This perception of institutional issues primarily determines how wardens spend their time and what work they accomplish over a reasonable period. Figure 6 - Institution Directed Principal Determinants - illustrates some of the wardens' responses.

There is a whole set of other factors that determine how wardens must spend their time and what work they must do. These other determinants principally come from outside the institution. Figure 7 illustrates some of these other directed determinants.

The point to be made here is that as these other directed determinants increase in both number and volume, the warden has more work to do which is not directed toward the operational management of the institution. Wardens' perceptions indicate that the trend is in this direction.

FIGURE 6 - Institution Directed Principal Determinants

- daily operations and emergent situations;
- various crises;
- urgency to provide solutions to problems;
- daily work of both inmates and staff;
- decision and reflection time to resolve daily issues;
- status of the institution related to peace, security, and tranquility;
- monitoring atmosphere of inmate population;
- requirements and demands of staff and inmates;
- daily communications with staff and inmates.

FIGURE 7 - Other Directed Determinants

- volume of paper work dictated by policy of accountability;
- turnaround time imposed by RHQ;
- visitors from RHQ and NHQ;
- pre-set meetings, particularly those at RHQ;
- need to respond to more than one branch of the organization at NHQ;
- several requests for similar information from several sources;
- instructions from superiors;
- need to keep current with policies, directives, information;
- impositions by Regional or National Headquarters; and
- system and boss-imposed requirements.

2.7 Conclusions

The conclusions resulting from the analysis of time and activities are as follows:

Normal Work Week

It is not unusual for the majority of wardens to work 50 hours per week. At the same time, wardens attempt to contain their work week to between 40 and 50 hours. The flexibility in number of hours per week is largely dependant on the "mood" of the institution. This is subject to change at any time.

Discretionary Time

Forty-seven per cent of the wardens indicated that between 5 to 30 per cent of their time in a normal work week was discretionary. Discretionary time was identified as time within a normal work week that the wardens could use as they saw fit and when they wanted.

Activities That Consume Time

The majority of wardens indicated that the activities that consumed their time in a normal work week were directly dependant on the "mood" of the institution. The activities fell naturally into two categories: (1) internal directed, such as staff and inmate meetings, and; (2) external directed such as RHQ meetings and response to RHQ requests. There was a distinct trend that wardens could use and wanted more time for internal directed activities, but this was precluded by external directed activities, particularly those deriving from RHQ.

Perception of Priorities

All the wardens indicated that they perceived their priorities as being focused on the daily management of the institution; namely, staff morale, inmate morale, visibility within the institution, and providing leadership to other managers. None of the wardens indicated that responding to RHQ requests and processing paper documents was a priority, unless such actions could be related directly to the above four areas.

Time Wasters

Wardens identified four principal time-wasters, i.e., activities they are asked to perform or participate in because of the way the Service is managed, but which can consume wardens' management time and detract from quality time away from their perceived priorities. These are

1. the actual volume of paper;
2. the actual number of requests and/or demands coming from RHQ with too short a turnaround time;
3. the volume of procedures and directives;
4. the number of audits and investigations.

Determinants

Two principal determinants cause the wardens to spend their time the way they do. The first is their own perception of what the institution's operations management requires of them each day. The second is the demands and requests that come from RHQ/NHQ. The majority of the wardens felt that the latter was continuously increasing.

General Conclusion

It appears that the activity span required of the wardens to manage the day-to-day operations of the institution, and to respond to requests from RHQ/NHQ, is too great. This can result in a conflict of priorities between institutional needs and RHQ/NHQ needs. Several wardens feel they are in a position when they are being evaluated on what they see as lower priority issues. If such a trend continues unabated, it can lead to both management and organizational stress at all levels of the Service organization.

CHAPTER III

WORK LOAD AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed activities that consume wardens' time, how their time is allocated, priorities, time-wasters, and factors that cause time to be spent the way it is.

This chapter addresses whether or not the wardens have too much work, how they manage their work load, the constraints on managing the work, and some actions they believe are needed in order to manage their work load better.

The information for this chapter comes from both the responses to the questionnaire (particularly questions 13 through 30), and the interviews.

3.1 Too Much Work

Wardens were asked whether or not they have too much work to do. Fifty-two per cent of the respondents indicated "too much work", 44 per cent indicated "no", and 4 per cent indicated "sometimes".

The principal reasons for indicating too much work were:

1. The number of hours required to do the job;
2. The administrative paper burden; and,
3. The lack of control over work demands.

Some respondents indicated that they did not have too much work. They felt that this was largely because of their own management style and the fact that they felt they had "good self-management control" over the work; in other words, they determined what work was important and how to get it done.

There were some regional differences in the responses. One region indicated strongly that they had too much work; another indicated strongly that they did not feel that they had too much work.

Correlating this with other information, it is significant that wardens who indicated "too much work", generally had a low opinion of their Regional Headquarters, whereas those who indicated "not too much work" held their Regional Headquarters in high regard.

3.2 Deadlines

Wardens were asked who and what circumstances tend to set their work deadlines. Seventy-five per cent stated that deadlines were set by RHQ/NHQ; 25 per cent stated that they were largely in control of setting deadlines. However, even in this latter group, it was indicated that where they lacked control, deadlines were determined by RHQ/NHQ.

Again, the same regional differences appeared as in 3.1. The wardens who held their RHQ in high regard were those who felt they had greater flexibility in setting and meeting deadlines. This is likely a reflection of good communications between RHQ and the wardens.

3.3 Discretion to Adjust

Wardens were asked whether or not they had discretion to adjust deadlines to meet the unique institutional operational requirements. Seventy-one per cent indicated a definite "no" or "very rarely". Twenty per cent indicated "yes". The regional variation again appeared in these responses; namely, the wardens who held their RHQ in high regard were those who felt they had the greater amount of discretion in adjusting to deadlines.

3.4 Sufficient Support Staff

Wardens were asked whether or not they had sufficient support staff to whom they could delegate routine work and thereby allow themselves more work time for priorities.

Fifty-nine per cent of the respondents indicated they had sufficient support staff; 41 per cent indicated they did not.

There were no significant regional variations among the responses. Variations were largely from institution to institution, even within the same region.

Those wardens who indicated that they lacked sufficient support staff gave the following contributing factors:

- absenteeism;
- lack of clerical support for the assistant wardens;

- lack of quality support staff, and;
- the need for, at least, an executive assistant.

3.5 Constraints to Doing the Work Well

Wardens were asked what the principal constraints were that affected them, as the chief executive officer of the institution, in doing their work well. There was a 96 per cent response rate to this question.

The responses were grouped into "four general" categories:

(a) human resources;
(b) authority and control;
(c) management communications; and
(d) administrative management.

Figure 8 illustrates, under each category, recurring constraints identified by wardens.

FIGURE 8 - Recurring Constraints to "doing the job well" Identified by Wardens

Category	Recurring Constraints
A. Human Resources	° absenteeism; ° lack of adequate clerical support; ° resource shortages; ° lack of experienced senior and support staff; ° lack of well trained support staff; ° lack of control in hiring/firing.
B. Authority and Control	° excessive control; ° limited by functional authority centralized at RHQ; ° lack of autonomy and too much functional control; ° having to justify most decisions to several sources; ° shift of authority and control of resources from line managers to functional managers; ° centralization and erosion of wardens' authority over past five years; ° too many regulations; ° budgeting process.
C. Management Communications	° lack of understanding, on the part of superiors, to the operational reality of institutions; ° excessive demands for time away from the institution; ° need for consensus from several functional areas; ° external decisions that have an impact on local decision making.
D. Administrative Management	° proliferation of directives, guidelines, regulations; ° excessive paperburden; ° too many and too frequent reports.

3.6 Actions to Improve Work-Load Management

Wardens were asked what actions they would take (if they had the authority) to improve their work load management. There was an 80 per cent response rate to this question.

Figure 9 illustrates the most common responses. These have been selected from individual warden's responses and are therefore not priorized. And as many of them are specific action steps, they have not been grouped into different categories. However, there is an evident correlation between several of these action steps and the four broad categories identified in 3.5.

FIGURE 9 - Actions to Improve Work-Load Management

- reduce paperwork;
- increase autonomy in the application of directives to institutional needs;
- integrate objectives at the institutional level;
- reduce the number of established "watch dog" controls;
- a deputy warden would assist in all situations;
- a competent administrator;
- more training of subordinate staff;
- an executive assistant or deputy warden;
- re-institute ultimate authority in the warden;
- simplify the accountability process;
- rationalize the current reporting system;
- reorganize the reporting procedures;
- decrease the frequency of status reports;
- increase the use of computers; and
- adequate signing authority.

3.7 Conclusions

The conclusions resulting from the analysis of work load and how it is managed by the wardens are as follows:

Work load

Wardens are not bothered by the amount of work they have to do, but by what causes the work, its sources, and its relevance to the institution's needs.

Deadlines

The majority of wardens do not have control over the setting of deadlines. Such control rests primarily with RHQ/NHQ. This is aggravated by the short turnaround times given to the institutions to respond to deadlines.

Discretion

The majority of wardens have little discretion in adjusting deadlines. The exceptions to this are in Regions where the wardens considered communications to be very good between the institutions and RHQ.

Sufficient Support Staff

There was a division of opinion among wardens as to whether or not they had sufficient support staff. The majority of wardens felt they needed more flexibility in the type of support staff and the timing of utilization. Some wardens indicated the need for more authority to select the assistant wardens for their own institution.

Constraints

Wardens identified four areas of constraints affecting their capacity to manage the work of the institution. These are: human resources; authority and control; management communications, and administrative management. The majority of wardens identified authority and control, and administrative management (paper work and systems) as the two prime constraint areas.

Actions to Improve Work-Load Management

In order to improve their work-load management, in terms of quality and results, wardens indicated that the following actions would be necessary: an increase in the autonomy of the wardens through the delegation of more signing authority; a reduction in the paperwork and the number of various types of audits; a simplification of the accountability process; and integration of functional management objectives with operational objectives at the institution.

General Conclusion

Wardens are not afraid of hard work nor of the actual volume of work they have to contend with. However, much of their work is in responding to demands for information, etc., from RHQ/NHQ. Assuming they had more autonomy, wardens maintain they could reduce the amount of paperwork and have more control of the institution's management systems. This, in turn, would produce more qualitative results which would reflect the unique requirements of each institution.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY REMARKS

Introduction

This chapter concludes the report on wardens' work load with some summary remarks.

The information in Chapters 2 and 3 came directly from the wardens. The remarks in this chapter are interpretations, reflecting the perspectives the consultant has identified as being most important in terms of the subject matter of this report.

4.1 Response Rates

Seventy-seven per cent of the wardens had responded to the questionnaire by October 10, 1984. This was the base from which the information was analyzed. Responses that were received after October 10 did not change the findings and increased the response rate to 92.3 per cent.

4.2 Management Experience

The questionnaire respondents represent a total of 200 years warden experience, with a national mean of 7.5 years.

4.3 Issues

(1) The wardens have too much to do in carrying out their responsibilities, too much in terms of number of activities, and too much in terms of the volume of paper that crosses their desks in one form or another.

(2) Of necessity, the wardens' primary focus of attention has to be on the day-to-day operational needs of the institution. And the institution operates everyday. The scope of activities required to do this is extensive. Unnecessary or uncoordinated intrusions from outside the institution (be it paperwork or persons) on a continuous basis can be dysfunctional to the well-being of the institutions. Indications are that such intrusions are increasing, requiring more of the wardens' time and work away from institutional priorities.

(3) Power and influence are dispersed. It is stated that wardens have the authority to manage the institutions; they do have the responsibility and they are certainly

held accountable. But they do not control the resources nor the management systems of their own institutions. Such control is dispersed among several functional managers at RHQ/NHQ. It is a classic case of largely top down management through the introduction of various functional systems which, in some cases, constrain and hinder operations at the institution rather then support them. There is too much functional system implementation effort and not enough building of operational systems which support the management needs of each institution. The latter approach would provide functional managers with the information they need, but those managers would have to integrate the information themselves rather than trying to force integration at the institution level.

(4) The consequence of the issue raised in (3) is conflicting objectives within the institution setting, objectives that are function oriented rather than operation results oriented. As a result of this, managers feel they are judged more often on their compliance with functional directives rather than on the results of operations at the institution. Witness the proliferation of directives, which go beyond a statement of desired end results to specifics on implementation at an institution, in an attempt to standardized how an objective will be reached. Given the uniqueness of each institution, this is unrealistic.

4.4 Concluding Remark

Every person encountered during the course of this work was dedicated and experienced. Many had positive solutions to the management issues they face. They get little recognition when things go well, and suffer severe consequences when they don't. In the words of one experienced warden: "What we need is one correctional service with autonomous institutions; unfortunately what we have is management by centralized systems and functional directives. The latter are not working at the institutional level."

APPENDICES

A. Questionnaire

B. List of Wardens and Institutions

C. Illustration of Responses

D. Examples of Principal Activities that Consume Wardens' Time

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

September 10, 1984

ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA ON THE MANAGEMENT OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to introduce myself, the type of work I have been asked to do with you, and how I intend to proceed.

I am a principal consultant with the Bureau of Management Consulting. BMC has been engaged by the Advisory Committee to the Solicitor General, and asked to examine warden workload. I am using an executive time management method for this work.

I am trying to determine how your work time is allocated, in other words what are the principal activities you do in fulfilling your responsibilities, how much time is allocated to these activities, and the amount of discretion you have in determining how your time is spent.

To do this, I am using three approaches:

1. direct phone calls to you;
2. a letter to each one of you soliciting your comments, opinions, and information;
3. interviews with as many of you as possible within the time period.

My work has to be completed by October 12, 1984, so we have a short time period. I want to emphasize that the results will be depersonalized and whatever information you provide will be held in confidence and therefore not identifiable with any one person.

The results of this work will be incorporated into a presentation and brief report to the Advisory Committee to the Solicitor General of Canada on the Management of Correctional Institutions.

With regard to procedure I suggest the following.

First, I will attempt to phone each one of you. At the same time, please feel free to call me at a time convenient to you. My office numbers are (613) 996-8445, 992-2510, my home number is (613) 731-7580. We can do a lot over the phone, and also clarify points I am developing as we proceed.

Secondly, I have attached a brief questionnaire which will prompt your thinking on how your time is consumed, on what activities, and why. This questionnaire is simply an information gathering tool, so if there is information missed that you consider important, please add this to your response and letter to me. **DO NOT FEEL BOUND BY THE QUESTIONNAIRE ONLY!**

Thirdly, there will not be enough time to interview each one of you. Therefore, the importance of written responses and phone conversations is highlighted to assure that you have the opportunity to provide valuable input to the study. A travel schedule is being arranged for me; as soon as I know this I will contact those to be interviewed to arrange a time convenient to you when I am in the area.

This is enough information for now. I have attached the Guidelines Questions on Time Allocation. I ask that you return this no later than September 28, 1984, and earlier if possible.

I look forward to talking and meeting with you. In the meantime if there are questions please call. (If I am not at the number leave a message and I will return your call within 24 hours).

I welcome your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Tompkins
Principal Consultant
Bureau of Management Consulting
365 Laurier Avenue West, Room 628
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0S5

c.c. J. Carson
L. Gosselin

GUIDELINE QUESTIONS ON TIME AND WORK ALLOCATION

Introduction

- Answer as many questions as you want, and add additional information you think would be useful.

- The best method to approach the questions is to take an hour or two in a quiet location, where you will not be interrupted.

- There can be two benefits to answering the questions. First, responses may reveal information to you that you did not think about before, and may be of use to you in managing your time better. Second, the response will provide raw data into the study.

- Responses can be handwritten if readable; otherwise please type. Some of you may wish to send a cassette and that is acceptable too.

PART 1 - QUESTIONS: TIME AND ACTIVITIES

1. **How long is your normal work week?**

   Answer in terms of hours, for example, 30, 40, 60, 80 hours.

2. **Of this normal work week, how much of your time is discretionary?**

   Discretionary time means that you have complete control over and can allocate to your priority activities.

   Answer in terms of number of hours relative to your normal work week, or a percentage of your normal work week hours.

3. **What are the principal activities that consume your time in a normal work week?**

   Answer by listing these activities one under the other.

   Note that most executives find that principal activities range from 7 through 12. You may have more. Possible examples in your case could be: meeting with staff; meetings with inmates; meetings with public groups; completing reports for RHQ; etc., etc., etc.

   In responding, it is important to think in terms of those activities which take up most of your time in any one week.

4. **As the chief executive officer of the institution, what do you see as your priorities, i.e., what is it that you believe most important that you give attention to each week?**

5. **From your experience, what do you consider to be the principal "time wasters" you have to contend with?**

6. **Do you maintain a daily time log?**

   Answer 'yes' or 'no'.

   A daily time log tells one how much time has been used against what activities.

7. **Do you analyze your time log occasionally with the intention of making changes?**

8. **Do you in fact make changes as the result of this analysis?**

9. **What are the principal "determinants" or factors tht cause you to spend time?**

10. **Do you take a "quiet hour" each day, to reflect, list your priorities, and daily objectives?**

11, **At the end of your day, do you review what has been accomplished, and set objectives for the next day?**

12. **Has your employer ever provided you with the opportunity to take an executive time management course?**

PART 2 - QUESTIONS: WORK LOAD AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

13. Do you have too much work to do? If the response is 'yes', how do you know this?

14. Who or what circumstances tend to set your work deadlines?

15. Do you have discretion in terms of adjusting these deadlines to meet your unique institutional situation?

16. How frequently do you meet with your superior on a regular basis for progress reporting?

17. Do you have sufficient support staff to whom you can delegate routine work, leaving yourself for priorities?

18. Based on your management expertise, list some specific actions you would like to take in order to manage the work load better.

19. What are the principal constraints you face as chief executive officer of the institution in doing your work well?

20. How many years of experience have you had in the management of this institution or any other institution within the Service?

Conclusion

This completes the set of questions to which I would like you to respond. There may be other points you want to raise, and please feel free to do so.

Thank you for your time, cooperation, and work.

Robert G. Tompkins

APPENDIX B

MASTER LIST OF INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTIONS	WARDEN
Atlantic Region	
Dorchester Penitentiary	D. Ferguson
Springhill Institution	N. Corcoran
Westmorland Institution	J. Davidson
Quebec Region	
Archambault Institution	P. Viau
Ste-Anne des Plaines Institution	R. Benoit
Cowansville Institution	J. Lupien
Montée St-François Institution	J. Dallaire
La Macaza Institution	M. Jacques
Laval Institution	M. Lafleur
Leclerc Institution	R. Rousseau
Drummond Institution	J. Dyotte
Federal Training Centre	A. Lemarier
Correctional Development Centre	R. Caron
Regional Reception Centre	P. Goulem
Ontario Region	
Bath Institution	M. Willard
Collins Bay Institution	K. Payne
Frontenac Institution	G. Downing
Joyceville Institution	R. Gobeil
Kingston Penitentiary	M. Dawson
Millhaven Institution	J. Ryan
Pittsburgh Institution	J. Caird
Prison For Women	G. Caron
Warkworth Institution	H. Neufeld
Prairie Region	
Drumheller Institution	D. Kane
Saskatchewan Penitentiary	J. O'Sullivan
Saskatchewan Farm Institution	K. Hemstad
Stony Mountain Institution	A. Stevenson
Rockwood Institution	J. Keane
Edmonton Institution	B. Benner
Bowden Institution	M. Gallagher
Regional Psychiatric Centre	R. Gilles

MASTER LIST OF INSTITUTIONS
(Continued)

INSTITUTIONS	WARDEN
Pacific Region	
Kent Institution	J. Stonoski
Regional Psychiatric Centre	P. LaMoth
Matsqui Institution	W. Scissons
Mission Institution	R. Lusk
Mountain Institution	P. DeVink
William Head Institution	A. Bender
Elbow Lake Institution	P. Jacks
Ferndale Institution	M. Van Der Veen

APPENDIX C

NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE BY REGION BY OCTOBER 19, 1984

REGION	TOTAL INSTITUTIONS	NUMBER OF RESPONSES	%
Atlantic	3	3	100.0
Quebec	11	11	100.0
Ontario	9	7	77.0
Prairies	8	7	87.5
Pacific	8	8	100.0
TOTALS	39	36	92.3

APPENDIX D

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 1

Principal Activities

- Meetings with staff, as an executive group, individual managers, individual staff, unions;
- Paper work:
  - responding to audits,
  - responding to RHQ, NHQ requests,
  - reviewing, responding to work of Divisional Heads,
  - minutes of meetings, reports, etc., and
  - performance appraisals,
- Contacts with RHQ personnel over staffing, performance appraisals, classification issues;
- Resolving problems as they occur;
- Reviewing programs and institutional policies to develop and maintain a high caliber of service;
- Reviewing issues surrounding parole, problems raised by NPB, interactions with NPB and NPS;
- Meeting with inmate;.
- Meeting with colleagues locally re provision of service;
- Giving professional talks, interviews, and meeting with professional organizations.

APPENDIX D

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 2

Principal Activities

- R.E.M.C. meetings;
- Inmate Committee/interview meetings;
- Staff assemblies/interviews;
- Senior institutional management meetings/interviews;
- Various monthly meetings:
    - i. Union of Solicitor General Employees,
    - ii. Citizens Advisory Committee,
    - iii. Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police/Federal Correctional Service,
    - iv. Police/Corrections Museum Committee,
    - v. Crime Prevention Committee,
    - vi. North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents,
    - vii. Chamber of Commerce;
- External reports:
    - i. RHQ,
    - ii. NHQ,
    - iii. Correctional Investigator,
    - iv. Research project/questionnaires,
    - v. Accreditation;
- Internal Reports
    - various boards,
    - grievances,
    - staff complaints;
- Institutional inspections;
- Public relations;
- Special handling unit construction.

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 3

Principal Activities

- Reviewing the mail - directing mail;
- Replying to various correspondence;
- Reading various draft CD's and DI's, and coordinating replies;
- Meetings with inmates, staff, divisional heads, U.S.G.E., C.A.C., etc;
- Individual interviews with staff, inmates re claims, grievances, etc;
- Disciplinary interviews with staff and inmates;
- Attending special ceremonies - graduations, wardens' installation, etc;
- Attending RHQ, monthly Management Meetings;
- Attending various inmate activities;
- Responding to RHQ
    - Operational Assistance Reviews,
    - Management Audits,
    - Financial Audits,
    - Inspector General's inquiries,
    - Ministerial inquiries, etc;
- Approving T.A.'s and commenting on transfers;
- Reviewing minutes of various staff meetings;
- Reviewing all accident reports;
- Reviewing all performance appraisals;
- Completing performance appraisals;
- Reviewing weekly inmate disciplinary court proceedings and segregation review boards.

APPENDIX D

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 3
(Continued)

Principal Activities

- Regular inspections of the institution and grounds;
- Conduct Institutional Management Meetings bi-monthly;
- Meeting special guests and arranging and providing tours;
- Screening various media requests and conducting media interviews;
- Reviewing budget, cash forecast and overtime figures;
- Interviewing staff for various reasons.

APPENDIX D

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 4

Principal Activities

1. My normal work week is approximately 60 hours.

2. At the very most, 20 per cent of my normal work (12 hours) is available as discretionary time.

3. I list first all of the mandatory meetings which I must attend:

    - Regional Executive Management Committee (monthly);
    - Regional Senior Personnel Committee (monthly);
    - Institutional Management Meeting (monthly);
    - Operations Meeting (weekly);
    - Labour/Management Consultation (monthly);
    - Living Unit Supervisors Meeting (monthly);
    - Inmate Committee Meeting (monthly);
    - Citizens Advisory Committee Meeting (monthly);
    - Staff Assemblies (bi-monthly);
    - Divisional Meetings (quarterly);
    - Facilities Planning Committee (quarterly);
    - Personnel Review Committee (quarterly);
    - Community College Committee (monthly);
    - Administrator's Conference (two weeks annually);
    - Performance Appraisal Review Committee (quarterly).

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 4
(Continued)

Principal Activities

I will now list activities which are not in the mandatory category but which are essential:

- Meeting with individual staff members;
- Meeting with individual inmates;
- Meeting with media representatives;
- Participating in selection boards (to date in 1984 this has consumed two full weeks);
- Hearing inmate complaints and grievances;
- Hearing staff grievances;
- Interviewing staff for disciplinary cases;
- Completing performance appraisals on 10 individuals;
- Reviewing the performance appraisals - in excess of 44 reviews;
- Reviewing draft directives and preparing comments on them;
- Signing financial approvals;
- Reviewing the keepers daily report, signing it off and approving overtime lists;
- Approving custom work orders;
- Inspecting all areas of the institution (this function is mandatory);
- Attending inmate social development activities;

EXAMPLES OF PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES THAT CONSUME WARDENS' TIME

EXAMPLE 4
(Continued)

Principal Activities

- Speaking at community functions, organizations, etc.;
- Approving family related leave and other leave for both management staff and other employees;
- Responding to inquiries from the Correctional Investigator and from the Inmate Affairs Branch;
- Reviewing and approving or denying applications for temporary absences;
- "Fire fighting" - In an institutional environment there are almost always situations which might be termed mini-emergencies. Because of the nature of the organization and control at a prison, the Warden is involved in most if not all of these. He is obliged to review, within 24 hours, every case where an inmate is placed in segregation. There are also subsequent reviews at different times if the inmate remains in segregation. To be effective and to be seen to be effective in terms of dealing with inmates and staff who may have problems, the Warden has to be available to them for interviews and discussions.

Although I have listed the mandatory meetings that I attend, it is not just the meetings that consume time, it is the preparation for them. Most of the meetings require a considerable amount of time to research the topics which will be discussed, gather additional information in order to be well enough informed to reach decisions at the meetings, etc., etc.

APPENDIX D

EXEMPLES DES PRINCIPALES ACTIVITÉS AUXQUELLES LES DIRECTEURS S'ENGAGENT

5e EXEMPLE

Activités principales

- Comité exécutif de gestion;
- Réunion avec les différents directeurs adjoints pour discuter de politiques, de planification ou d'opérations de routine institutionnelle, qui posent des problèmes urgents;
- Rencontre avec le D.A. Socialisation, le Chef des unités résidentielles sur les rapports soumis la veille;
- Rencontre avec l'agent principal de service pour discuter des événements qui peuvent s'être passés en-dehors des heures normales de travail;
- Visites de l'établissement avec un directeur adjoint et rapport;
- Rendez-vous à la région pour rencontrer les administrateurs régionaux ou le sous-commissaire;
- Courrier, dictée, correspondance, signatures;
- Étude d'absences temporaires avec ou sans escorte et signature;
- Réunion avec les commissaires de la C.N.L.C.;
- Réunion avec le comité des résidents;
- Réunion avec le directeur du S.N.L.C.;
- Lectures de communiqués, de directives, d'ébauches de directives et d'instructions à mes adjoints, lecture de documents divers;
- Préparation de rapports à l'intention de l'administration régionale.

APPENDIX D

EXEMPLES DES PRINCIPALES ACTIVITÉS AUXQUELLES LES DIRECTEURS S'ENGAGENT

6e EXEMPLE

Activités principales

- Lecture du courrier quotidien venant de l'extérieur de l'établissement.
- Lecture de rapports de contrôle interne divers: rapports de l'agent principal, rapport journalier des CX-COF-06's, rapports journaliers des AUR's, rapports de l'Agent de sécurité préventive, rapports des directeurs-adjoints.
- Lecture et signature de formulaires divers: mandats de transferts (environ 50 par semaine), temps supplémentaire, demandes de congé, bordereaux de commande, transfert d'argent de détenus, demandes de personnel, prolongations de positions intérimaires, absences temporaires, placement de détenus en ségrégation, dépenses de voyage.
- Rédaction et dictée à la secrétaire de réponses à des notes de service du Sous-Commissaire Régional et à ses assistants.
- Rencontre informelle et discussion avec mes adjoints concernant des problèmes opérationnels divers demandant une solution rapide.
- Réunions diverses: comité institutionnel de gestion, comité régional de gestion, réunion patronale-syndicale, comité avec les représentants des détenus, réunion avec les CX-COF-06's, réunion avec les SUR's.
- Visites de l'établissement et surtout des pavillons cellulaires comprenant l'inspection des locaux, discussion avec le personnel et les détenus.
- Planification de l'ouverture de l'Unité Spéciale de Détention comprenant analyse des programmes proposés par les directeurs-adjoints, étude des différents processus opérationnels allant de la sécurité aux services et la maintenance, visite du site de construction afin de détecter les faiblesses tant sécuritaires que fonctionnelles.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SPECIAL HANDLING UNIT PROGRAM FROM THE REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON MURDERS AND ASSAULTS IN THE ONTARIO REGION

Recommendation 19:

A concerted effort must be made to provide opportunities, meaningful activities, programs and "therapy" for "particularly dangerous inmates". (p.112)

Recommendation 20:

Where there is concern that SHU security is not necessary for a particular inmate, presently confined in the SHU, his case should be reviewed immediately with a view to returning him to a regular inmate population. (p.113)

Recommendation 21:

The "two-year minimum" should be removed in order to provide hope and incentive for inmates. (p.113)

Recommendation 22:

Inmates should have the opportunity and incentive to progress through clearly distinct phases toward their eventual release to a regular population. (p.113)

Recommendation 23:

Meaningful staff-inmate communication must be an integral part of the SHU program and phases. (p.114)

Recommendation 24:

An associate warden is required. His/her sole responsibility should be the management of the special handling unit. (p.114)

Recommendation 25:

We support CSC's current efforts to develop an SHU staff training program and emphasize that "interpersonal relations" must be an integral part of this training. (p.114)

Recommendation 26:

In order to facilitate communication between staff and inmates, staff members should be assigned to a small group of inmates for purposes of enhancing communication, to ensure consistency in the application of rules, and for evaluation. (p.114)

Recommendation 27:

One staff person (non-security) should be designated the "inmate liaison officer" whose responsibility should include frequent communication with "inmate range representatives". (p.115)

Correctional Service Canada   Service correctionnel Canada

COMMISSIONER'S DIRECTIVE
DIRECTIVE DU COMMISSAIRE

DOCUMENT No. - N° DU DOCUMENT			
SERIES SÉRIE	SECTION	CHAPTER CHAPITRE	PAGE 1
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TITLE - TITRE

IMPLEMENTATION OF POST CRISIS MEASURES

MISE EN OEUVRE DE MESURES SUIVANT LE RÈGLEMENT D'UNE SITUATION D'URGENCE

AUTHORITY

1. Authority to issue:
   Penitentiary Act, subsection 29.(3).

2. Authority for content:
   Penitentiary Act, sutsection 29.(3).

REVOCATION

3. Nil.

PURPOSE

4. To establish policy for the provision of plans and procedures to be implemented by the Service at the conclusion of an emergency situation.

DEFINITION

5. "Emergency Situation" means major disturbances, unlawful assemblies, riots, hostage incidents, work stoppages, hunger strikes, demonstrations, escapes, armed or unarmed intrusions at institutions, and mass inmate disobedience or failure to lock up.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITY

6. The Service shall establish plans and procedures which may be implemented,

AUTORISATION

1. Autorisation - Publication:
   Loi sur les pénitenciers, paragraphe 29.(3).

2. Autorisation - Teneur:
   Loi sur les pénitenciers, paragraphe 29.(3).

ABROGATION

3. Néant.

OBJET

4. Énoncer la politique concernant les plans et procédures que le Service doit mettre en oeuvre lorsqu'une situation d'urgence prend fin.

DÉFINITION

5. "Situation d'urgence" désigne les troubles importants, les attroupements illégaux, les émeutes, les prises d'otages, les arrêts de travail, les grèves de la faim, les manifestations, les évasions, les intrusions armées ou non armées dans les établissements et la désobéissance collective des détenus ou le refus de ceux-ci de réintégrer leurs cellules.

RÔLES ET ATTRIBUTIONS

6. Le Service doit établir des plans et des procédures qui peuvent être mis

RESPONSIBILITY CENTRE - CENTRE DE RESPONSABILITÉ		SPONSORING AUTHORITY - RÉPONDANT	EFFECTIVE DATE DATE D'ENTRÉE EN VIGUEUR
100	NAME - NOM National Headquarters Administration centrale	Security Sécurité	1984-04-30

following resolution of an emergency situation, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly return to normalcy.

7. The Assistant Commissioner, Security shall issue instructions and guidelines for the development of these plans and procedures.

CONCLUSION OF AN INCIDENT

8. Upon resolution of the incident, further vital administrative and legal action shall be initiated. Successful handling of the post-crisis phase is critical to the restoration of normal institutional operations and Directors shall ensure that plans for dealing with post-crisis situations are reflected in institutional contingency plans.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTINGENCY PLANS

9. This plan shall establish the steps to be taken after an incident, as follows:

Surveillance

a. Close surveillance shall be provided following serious incidents, as specified in the pertinent divisional instruction;

Security of Records

b. The security of documents, logs, records, and magnetic tapes that record the activities of the institution before, during and after the incident shall be ensured;

en oeuvre après une situation d'urgence, afin d'assurer une transition à une situation normale de manière disciplinée et calme.

7. Le commissaire adjoint à la Sécurité doit diffuser des instructions et des lignes directrices concernant l'élaboration de ces plans et procédures.

FIN D'UN INCIDENT

8. Lorsqu'un incident prend fin, il faut immédiatement prendre d'autres mesures administratives et juridiques essentielles. Il est primordial de maîtriser la situation suivant un incident pour que les opérations de l'établissement reviennent à la normale, et les directeurs doivent s'assurer que les plans visant à régler des situations suivant un incident sont compris dans les plans d'urgence de l'établissement.

PLANS D'URGENCE DE L'ÉTABLISSEMENT

9. Ce plan doit faire état des mesures à prendre à la suite d'un incident, de la façon suivante:

Surveillance

a. Il faut assurer une surveillance étroite à la suite d'un incident grave, comme le précise l'instruction divisionnaire pertinente;

Sécurité des documents

b. Il faut veiller à la sécurité des documents, des registres, des dossiers ainsi que des rubans magnétiques servant à l'enregistrement des activités de l'établissement, avant, pendant et après l'incident;

Staff Briefing and Counseling

c. Staff needs shall be met. This shall include a staff briefing to ensure all personnel are fully aware of the outcome of the crisis and the action management will be taking as a result. As well, special counseling shall be provided for those staff who may have been affected by a serious incident;

Inmate Access to Doctors, Chaplains and Legal Counsel

d. Upon request, an inmate shall be provided with unrestricted access to medical doctors, chaplains, and legal counsel. Access shall be refused only when it could constitute a threat to the safety of any person. Should it be deemed necessary to refuse access, the Deputy Commissioner of the region shall be consulted before the decision is made;

Media Access to the Institution

e. The media shall be allowed access to the institution, unless there are security concerns;

Recourse to Grievance Procedures

f. Recourse to grievance procedures shall be provided;

Exposé de la situation et consultation à l'intention du personnel

c. Il faut voir aux besoins du personnel. Cela doit comprendre un exposé de la situation donné à tous les employés afin de s'assurer qu'ils sont bien au courant du résultat de l'incident et des mesures que la direction prendra à cet égard. En outre, il faut offrir des services de consultation spéciaux aux employés qui ont été touchés par un incident grave;

Services de médecins, d'aumôniers et de conseillers juridiques mis à la disposition des détenus

d. Un détenu doit pouvoir consulter, sur demande et sans aucune restriction, un médecin, un aumônier ou un conseiller juridique. Une telle consultation ne doit lui être refusée que si elle pourrait constituer une menace à qui que ce soit. Si l'on juge nécessaire de refuser un tel service, il faut consulter le sous-commissaire de la région avant de prendre une décision;

Admission des médias à l'établissement

e. Les médias doivent être admis à l'établissement à moins que cela nuise à la sécurité;

Recours à la procédure de grief

f. Il faut permettre le recours à la procédure de grief;

Physical Examination of Inmates

g. The institutional physician or Health Care Centre staff shall conduct a physical examination of all inmates of the section(s) involved in the incident. Furthermore, the institutional physician shall make periodic visits to all areas of the institution to verify the physical well-being of inmates; and

Availability of a Chaplain

h. A chaplain shall be available at the institution at all times to respond to the needs of both staff and inmates. The chaplain shall also make periodic visits to all areas of the institution to verify the well-being of staff and inmates.

REFERENCE

10. Nil.

Commissioner,

Examen physique des détenus

g. Le médecin de l'établissement ou les employés du centre de santé doivent procéder à un examen physique de tous les détenus du ou des secteurs en cause dans l'incident. De plus, le médecin de l'établissement doit faire des visites périodiques dans tous les secteurs de l'établissement, afin de voir au bien-être des détenus; et

Disponibilité de l'aumônier

h. Un aumônier doit être à l'établissement en tout temps, afin de répondre aux besoins du personnel et des détenus. Il doit également faire des visites périodiques dans tous les secteurs de l'établissement, afin de voir au bien-être du personnel et des détenus.

RÉFÉRENCE

10. Néant.

Le Commissaire,

D.R. Yeomans

Correctional Service Canada Service correctionnel Canada

DIVISIONAL INSTRUCTION
INSTRUCTION DIVISIONNAIRE

DOCUMENT No. - N° DU DOCUMENT			
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TITLE - TITRE

SPECIAL MEASURES FOLLOWING SERIOUS INCIDENTS

MESURES SPÉCIALES À PRENDRE À LA SUITE D'UN INCIDENT GRAVE

AUTHORITY

1. Authority to issue:
   Penitentiary Service Regulations, section 7.

2. Authority for content:
   Penitentiary Service Regulations, subsection 5.(1) and section 8.

REVOCATION

3. Nil.

PURPOSE

4. To ensure procedures are developed to implement special measures following serious incidents in institutions.

DEFINITIONS

5. "Special measures" means additional assistance given to institutional management and staff, including special surveillance of designated areas of an institution either following serious incidents or in other circumstances where the Director decides it is warranted.

6. "Serious incident" means any occurrence in an institution that results in death or serious injury to staff by acts of violence.

AUTORISATION

1. Autorisation - Publication:
   Règlement sur le service des pénitenciers, article 7.

2. Autorisation - Teneur:
   Règlement sur le service des pénitenciers, paragraphe 5.(1) et article 8.

ABROGATION

3. Néant.

OBJET

4. Voir à l'élaboration de mesures spéciales devant être mises en oeuvre à la suite d'un incident grave dans un établissement.

DÉFINITIONS

5. "Mesures spéciales" désigne tout appui supplémentaire donné à la direction et au personnel de l'établissement, y compris la surveillance spéciale d'un secteur désigné, à la suite d'un incident grave ou de toute autre circonstance lorsque le directeur le juge à-propos.

6. "Incident grave" désigne tout événement qui survient dans un établissement où, à la suite d'actes de violence, des membres du personnel sont gravement blessés ou tués.

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7. "Designated area" means dissociation, segregation and living units, cell blocks, or any other area of the institution which the Director has designated for special surveillance following a serious incident.

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY - REGIONAL PLANS

8. The Deputy Commissioner of the region shall ensure that a post-incident plan is developed which will permit the rapid mobilization of resources within the region to provide assistance to an institution following a serious incident. The plan shall include the following:

   a. provision for the establishment of special observer teams, composed of Citizens' Advisory Committee members and other members of the community who have credibility for the purpose of monitoring designated areas of the institution;

   b. provision for the establishment of post-emergency recovery teams, composed of staff within the region who have expertise in the major operational areas such as security, case management, food services and health care services. The role of these teams shall be to lend support to institutional staff to ensure that essential services are restored to the institution as efficiently as possible. In those regions where the development of a regionalized observer team is

7. "Secteur désigné" désigne les aires d'isolement et de ségrégation, les unités résidentielles, les pavillons cellulaires et tout autre secteur de l'établissement qui, selon le directeur, doit faire l'objet d'une surveillance spéciale à la suite d'un incident grave.

RÔLE ET ATTRIBUTIONS - PLANS D'ACTION RÉGIONAUX

8. Le sous-commissaire de la région doit voir à l'élaboration d'un plan d'action devant être mis en oeuvre à la suite d'un incident grave, afin de permettre la mobilisation rapide des ressources de la région en vue de fournir de l'aide à l'établissement en cause à la suite d'un incident grave. Ce plan d'action doit comprendre les éléments suivants:

   a. la mise sur pied d'équipes spéciales d'observateurs composées de membres du Comité aviseur de citoyens et de représentants de la collectivité qui jouissent de confiance, dans le but d'observer le déroulement des activités dans les secteurs désignés de l'établissement;

   b. la formation d'équipes de support à la suite d'une urgence, composées d'employés de la région qui ont une connaissance technique des grands secteurs opérationnels, comme la sécurité, la gestion de cas, les services d'alimentation et de santé. Ces équipes doivent avoir pour rôle d'offrir leur appui au personnel de l'établissement et de voir à ce que les services essentiels soient rétablis de la façon la plus efficace possible. Dans les régions où il n'est pas approprié not appropriate for a given institution, the Deputy Commissioner shall ensure that the Director develops such a team from resources within his locale;

c. provision for prompt repairs to any material damage; and

d. the provision of assistance to the institution in dealing with the trauma experienced by staff, both individually and collectively, in accordance with Service policy on special assistance to employees following acts of violence.

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY - INSTITUTIONAL PLAN

9. The Director shall prepare, as part of the institutional contingency plan, a post-incident plan containing special measures to be implemented after resolution of a serious incident.

SPECIAL MEASURES

10. The post-incident plan shall contain provision for the following special measures:

a. a relocation, if deemed necessary, of staff directly involved in the incident;

b. segregation, and if deemed necessary, the transfer of the principal inmates involved in the incident. Transfers should not take place prior to consultation with the police involved;

de former une équipe régionale d'observateurs, le sous-commissaire doit s'assurer que le directeur se chargera d'en former une avec les resources à sa disposition;

c. les mesures à prendre en vue de la réparation rapide de tous les dommages matériels; et

d. l'aide devant être apportée en vue de traiter, individuellement ou collectivement, les employés souffrant de traumatisme, conformément à la politique du Service portant sur l'aide aux employés victimes d'actes de violence.

RÔLE ET ATTRIBUTIONS - PLAN D'ACTION DE L'ÉTABLISSEMENT

9. Le directeur doit préparer un plan faisant partie du plan des mesures d'urgence de l'établissement et comprenant des mesures spéciales qui seront mises en application immédiatement après le règlement d'un incident grave.

MESURES SPÉCIALES

10. Le plan d'action doit prévoir les mesures spéciales suivantes:

a. le déplacement si nécessaire, du personnel directement touché par l'incident;

b. la ségrégation et, si nécessaire, le transfert des principaux détenus à l'origine de l'incident. Cependant, le transfert ne devrait s'effectuer qu'après consultation avec les agents de police concernés;

c. continuance of normal duties by other institutional staff;

d. increase in staff in designated areas, as determined by the Director;

e. monitoring of designated areas by temporarily assigned support staff from other facilities within the region; the members of this support staff have no line authority. Their role shall be to assist staff in the performance of their duties;

f. use of video tape recorders to record any contact between staff and inmates, movement of inmates or cell searches which may be sensitive;

g. the attendance of an Assistant Director during each shift, to brief incoming staff and to visit designated areas frequently throughout the shift;

h. briefing by the Director or an officer so designated of all temporarily assigned staff from outside the institution;

i. briefing by the Director to notify all institutional staff of the special measures of the post-incident plan, and the reasons for the presence of outside staff;

c. la poursuite des fonctions normales assumées par les autres membres du personnel de l'établissement;

d. l'augmentation du personnel dans les secteurs désignés tel que déterminés par le directeur;

e. le contrôle des secteurs désignés par un personnel de soutien détaché temporairement d'autres installations de la région; ce personnel de soutien ne doit avoir aucun pouvoir hiérarchique. Il lui incombe d'aider le personnel en place dans l'accomplissement de ses fonctions;

f. le recours à un magnétoscope pour enregistrer toutes les communications entre les membres du personnel et les détenus et, aux points névralgiques, leurs déplacements ainsi que les fouilles des cellules;

g. la présence d'un directeur adjoint au cours de chaque quart de travail, qui sera chargé d'exposer la situation au personnel de relève et de faire des visites fréquentes des secteurs désignés;

h. un exposé de la part du directeur ou d'un agent désigné aux membres du personnel de l'extérieur temporairement affectés à l'établissement;

i. un exposé du directeur au personnel de l'établissement, sur les mesures spéciales prévues par le plan d'action à la suite d'un incident et sur les raisons justifiant la présence de personnel de l'extérieur;

j. special emphasis on pre-shift briefings of staff assigned to designated areas;

k. submission to the Director, following each shift, of a report written by outside observers on the operation of designated areas; and

l. submission of a written report to the officer in charge of the designated area following each shift.

11. The Director shall ensure that the psychological needs of staff members affected by the serious incident are given due consideration and assistance as required.

REFERENCE

12. Nil.

Assistant Commissioner,
Security

j. avant le début de la relève, un accent spécial sur les exposés (briefing) au personnel affecté aux secteurs désignés;

k. après chaque quart de travail, la présentation au directeur d'un rapport rédigé par des observateurs de l'extérieur et portant sur le fonctionnement des secteurs désignés; et

l. la présentation d'un rapport écrit par l'agent responsable du secteur désigné après chaque quart de travail.

11. Le directeur doit s'assurer que l'on répond de façon adéquate aux besoins psychologiques des membres du personnel affectés par un trouble grave.

RÉFÉRENCE

12. Néant.

Le Commissaire adjoint,
Sécurité

H.P. Vignola

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO SUBMITTED BRIEFS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Amnesty International, England
Canadian Association for Adult Education
Canadian Criminal Justice Association
Canadian Psychological Association
Citizens' Advisory Committee, Dorchester Institution
Clark, Mr. Donald
Church Council on Justice and Corrections
Dangerous Offender Consultation Committee
Elizabeth Fry Society of British Columbia
Inmate Committee, Elbow Lake Institution
Inmate Committee, Warkworth Institution
John Howard Society of British Columbia
John Howard Society of Canada
John Howard Society of Ontario
Major Accomplishments, Current and Foreseen Initiatives, Correctional Service Canada Branch Heads, August, 1984
Native Brotherhood Group, Edmonton Institution
Native Counselling Services of Alberta
Office des Droits des Detenu(e)s
Patterson, Dr. Morton
Prisoners' Rights Group
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada
St. Leonard's Society of Canada
Task Force on Early Retirement, Early Retirement of Correctional Staff and Related Issues
Union of Solicitor General Employees, Public Service Alliance of Canada

CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA INSTITUTIONS VISITED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Archambault
Centre de Formation - Laval
Centre Regional de Reception - Quebec
Collins Bay
Cowansville
Dorchester
Drumheller
Drummondville
Elbow Lake
Edmonton
Frontenac
Kent
Kingston
La Macaza
Laval
Leclerc
Matsqui
Millhaven
Mission
Pittsburgh
Prison for Women - Kingston
Regional Psychiatric Centre - Saskatoon
Regional Treatment Centre - Kingston
Saskatchewan
Springhill
Stony Mountain
Warkworth
Westmorland

OTHER FACILITIES VISITED

Canada

Correctional Service Canada

Regional Headquarters, Moncton, New Brunswick
Laval, Quebec
Kingston, Ontario
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Abbotsford, British Columbia

Parole Service Offices, Moncton, New Brunswick
Duvernay, Laval
Abbotsford, British Columbia

National Staff College, Kingston Campus
Laval Campus
Mission Campus

National Parole Board, Regional Office, Moncton, New Brunswick
Regional Office, Montreal, Quebec
Regional Office, Kingston, Ontario
Regional Office, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Regional Office, Vancouver, British Columbia

United States

American Correctional Association Office, College Park, Maryland
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, Rockville, Maryland
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.
National Institute of Corrections, Washington, D.C.

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE

Agle, N.
Alexander, L.
Allard, G.
Alward, V.H.
Anderson, B.
Anderson, T.
Appleyard, K.
Arbuckle, R.
Arcesi, M.
Archibald, G.
Arrow, W.
Asch, M.
Atkinson, J.
Atkinson, J.T.N.
Auby, D.
Auger, R.
Augert, D.
Aussant, J.
Babcalis, S.J.
Baillargeon, A.
Bakehead, K.
Baker, J.E.
Bamford, S.
Barker, R.
Barron, P.
Barten, M.
Bartlett, J.
Batchelor, R.V.
Beattie, C.
Beatty, D.
Beauchaine, M.
Beaudet, J.G.
Beaudry, A.
Beaudry, P.A.
Beeman, P.
Belanger, A.
Bélanger, G.
Bélisle, H.
Bélisle, L.
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